



NHSMUN

HISTORICAL CRISIS

BACKGROUND GUIDE

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Delegate Experience
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Global Partnerships
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Anshul Magal
Analucia Tello
Sofia Velasco
Renata Venzor

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to Historical Crisis! My name is Lizzie Chen and I am thrilled to be your Session I Director!

I'm a junior at the University at Buffalo majoring in neuroscience on the pre-med track, GO BULLS WOO!! I know how this totally doesn't align with MUN at all, but researching as a whole has been my passion. Outside of school, I love to spend time with my friends, try new restaurants, cafe hop, rewatch *BoJack Horseman*, and most importantly, cook!

I'm from Brooklyn, NY, and have been part of MUN since high school. More specifically, I started my own MUN club during my sophomore year of high school. I was the president and head delegate until my senior year, and although very stressful, it was an unforgettable time. I had the opportunity to attend NHSMUN 2022, and I represented North Korea for SOCHUM. Connecting with people worldwide and gaining a deeper understanding of global affairs was incredible. It was a memorable experience, and I hope you get to go through it too!

Throughout the committee sessions, you will think critically, collaborate with your fellow cabinet members, and make decisions that could alter the course of history. We will tackle the challenges Mossadegh's cabinet faced, and your input will shape how these events could have unfolded. This committee is not just about understanding history but about reimagining it! I look forward to seeing how committee will unfold, reflecting on all the time and effort you have put up till the conference. Feel free to reach out with any questions or concerns and I cannot wait to see you all!

Best,

Lizzie Chen

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Director of Historical Crisis

Session I



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Hello Delegates!

Welcome to Historical Crisis: Cabinet of the Imperial State of Iran at NHSMUN 51! I am incredibly excited to have the privilege of being your Session II Director for this conference.

I am a sophomore at Emory University majoring in Business Management and Political Science. I picked up MUN back in high school and attended NHSMUN as a delegate three times, so this is technically my fifth time at the Hilton! I compete on Emory's travel team and also help organize our college and high school conferences. Outside of MUN, I am an analyst for a nonprofit consulting firm on campus, help organize the TEDx conference at Emory, and work as a lobbyist for the Armenian National Committee of America. Boring stuff aside, I also love listening to music, especially The Strokes and TV Girl, watching analog horror on YouTube, and surviving my schedule with energy drinks.

As delegates in this committee, you will be tasked with control over Iran during one of its most pivotal moments in history. Before Mossadegh Iran has been through 13 Prime Ministers, and several regime changes with various amounts of authoritarianism, all only in the past decade. Extremist political parties gain more and more political power each day, and instability is at an all-time high. Aside from issues domestically, Iran has the first opportunity in centuries to assert itself as an independent power within the Middle East, free from foreign influence. This topic has a personal connection to me and my family, as despite my direct family being immigrants from Armenia, my grandfather was one of the founders of Iran's communist party highlighted later in this background guide. Through substantive debate and directive writing you as delegates will shape a path for Iran not only for the rest of the 20th century, but also beyond.

One of my favorite aspects of historical crisis committees, and the reason I mainly staff and compete in them, is the delegate's ability to influence world events and create a new path for others in their committee. With the impact of each delegate's position within Mossadegh's Cabinet and the fast-paced nature of the committee, I cannot wait to see how we deviate from real-life events. I highly encourage and always love to see when delegates work with others, as it makes your experience a lot more fun and can give you an edge both in the front room and back room! I cannot wait to see you all in March, but please feel free to contact me about anything!

Best,

Armen Bagdassarian

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Director of Historical Crisis

Session II



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A Note on the NHSMUN Difference

Esteemed Faculty and Delegates,

Welcome to NHSMUN 2025! We are Terry Wang and Jordan Baker, and we are this year's Secretary-General and Director-General. Thank you for choosing to attend NHSMUN, the world's largest and most diverse Model United Nations conference for secondary school students. We are thrilled to welcome you to New York City in March.

As a space for collaboration, consensus, and compromise, NHSMUN strives to transform today's brightest thinkers, speakers, and collaborators into tomorrow's leaders. Our organization provides a uniquely tailored experience for all through innovative and accessible programming. We believe that an emphasis on education through simulation is paramount to the Model UN experience, and this idea permeates throughout numerous aspects of the conference:

Realism and accuracy: Although a perfect simulation of the UN is never possible, we believe that one of the core educational responsibilities of MUN conferences is to educate students about how the UN System works. Each NHSMUN committee is a simulation of a real deliberative body so that delegates can research what their country has said in the committee. Our topics are chosen from the issues currently on the agenda of that committee (except historical committees, which take topics from the appropriate time period). We also strive to invite real UN, NGO, and field experts into each committee through our committee speakers program. Moreover, we arrange meetings between students and the actual UN Permanent Mission of the country they are representing. Our delegates have the incredible opportunity to conduct first-hand research, asking thought-provoking questions to current UN representatives and experts in their respective fields of study. These exclusive resources are only available due to IMUNA's formal association with the United Nations Department of Global Communications and consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. No other conference goes so far to deeply immerse students into the UN System.

Educational emphasis, even for awards: At the heart of NHSMUN lies education and compromise. Part of what makes NHSMUN so special is its diverse delegate base. As such, when NHSMUN distributes awards, we strongly de-emphasize their importance in comparison to the educational value of Model UN as an activity. NHSMUN seeks to reward students who excel in the arts of compromise and diplomacy. More importantly, we seek to develop an environment in which delegates can employ their critical thought processes and share ideas with their counterparts from around the world. Given our delegates' plurality of perspectives and experiences, we center our programming around the values of diplomacy and teamwork. In particular, our daises look for and promote constructive leadership that strives towards consensus, as real ambassadors do in the United Nations.

Debate founded on strong knowledge and accessibility: With knowledgeable staff members and delegates from over 70 countries, NHSMUN can facilitate an enriching experience reliant on substantively rigorous debate. To ensure this high quality of debate, our staff members produce detailed, accessible, and comprehensive topic guides (like the one below) to prepare delegates for the nuances inherent in each global issue. This process takes over six months, during which the Directors who lead our committees develop their topics with the valuable input of expert contributors. Because these topics are always changing and evolving, NHSMUN also produces update papers intended to bridge the gap of time between when the background guides are published and when committee starts in March. As such, this guide is designed to be a launching point from which delegates should delve further into their topics. The detailed knowledge that our Directors provide in this background guide through diligent research aims to increase critical thinking within delegates at NHSMUN.

Extremely engaged staff: At NHSMUN, our staffers care deeply about delegates' experiences and what they take away from their time at NHSMUN. Before the conference, our Directors and Assistant Directors are trained rigorously through hours of workshops and exercises both virtual and in-person to provide the best conference experience possible. At the conference,

delegates will have the opportunity to meet their dais members prior to the first committee session, where they may engage one-on-one to discuss their committees and topics. Our Directors and Assistant Directors are trained and empowered to be experts on their topics and they are always available to rapidly answer any questions delegates may have prior to the conference. Our Directors and Assistant Directors read every position paper submitted to NHSMUN and provide thoughtful comments on those submitted by the feedback deadline. Our staff aims not only to tailor the committee experience to delegates' reflections and research but also to facilitate an environment where all delegates' thoughts can be heard.

Empowering participation: The UN relies on the voices of all of its member states to create resolutions most likely to make a meaningful impact on the world. That is our philosophy at NHSMUN too. We believe that to properly delve into an issue and produce fruitful debate, it is crucial to focus the entire energy and attention of the room on the topic at hand. Our Rules of Procedure and our staff focus on making every voice in the committee heard, regardless of each delegate's country assignment or skill level. Additionally, unlike many other conferences, we also emphasize delegate participation after the conference. MUN delegates are well researched and aware of the UN's priorities, and they can serve as the vanguard for action on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Therefore, we are proud to connect students with other action-oriented organizations to encourage further work on the topics.

Focused committee time: We feel strongly that face-to-face interpersonal connections during debate are critical to producing superior committee experiences and allow for the free flow of ideas. Ensuring policies based on equality and inclusion is one way in which NHSMUN guarantees that every delegate has an equal opportunity to succeed in committee. In order to allow communication and collaboration to be maximized during committee, we have a very dedicated administrative team who work throughout the conference to type up, format, and print draft resolutions and working papers.

As always, we welcome any questions or concerns about the substantive program at NHSMUN 2025 and would be happy to discuss NHSMUN pedagogy with faculty or delegates.

Delegates, it is our sincerest hope that your time at NHSMUN will be thought-provoking and stimulating. NHSMUN is an incredible time to learn, grow, and embrace new opportunities. We look forward to seeing you work both as students and global citizens at the conference.

Best,

Terry Wang
Secretary-General

Jordan Baker
Director-General

A Note on Research and Preparation

Delegate research and preparation is a critical element of attending NHSMUN and enjoying the debate experience. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in your committee. We encourage and expect each of you to critically explore the selected topics and be able to identify and analyze their intricacies upon arrival to NHSMUN in March.

The task of preparing for the conference can be challenging, but to assist delegates, we have updated our [Beginner Delegate Guide](#) and [Advanced Delegate Guide](#). In particular, these guides contain more detailed instructions on how to prepare a position paper and excellent sources that delegates can use for research. Use these resources to your advantage. They can help transform a sometimes overwhelming task into what it should be: an engaging, interesting, and rewarding experience.

To accurately represent a country, delegates must be able to articulate its policies. Accordingly, NHSMUN requires each delegation (the one or two delegates representing a country in a committee) to write a position paper for each topic on the committee's agenda. In delegations with two students, we strongly encourage each student to research each topic to ensure that they are prepared to debate no matter which topic is selected first. More information about how to write and format position papers can be found in the NHSMUN Research Guide. To summarize, position papers should be structured into three sections:

I: Topic Background – This section should describe the history of the topic as it would be described by the delegate's country. Delegates do not need to give an exhaustive account of the topic, but rather focus on the details that are most important to the delegation's policy and proposed solutions.

II: Country Policy – This section should discuss the delegation's policy regarding the topic. Each paper should state the policy in plain terms and include the relevant statements, statistics, and research that support the effectiveness of the policy. Comparisons with other global issues are also appropriate here.

III. Proposed Solutions – This section should detail the delegation's proposed solutions to address the topic. Descriptions of each solution should be thorough. Each idea should clearly connect to the specific problem it aims to solve and identify potential obstacles to implementation and how they can be avoided. The solution should be a natural extension of the country's policy.

Each topic's position paper should be **no more than 10 pages** long double-spaced with standard margins and font size. **We recommend 3–5 pages per topic as a suitable length.** The paper must be written from the perspective of your assigned country and should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference.

Each delegation is responsible for sending a copy of its papers to their committee Directors via [myDais](#) on or before **February 21, 2025**. If a delegate wishes to receive detailed feedback from the committee's dais, a position must be submitted on or before **January 31, 2025**. The papers received by this earlier deadline will be reviewed by the dais of each committee and returned prior to your arrival at the conference.

Complete instructions for how to submit position papers will be sent to faculty advisers via email. If delegations are unable to submit their position papers on time, please contact us at info@imuna.org.

Delegations that do not submit position papers will be ineligible for awards.

Committee History

Iran has had a long and rich history as a country. Led by Cyrus the Great, the region was home to the Achaemenid Persian Empire, one of the largest empires in all of history. After being conquered by Arab Muslims, it became a hub of Islamic culture and science. After centuries of European imperialism and internal instability, Iran established the 1906 Constitution which set up a parliament for the Iranian people known as the Majlis to co-govern the state along with the reigning monarch, the Shah.¹ The Majlis is the legislative branch of the Iranian government and makes decisions on approving laws and drafting bills. It also has the important role of appointing the government. This would eventually culminate in the formation of the National Front Party under the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1949 which aspired to bring about massive social and economic change by nationalizing the oil industry, increasing election security, and land reform.²

The 1952 cabinet of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran was characterized by a structure that emphasized national independence and resistance to foreign influence, particularly from Britain and the United States. As Prime Minister, Mossadegh led a coalition of nationalist and leftist forces, including the National Front (his political movement) and parts of the Tudeh Party, a communist organization. The cabinet was a mix of technocrats, reformists, and nationalists, united by the common goal of asserting Iran's sovereignty over its natural resources—especially oil.³ While Mossadegh's government nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1951, it was not without contention as the wide coalition supporting Mossadegh had varying viewpoints on the topic.⁴ For example, many conservative members of the cabinet sought to simply renegotiate terms rather than void the entire contract to avoid repercussions and maintain foreign investment. Therefore, each cabinet member must plan their path toward greatness for Iran. Ideologically, the Mossadegh cabinet was driven by a vision of national sovereignty, democratic reform, and modernization, grounded in a strong sense of Iranian nationalism. Mossadegh, a staunch anti-imperialist, believed that Iran's wealth should be used for the welfare of its people rather than being siphoned off by foreign powers. This stance earned him admiration among many in the Middle East and beyond, but it also made him a target of British and American opposition, who viewed his policies as a threat to Western interests in the region.⁵

The Iranian Cabinet is charged with making the executive decisions of the Iranian government. This notably excludes legislative decision-making, which sits in the hands of the Majlis as the parliament created by the 1906 constitution. Cabinet members must work together to make decisions on what the government of the day will decide to do. Although the cabinet has a strong degree of autonomy to make independent decisions, the 1906 Constitution remains in force, and the support of the Majlis must not be taken for granted. For example, the 1951 nationalization of the AIOC only occurred with a vote in favor of the policy in the Majlis.⁶ However, the 1906 Constitution has been weakened by foreign influence and opposition, and therefore the cabinet must be careful about attempts to undermine their influence, both by the Majlis, foreign powers, and by other cabinet members.

1 Shiva Balaghi, "A Brief History of 20th-Century Iran," Grey Art Museum New York, accessed September 20, 2024, <https://greyartmuseum.nyu.edu/2015/12/a-brief-history-of-20th-century-iran/>.

2 Balaghi, "A Brief History of 20th-Century Iran."

3 Balaghi, "A Brief History of 20th-Century Iran."

4 Reza Ghasimi, "Iran's Oil Nationalization and Mossadegh's Involvement with the World Bank," *Middle East Journal* 65, no. 3 (2011): 442–56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23012174>.

5 Ervand Abrahamian, "The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations," New York: The New Press, 2013.

6 Ghasimi, "Iran's Oil Nationalization and Mossadegh's Involvement with the World Bank."

Simulation

This committee will be operating with some modified procedural aspects because of the unique way that delegates will be able to change the flow of the committee. There will be less of an emphasis on formal debate and, because of the nature of a crisis simulation, the committee will encourage fast and detailed debate. Because delegates represent individuals tied to areas of government as opposed to the countries in general, roles are more specific, while also giving delegates the task of ensuring that their actions are appropriate for both who they represent and the governing body as a whole.

Because this crisis simulation has specific responsibilities and mandates, delegates must be aware that each action taken must follow their representative's unique policy while also falling in line with actions prescribed in the governing body's mandate. If an action is taken outside of its mandate, it will be ruled improper and removed from consideration. The aforementioned responsibilities require different procedural mechanisms; thus, this committee will use heavily modified procedural rules during both the mandate review and crisis management portions of debate. Due to the complex nature of this committee, we encourage delegates to read the following pages thoroughly.

Individual and Committee Mandates

The committee will be called upon to resolve any crises that may take place under the purview of the committee. Delegates should be acutely aware of the actors and interests surrounding the issues, the possible causes, and barriers to solutions.

Delegates must become absolute experts on the background, politics, and past actions of their assigned positions. This exceptional knowledge is needed to prepare for updates that will be presented to delegates at an extremely rapid rate. New crises will emerge throughout committee sessions, and delegates must call upon past actions attempted by the committee as well as the current situation to formulate a response that is in line with their assigned character's policy. If delegates are not aware of their standing on an issue of their own policy platforms, contradictory and unfeasible policies may arise, slowing down committee and halting debate. With informed delegates, the committee will make informed decisions. For a more detailed account of the various roles, their duties, and functions, please refer to the Committee Representatives section of the paper.

Similarly, delegates must be well informed of the powers of the committee and the types of decisions it is empowered to make. Anything outside the mandate of the body will not be accepted. The committee will be tasked with a variety of issues that will encompass many parts of its mandate, and so prioritizing will be key to ensuring that crises are responded to efficiently. Various actors will have access to information or resources which the whole committee does not have access to. As a result, individuals will have to make decisions on whether they want to respond to issues unilaterally, work with other actors, or through the committee as a whole. Delegates will also have their own agendas, and delegates must consider what they can gain for their countries by approaching a situation in a certain way.

Special Parliamentary Procedures

To better control the unique powers of this committee, special rules and procedures will be adopted. Three forms of debate will be used in this crisis simulation: round robin, roundtable, and moderated caucus. When a standard committee ends a caucus with no further motions, debate automatically returns to the speakers list. This is called the "default debate format." In our simulation, once another form of debate is exhausted, such as a moderated or unmoderated caucus, the committee will revert to a non-exhaustible moderated caucus with a speaking time to be decided at the chair's discretion. This will be this committee's new default debate format. The speaking time can be adjusted by the delegates via a motion.

To modify the default debate style, delegates will have a new procedural motion available to them during debate being a “motion to change the default debate style.” The motion will require a simple majority to pass and will not require any speakers for or against. At the start of committee, the chair will accept motions to set the debate style, generally a moderated caucus with speaking time selected by simple majority; however, the dais understands that it may become necessary from time to time for the committee to create a speakers list or enter a round robin of speeches to have each delegate elaborate on their respective policies.

If the committee reaches a portion of debate where delegates feel that a more fluid form of procedure is needed, such as a time elapsing crisis in which delegates will be forced to solve a specific issue in a controlled period, a new form of debate is necessary. Debate during these segments will need to move much faster than the crisis debate before this period to meet the time requirements set by the dais at which the crisis shall be solved. During these situations, the committee can vote for a roundtable discussion. Thus, delegates will openly discuss the crisis at hand without a structured speaking time. This form of debate resembles an unmoderated caucus that is held at the table to help delegates hear all points of view on the present without a time limit. Of course, if delegates find that the crisis requires a lot of writing, an unmoderated caucus can be motioned for as well.

The last form of debate style is called “round robin.” During this form of debate, each delegate will be allotted a time to speak on the topic. Each time this form of debate is used, a different person will start a speech and then move clockwise or counterclockwise from that delegate. If a delegate wishes to not speak on the issue, they can merely say “pass” to the chair, and their speaking time will be absorbed by the dais. In addition, a delegate may also say, “I yield my time to the chair” to skip his/her speech. Note that personal pronouns here are appropriate because delegates are representing individuals, not countries. To move into this style of debate, a delegate may simply request the following: “motion to change the debate style to a round robin.”

Final Products

The document output for the crisis portions will be heavily modified as well. Because of the nature of the updates provided throughout committee, there will be no resolutions used in this committee. Instead, the committee may pass three types of documents: **press releases**, **communiqués**, and **directives**. Press releases and communiqués are similar documents but have quite different uses. Press releases are when the committee or individuals wish to make information of any kind available to the public. On the other hand, communiqués are addressed to particular individuals and will not be released into the public eye. Anyone who can access a newspaper can subsequently access press releases, but only selected recipients can access communiqués. Thus, if a committee member only wants one other member to know of their stance on an issue, a communiqué may be issued to only that one member.

Directives are of an entirely different nature. Standard resolutions take far too long to write and are very ineffective when dealing with constant crisis. Thus, the committee will utilize directives as an alternative to resolutions. Directives exercise the executive power of the committee in any way that it sees fit. For example, delegates of the committee may redirect aid, distribute pamphlets about the issues, or anything that delegates can think of as long as it falls under the mandate of this special session. Directives are only comprised of sponsors and operatives, and all perambulatory clauses that a resolution must have are stripped. Thus, a directive is a less formal resolution, having only the operative needed and sponsors enlisted.


Each of these documents will require a different voting procedure to be passed. Communiqués sent from individuals concerning a representative’s own organization do not need to come before a public vote. Rather, the communiqué is simply handed to chair and immediately passed. Similarly, for directives, if it is within the individual powers of your organization then the committee does not have to pass it for it to go into effect. However, the committee must approve communiqués and directives sent from the governing body. These documents must have three members as sponsors to be considered, and no signatories are needed. After the directive or communiqué is presented to the dais, the dais will formally present it to the committee. At this time, the committee

may either vote immediately on the piece, or the committee may continue to debate the proposal. To enter voting procedure, the committee must approve a motion to vote on the proposals on the floor, and it requires two-thirds to pass. Proposals that pass will immediately go into effect, and proposals that fail will no longer be recognized by the dais and will be returned to one of the sponsors. The document may be altered and reintroduced, but it must go through the voting process once again.

Final Notes and Summary

This committee will be moving extremely quickly, especially during crisis situations. There is no formula to provide the real-time at which a crisis is moving (e.g., 1 crisis minute = 1 simulation hour) since this would make some portions of debate outlandishly quick and others extremely slow. Instead, crisis times and allotted periods for discussion will be under the chair's discretion. All crises will be accompanied by a day, month, and year to keep delegates aware of how the committee is moving. Clearly, this committee is extremely unique and moves at a much different pace than all other committees at NHSMUN. However, if delegates come into committee having read this document and already possessing a rudimentary understanding how this secretariat will function, then the committee shall run smoothly. Delegates will also quickly pick up these concepts as debate moves.

If there are any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the Crisis directors.



HISTORICAL CRISIS

NHSMUN 2025

**TOPIC A:
THE NATIONALIZATION OF IRAN (1952)**

Photo Credit: Unknown

Introduction

In the early 1950s, Iran was at a major turning point. The country faced many challenges, one of which included the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. For context, this company accounted for nearly all of Iran's oil exports, which shows the amount of foreign influence in the region. When Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh rose to power, he made the Iranian oil industry state-owned. He renamed it the National Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh was an influential figure who advocated for constitutionalism. This means that he wanted the government to have a constitution that clearly expressed what the government can and cannot do.¹ This step aimed to remove British control over Iran's economy. However, this nationalization of oil triggered a severe crisis in Iran. Britain and other Western countries blocked ports and imposed economic sanctions on the country, which severely damaged Iran's economy.²

It was evident that many powerful countries had a vested interest in Iran. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union were interested in Iran's location because of its oil-rich lands. Given that this happened during the height of Cold War tensions, Mossadegh found himself in a very difficult environment.

Internally, Iran had many issues as well. Many factions wanted to control the state, namely the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Also, there were conservative religious leaders, called clerics. The clerics were well-versed in Islamic Law, and would often teach it around Iran.³ These leaders wanted Iran to transform into a hyper-conservative, religious state. There were also Iranian communists, called the Tudeh party. Each of these groups was suspicious of Mossadegh, believing him to go against each of their core beliefs. Overall, this fragmentation of society made it very difficult for Mossadegh to unite Iran. For example, one of Mossadegh's big goals was to modernize the economy through social reform. However, there were extremist groups that wanted to turn Iran into an industrial power that would use oil for economic development. Furthermore, other groups wanted to maintain stability, while others wanted the focus to be on promoting human rights. These competing factions left Mossadegh tasked with uniting a scattered country and government. Of course, there was also

the issue of foreign interest and involvement in the region.⁴

As members of Mossadegh's cabinet, you will need to effectively handle these challenges. Some of these include economic issues, social reform, and political stability. They are all complex and long-term issues that have historical implications. Given this, it is important to think on your feet and respond to challenges as they arise. Above all, however, it is important to lay the foundation for an independent Iran. The committee's decisions could alter the course of history. Will the country emerge stronger and more unified? Or will it succumb to internal divisions and external pressures? Iran's future is entirely dependent on your choices.

History and Description of the Issue

The Pahlavi Dynasty's Legacy

In 1925, Reza Shah Pahlavi took power in Iran. This replaced the Qajar dynasty and started the Pahlavi dynasty. This marked a turning point for Iran. Reza Shah wanted to make Iran less religious and more secular. Furthermore, the Shah wanted Iran to be able to compete with major world powers. As a result, he modernized the country.⁵ He built railways, roads, and schools, and reduced the authority of religious figures in

1 Hassan Mohammadi Nejad, "Elite-Counterelite Conflict and the Development of a Revolutionary Movement: The Case of Iranian National Front," www.proquest.com, 1970, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/302536657>.

2 Nejad, "Elite-Counterelite Conflict and the Development of a Revolutionary Movement."

3 Nejad, "Elite-Counterelite Conflict and the Development of a Revolutionary Movement."

4 Nejad, "Elite-Counterelite Conflict and the Development of a Revolutionary Movement."

5 Ariane M. Tabatabai, 'Reza Shah, the Modernizing Strongman', No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran's National Security Strategy (2020; online edn, Oxford Academic, 21 Jan. 2021), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197534601.003.0003>

the state. Eventually, Iran's economy grew.⁶

While modernization saw economic benefits, it received opposition as well, as many of his reforms were seen as controversial.⁷ For example, his attempts to promote secular ideas were hated by some, namely those in religious circles. Many viewed his banning of veils and subsequent promotion of Western clothing as blasphemous. Many conservative religious factions opposed these changes. Given the authoritarian measures through which these changes took place, many felt that the Shah was abusing his power. What resulted was widespread dissatisfaction in the state.⁸ This centralization of power set the stage for future political tensions. Also, it created a divide between the modernizing elite and the traditional sectors of society.

In 1933, the Nazis rose to power and initiated World War II. Similar to other powerful states, the Nazis tried to influence economic affairs in Iran. More specifically, they wanted to weaken the power of the British and French colonial empires, so that the Nazis could control Great Britain's trade routes to British India and the Soviet Union.⁹ The Shah sympathized with Nazi Germany for one big reason, unlike Great Britain or the Soviet Union, Germany never occupied Iran. Therefore, the Shah felt that Nazi Germany and Iran had similar sentiments about other superpowers. The Shah wanted to have Germany as an ally so that Iran could have backing from a powerful military. Another reason was that, around this time, the Shah saw Nazi Germany as a better trading partner than the Soviet Union. The Shah eventually reduced trade with the latter, and by 1941, nearly half of all Iranian imports came from Germany, and 42 percent of Iranian exports went there.¹⁰

At the start of WWII, Reza Shah did not align Iran with anyone. He was scared of Great Britain and the Soviet Union.¹¹ The Shah recognized that neither of these two countries had Iran's best interests in mind, and instead viewed Iran as nothing more than a hotbed for oil trade.¹²

Operation Barbarossa occurred when German troops invaded the Soviet Union and subsequently captured five million Soviet troops.¹³ Immediately after this, British and Soviet troops occupied South and North Iran, respectively. This was done for two reasons. Firstly, the Allies condemned the Shah for not denouncing Germany as the rest of the Allies had. Secondly, the allies, particularly the Soviets, were worried that the Germans would advance their charge even more East, beyond the Caucasus. The Caucasus is the border beyond Eastern Europe and West Asia. Britain and the Soviets did not want any more Soviet losses to occur. Equally as important was that they wanted to protect their supply routes that ran near Iran, specifically through the Trans-Iranian Railroad.

The Trans-Iranian Railroad was a major railway-building project started under the Shah in 1927, and was potentially the most important reason why the British and Russians invaded Iran.¹⁴ Despite all this, the Shah still wanted to remain neutral in the conflict. This clashed with the Allies' intention to use the Trans-Iranian Railway to transport oil to Britain and supplies to the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Therefore, the Allies forcefully invaded Iran and in September 1941, they took over the operation of the Railroad.¹⁶

Along with this forced control of the railroad, the Allied forces occupied Iran in a military invasion, forcing Reza

6 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–4, DOCUMENTS ON IRAN AND IRAQ, 1969–1972, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 180.

7 "Iran During World War II," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Accessed September 18, 2024, <https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Iran-During-World-War-II.pdf>.

8 Stephanie Cronin, "Re-Interpreting Modern Iran: Tribe and State in the Twentieth Century," *Iranian Studies* 42, no. 3 (2009): 357–88, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25597561>.

9 Matthias Kuntzel, "Iranian Antisemitism: Stepchild of German National Socialism," *The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 4, no. 1 (2010), p. 45.

10 Shareen Blair Brysac, "A Very British Coup: How Reza Shah Won and Lost His Throne," *World Policy Journal* 24, no. 2 (2007), p. 102.

11 Hugh Hughes, "Middle East Railways", Harlow: Continental Railway Circle, 1981.

12 Hughes, "Middle East Railways".

13 Hughes, "Middle East Railways".

14 Patrick Clawson, "Knitting Iran Together: The Land Transport Revolution, 1920–1940: *Iranian Studies*," Cambridge Core, January 1, 2022. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/iranian-studies/article/abs/knitting-iran-together-the-land-transport-revolution-19201940/903B46484AECF638669DF1A704318B32>.

15 Clawson, "Knitting Iran Together: The Land Transport Revolution, 1920–1940: *Iranian Studies*."

16 Clawson, "Knitting Iran Together: The Land Transport Revolution, 1920–1940: *Iranian Studies*."

Shah to abdicate. The Allies needed Iran to provide supply routes and war resources, and Reza Shah's relationship with Nazi Germany threatened these resources.¹⁷ Therefore, his forced surrender was needed. After the Shah accepted these concessions, the British sent him into exile.¹⁸ He was first sent to the island of Mauritius. Next, he was sent to Johannesburg, South Africa. He spent the last two years of his life there.¹⁹ His son took his father's position and became the shah. His name was Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.²⁰

Mohammed Reza Shah's main priority was to assert Iran's ability to stand on its own. Internationally, many looked down upon Iran's ability to govern itself because of the country's relationship with the Allies.²¹ Therefore, the Shah wanted to build Iran's image back up so that the country could fight back against Great Britain and retake control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.²² To do this, the country needed to be more united than ever, so the Shah tried solidifying power in various Iranian movements, taking control over all of them to achieve greater unification.²³

Despite the Shah's attempts to gain control over the different factions, communist factions started gaining heavy influence during his rule. One reason this happened was because of the global spread of communist ideology. During this time, Iran's official communist party was created. It was called the Tudeh Party, and they advocated for workers' rights and other social reforms.²⁴ They became very popular among working class and educated people, and this contributed to the era's turmoil.

Many conservative religious groups presented a challenge to the Shah. They opposed the Shah's secular policies and Westernization that the previous and current Shah committed to. Many of these religious groups were worried that these changes went against Iran's Islamic traditions. Under Reza

Shah, religious leaders already lost lots of influence. To these religious leaders, it was apparent that this trend would continue under Mohammad Reza Shah. As a result, they heavily opposed his secular and Western-minded policies.

In general, many different political factions were clashing, which made the Shah's efforts to present a united Iran very difficult. This contributed to external and internal political instability at the time. The Shah's inability to unite Iran made the country appear weaker to the very powers that keep trying to control it, like Great Britain or the Soviet Union.

While the Pahlavi's' push for modernization laid the foundation for nationalizing the oil industry, it also created tensions that Mossadegh had to navigate when he entered office in 1951. Therefore, understanding this legacy adds context to the pressures faced by Mossadegh. Some of those pressures were internal, as seen by Iran's clashing factions. Some of them were external, as seen by Iran's history of foreign involvement.

Knowing the Imperial state's history gives insight into how Mossadegh balanced these pressures within Iran. However, it was this very history that created the tension that Mossadegh had to navigate.

The Rise of the Clerics in Government

One of the most important parts of Iran is religion and how it has been used to shape various governments and social movements. At the forefront of Iran's religious community are religious leaders called the clerics. The clerics are spiritual guides who have religious authority over the rest of Iran. Given that they are well-versed in Islamic Law and are part of the educated class, they are held in high regard and hold massive influence in the state.²⁵ That is, until the Pahlavi

17 David S. Sorensen, "An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics," Routledge & CRC Press, 2013. <https://www.routledge.com/An-Introduction-to-the-Modern-Middle-East-History-Religion-Political-Economy-Politics/Sorensen/p/book/9780429495410>.

18 Sorensen, "An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics."

19 Sorensen, "An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics."

20 Mokhtari, p. 66

21 Juan Romero, "Decolonization in Reverse: The Iranian Oil Crisis of 1951–53," *Middle Eastern Studies* 51, no. 3 (2015): 462–88, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24585900>.

22 Romero, "Decolonization in Reverse: The Iranian Oil Crisis of 1951–53."

23 Romero, "Decolonization in Reverse: The Iranian Oil Crisis of 1951–53."

24 Fred Halliday, "The Tudeh Party in Iranian Politics," *Middle East Report* 86 (March/April 1980).

25 Mansoor Moaddel, "The Shi'i Ulama and the State in Iran," *Theory and Society* 15, no. 4 (1986): 519–56, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/657210>.

dynasty. During this period, the Clerics' influence was greatly diminished.²⁶ The two Shahs enacted various initiatives that made Iran more secular, including the banning of all Islamic veils and turning education systems and judicial systems purely secular. Whereas in the past, Islam would be a central subject in schools, Reza Shah entirely removed this from curriculums. These attempts to make Iran less religious were seen as direct challenges to traditional Islamic values, and on a deeper level, to the cleric's leadership. This promotion of secular ideas continued during Mohammed Reza's reign.²⁷ The result was that the clerics were seeing less and less influence in Iran.

Needless to say, the Shah was criticized heavily by Iran's religious sectors. One figure in particular who led this criticism was Abol-Ghasem Kashani, an Ayatollah during the Shah's reign. An Ayatollah is the title for a high-ranking clergy member in Iran. Kashani was raised in a very religious Muslim family, with his father being a religious figure as well. Educated by clerics, Kashani became a cleric at a young age and soon emerged as a prominent leader. It goes without question that Kashani advocated for religious influence within the government, as well as Islam being a tenant in school curriculums. Given Kashani's passion for the religion, he was enraged by the Shah's rule. Specifically, one point of anger was the Shah's relationship with Western powers. This was seen as opposite to Islamic identity, and one of Kashani's main goals was to remove the influence of all external powers in Iran.²⁸ This was one of the reasons why he found an ally in Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh.²⁹

In 1951, Mossadegh was elected as prime minister of Iran on the platform of nationalization. Winning by a vote of 79-12 in the Parliament of Iran, his party's main focus was to counteract the British control of domestic affairs. These ideas immediately struck a chord with Iran's citizens. Massive rallies were held in Iran's capital, Tehran, supporting this cause. There was no doubt that Mossadegh's pro-Iranian words energized

Iran's citizens, particularly the religious sectors. Mossadegh was a perfect foil to the Shah. Whereas the Shah promoted Westernization and external forces to influence Iran, all while stripping religious clerics of their power, Mossadegh was focused entirely on removing external involvement in Iran's affairs. While not explicitly supportive of the return of religious influence in the region, Mossadegh promises to be democratic and not sell Iran to the West.³⁰ This was more reassuring than anything the Shah promised, which is why much of Iran's religious sector supported the prime minister.

Initially, the clerics, including Kashani, supported Mossadegh for his firm stance against foreign dominance.³¹ This support was crucial for Mossadegh because it meant that the public would support his attempt to nationalize Iran's oil industry and take it back from the British. He saw this as a way to reduce foreign influence in the region and also assert Iran's national sovereignty. Kashani publicly supported the National Front, which was Mossadegh's political organization. Moreover, Kashani used his influence in religious sectors to aid Mossadegh in rallying that part of society. With this assistance, Mossadegh successfully passed the oil nationalization bill in the Majlis or the Iranian Parliament. However, Kashani remained cautious. Mossadegh had many secular policies, which Kashani was skeptical of. This relationship showcased how many clerics approached politics during this time: The focus, for them, was entirely on Islamic values. The clerics would support anything that aligned with their values, but would also oppose anything that went against them.³²

Since the clerics supported Mossadegh and vice versa, this allowed the clerics to gain back influence in Iran's government. One of the factors that contributed to this was the sheer existence of oil in the region. For context, Iran's rich oil reserves caught the attention of both the West and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Both vied for control, attempting to exert influence over the country and use Iran's oil deposits to their advantage.

26 Moaddel, "The Shi'i Ulama and the State in Iran."

27 James C. Van Hook, "Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran, 1951-1954," U.S. Department of State, Accessed September 17, 2024, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d43>.


28 Van Hook, "Foreign Relations of the United States, Iran, 1951-1954."

29 Ervand Abrahamian, "Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic," University of California Press, 1993. p. 107.

30 William L. Cleveland, and Martin Bunton, "A History of the Modern Middle East," Routledge & CRC Press, August 1, 2016, <https://www.routledge.com/A-History-of-the-Modern-Middle-East/Cleveland-Bunton/p/book/9780813349800>.

31 Wolfgang K. Kressin, "Prime Minister Mossaddegh and Ayatullah Kashani From Unity to Enmity: As Viewed from the American Embassy in Tehran, June 1950 - August 1953," University of Texas at Austin, May 1991.

32 Kressin, "Prime Minister Mossaddegh and Ayatullah Kashani From Unity to Enmity."



Anglo-Persian Oil Company Directors at the Abadan Refinery

Credit: Nevit Dilmen

The clerics, worried about the effects of control, sought to prevent foreign influence on their oil. Additionally, the communist Tudeh Party was gaining influence and wanted to nationalize the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.³³ The clerics also viewed them with suspicion, seeing them as a threat to Islamic values and traditional social structures.³⁴ This opposition to communism and foreign influence further aligned the clerics with nationalist movements like Mossadegh's.

Kashani and other clerics used their influence to shape public opinion and government policy. For example, many Iranians were opposed to the Pahlavi regime's acceptance of foreign influence and agreed that this level of interference was a danger to Iran's sovereignty and values. Therefore, the clerics amassed more of a following and held more of an influence during Mossadegh's time as prime minister. However, Kashani and Mossadegh ultimately viewed Iran's future differently. Kashani wanted to go one step ahead and entirely restore Islam's role in governance. Moreover, he wanted the restructuring of the schools and judicial systems in the country to be based on the tenets of Islamic Law. However, Mossadegh's emphasis was less

on religious authority, and more so on national sovereignty and economic independence.³⁵

As Mossadegh's power grew, the clerics grew more unhappy with him and started viewing him as a threat. For Clerics, Mossadegh threatened many Islamic traditions.³⁶ A gap between the religious side of Iran and Mossadegh began to emerge. This had grave implications for his control of the country. Eventually, seeking more power, many religious leaders started aligning themselves with a conservative faction called "monarchists". This faction wanted the Shah to have full power and resented any attempts to steer power away from Iran's monarchy. This ultimately added to the political turmoil of Mossadegh's cabinet, which caused Mossadegh to finally get rid of all religious influence in his cabinet. Mossadegh fired Kashani and restructured his cabinet to only have secular ministers.³⁷ This was the final nail in the coffin for the clerics. In the months that would follow, Mossadegh would see his authority erode as many clashing factions, including the clerics, tried stripping him of his power.

Unquestionably, the clerics have played a major role in shaping

³³ Kressin, "Prime Minister Mossaddegh and Ayatullah Kashani From Unity to Enmity."

³⁴ Annie Tracy Samuel, "Viewpoint Iran: The Past and Present of the U.S.-Iran Standoff," *Origins*, August 2013, <https://origins.osu.edu/article/viewpoint-iran-past-and-present-us-iran-standoff>.

³⁵ Gregory Brew, "Penny-Wise, Pound-Foolish: The Iranian Coup of 1953," *War on the Rocks*, July 7, 2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/penny-wise-pound-foolish-the-iranian-coup-of-1953/>.

³⁶ N. Marbury Efimenco, "An Experiment with Civilian Dictatorship in Iran: The Case of Mohammed Mossadegh," *The Journal of Politics* 17, no. 3 (1955): 390–406, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2127013>.

³⁷ Ervand Abrahamian, "Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic," University of California Press, 1993. p. 107.

Iran's political environment. Their initial dislike of the Pahlavi regime led to them siding with the nationalistic Mossadegh. Through knowing this, we understand some of Mossadegh's challenges to maintain national sovereignty, economic independence, and the demands of a deeply religious society.

The History of the National Front

The National Front of Iran was a political organization in Iran formed by Mohammed Mossadegh in 1949. When it was formed, the Front had multiple smaller organizations under it, including nationalist, democratic, and communist groups. However, the overall organization had the primary goal of nationalizing Iran's oil industry.

To understand why the National Front was necessary, it is important to look at the history leading up to its formation. The Front's history goes back to the late 19th century when Iran transformed from a feudal society to an urban one. Around this time, there was heavy Soviet influence in the north, which directly contributed to the formation of Iran's first communist party in June of 1920 in the Gilan province.³⁸ This was called

38 H RamHormozi, "Averting an Iranian Geopolitical Crisis: A Tale of Power Play for Dominance Between Colonial Powers, Tribal and Government Actors in the Pre and Post World War One era", Victoria, BC, Canada: FriesenPress, 2016.

39 Abdy Javadzadeh, "Iranian irony: Marxists becoming Muslims," Pittsburgh, PA: Rosedog Books, 2011.

40 Kayhan A Nejad, "To Break the Feudal Bonds: The Soviets, Reza Khan, and the Iranian Left, 1921-25," *Middle Eastern Studies* 57, no. 5 (April 1, 2021): 758–76, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2021.1897578>.

41 Abbas Amanat, "The Downfall of Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir and the Problem of Ministerial Authority in Qajar Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23, no. 4 (1991): 577–99, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/163885>.

the Jangal movement and it was led by Mirza Kuchik Khan. Since its formation, the Shah's government has been actively fighting the Jangal Movement. The movement began as an attempt to liberate the Gilan province from foreign powers in World War I.³⁹ Indeed, in its early years, the movement wasn't necessarily socialist. However, this soon changed.

In 1920, a separate movement called the Persian Communist Party was formed, led by Haydar Khan Amo-oghli. With aid from the Soviet Red Army, this party combined with the Jangal Movement, forming the Socialist Soviet Republic of Gilan. This republic was a breakaway state, which means that it recognized itself as an independent state even if Iran's government did not.⁴⁰ It would take Iran two years to end the republic, Mirza Khan's death being the main reason that the republic fell.⁴¹ Following Gilan's fall, communist ideology went underground in Iran. However, since the Shah took two years to end the republic, many view this as an example of a failure by Iran's government.

Only a few years later, in 1929, there were socialist strikes in an Isfahan textile mill, as well as in Mazandaran railways and



Tudeh Thugs in Tehran

Credit: Staff of the magazine

Mashad carpet workshops. Following these demonstrations, the government took harsh measures. Hundreds of Iranian communists were sent to their deaths in Qasr prison. Meanwhile, those who were able to escape fled the country.⁴² It was around this time that Reza Shah was abdicated, and his iron fist over the Iranian people was removed. Many political prisoners who survived Qasr prison ended up receiving amnesty from his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. This means that their charges were pardoned and they were freed.

Under this new atmosphere, socialist groups once again flourished. Many of those who were sent to Qasr prison got together and, with the help of the Soviets still in northern Iran, formed the Hezb-e Tudeh-ye Iran, a Marxist-Leninist party appealing to the broad masses. For short, they were called the Tudeh party.⁴³ By 1944, the group comprised only the most militant communists in Iran. This shift was due to the release of Ardeshir Ovanessian, an Iranian-Armenian communist. Having been imprisoned in the previous Shah's crackdown, Ovanessian removed those he deemed "corrupted" by capitalism and the wealth that the Tudeh Party had amassed.⁴⁴

On the other side of Iran's political spectrum was the Fada'iyan-e Islam, or the Fedayeen. This translates to "Self-Sacrificers of Islam." This was a religious fundamentalist group. They sought to purify Islam in Iran by ridding it of "corrupting individuals." They wanted to achieve this through carefully planned assassinations of certain leading intellectual and political figures.⁴⁵ Similar to Tudeh and other democratic movements, the Fedayeen despised the foreign influence that European powers had over Iran. However, what made the Fedayeen different was that they also pushed for the enforcement of traditional Sharia Muslim law. Some examples of their proposed measures included amputating the hands of

thieves, the forced veiling of Iranian women, and a ban on any non-Muslim subjects in the school system.⁴⁶

The Fedayeen's first act of terrorism would be the assassination of Ahmad Kasravi in 1946. Kasravi was an author who criticized the religious clerics of Iran. The assassination was carried out by Hussein Emani, a founding member of the Fedayeen.⁴⁷ Despite being caught in the act, Emani was set free because of his influence.⁴⁸ In the following years, many more assassinations would be carried out by various members. In 1949, for example, a prominent court minister named Abdolhossein Hazhir was murdered at a mosque in Tehran.⁴⁹ Only three months later, while attending a ceremony commemorating the founding of Tehran University, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was approached by a student named Fakhr-Arai. He pulled out a handgun and fired five times at the Shah.⁵⁰ The Shah was only grazed by one bullet, and Fakhr-Arai was found and killed by local police. However, this attempted assassination drastically weakened Iran politically. What made matters worse was that Prime Minister Haj Ali Ramzmara was assassinated only a few days later.⁵¹ No one in the government was truly safe from these extremist parties and groups. Unless they were killed, all of the assassins were pardoned for any crimes because of their influence among Iran's citizens. As a result, the democratic institutions that Iran had just regained after the previous Shah's exile seemed to be fading away.

After the 1949 attempt on the Shah's life, the government attempted to crack down on parties they deemed extreme. They started by banning Tudeh in parliament.⁵² This was because it was discovered that Fakhr-Arai, the man who tried to assassinate the Shah, had a connection to a journalist labor union affiliated with Tudeh.⁵³ The Shah was anxious to blame

42 Ervand Abrahamian, "Tortured Confessions : Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran," (Berkeley, Ca: University Of California Press, 1999).

43 Abrahamian, "Tortured Confessions : Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran."

44 Ervand Abrahamian, "A History of Modern Iran," (Cambridge ; New York ; Melbourne Etc.: Cambridge University Press, Cop, 2008).

45 Amir Taheri, "The Spirit of Allah," (Adler & Adler Publishers, 1986).

46 Ervand Abrahamian, "Iran between Two Revolutions," (Princeton, Nj: Princeton Univ. Pr., [Erschienen, 1983]).

47 Amir Taheri, "The Spirit of Allah," (Adler & Adler Publishers, 1986).

48 Taheri, "The Spirit of Allah."

49 Farhad Kazemi, "From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, ed. Said Amir Arjomand," (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1984), <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06847-0>.

50 Robert Dreyfuss, "Devil's Game : How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam," (New York: Henry Holt, 2006).

51 Sepehr Zabih, and Amos Perlmutter, *The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution*, Chicago, Ill: Lake View Press, 1982.

52 Ervand Abrahamian, "Iran between Two Revolutions," (Princeton, Nj: Princeton Univ. Pr., [Erschienen, 1983]).

53 Farhad Kazemi, "From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, ed. Said Amir Arjomand," (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1984), <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06847-0>.

the communists, and he declared that the attempt on his life was a conspiracy done by religious and communist radicals.⁵⁴ On that same night, he would decree martial law, ordering newspapers critical of his policies to be closed. He arrested 28 Tudeh leaders.⁵⁵ Despite promises of freedom, it seemed that Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was backpedaling toward autocracy, just as his father had done before.

In an attempt to prevent this, like-minded pro-democracy ministers knew they must form a coalition to regain control of the Majlis. The perfect catalyst for the coalition's creation came on October 15th, 1949 when the Shah, utilizing the power, appointed loyal royalists to 30 of the 60 seats in parliament.⁵⁶ This angered the Iranian people, as well as Mossadegh, who was only a member of parliament at this time. As a response, Mossadegh, alongside thousands of Iranian citizens, walked from his estate to the royal palace gardens. There, Mossadegh and 19 politicians demanded free and fair elections.⁵⁷ Iran's Interior Minister, Abdolhossein Hazhir, conducted a sit-in protest for three days straight. After that, he gave in and delivered a promise that the elections would be conducted fairly.⁵⁸

Directly after this, the group of 20 politicians would return to Mossadegh's estate. There, they finally formed the National Front coalition. An investigation of the election results commenced.⁵⁹ Unfortunately, this investigation would never have results. This is because Abdolhossein was soon after assassinated. The Shah, feeling political pressure and fear for his own life, decided to get rid of the current election results, planning to hold new elections in a couple of months.⁶⁰

From its founding, the National Front aimed to be a broad

coalition. It included members from several groups. These included the Iran Party, which held extreme nationalist values, the Toilers Party, which was social-democratic, the National Party, and the Tehran Association of Bazaar Trade and Craft Guilds.⁶¹ Despite such a broad range of opinions and values, the National Front had two central goals. The first was to nationalize Iran's oil resources, and the second was to counteract, counteract British interference in the Iranian government and internal affairs.⁶² By April of 1951, Mossadegh was elected as Prime Minister. At this time, the National Front held a majority and a powerful grip on the parliament and the decision-making of the country.⁶³

European Colonial Influence in Iran

Colonial influence in Iran started in the 19th century, driven by large powers like Britain. These powers wanted to control Iran for multiple reasons. For one, Iran was positioned directly between the East and the West, making it very important. This allowed for trade routes between the two. Also, the state had rich natural resources, like oil.⁶⁴ Iran's position on the map, as well as its rich natural resources, made it a victim of many external threats. This reality dawned on Mossadegh, and it became one of the biggest issues his cabinet faced.

In the 19th century, Britain wanted to maintain its presence in India and not give Russia the ability to cross Indian borders and colonize it. They did this by exerting influence over Iran. Britain viewed Iran as a buffer state against Russia, meaning that Iran stood between Britain and Russia. Since this was the case, it made it difficult for Russia to have a conflict with Britain, since Iran was between them. This also meant

54 Ervand Abrahamian, "Iran between Two Revolutions," (Princeton, Nj: Princeton Univ. Pr., [Erschienen], 1983).

55 Abrahamian, "Iran between Two Revolutions."

56 Ervand Abrahamian, "Tortured Confessions : Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran," (Berkeley, Ca: University Of California Press, 1999).

57 Abbas Milani, "The Shah", New York: St. Martin's Press, 2014.

58 Milani, "The Shah".

59 Stephen C. Poulson, "Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing Frameworks," Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2007.

60 Fakhreddin Azimi, "The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle Against Authoritarian Rule," (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010).

61 Ervand Abrahamian, "Iran between Two Revolutions," (Princeton, Nj: Princeton Univ. Pr., [Erschienen], 1983).

62 Stephen C. Poulson, "Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing Frameworks," Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2007.

63 Ervand Abrahamian, "Iran between Two Revolutions," (Princeton, Nj: Princeton Univ. Pr., [Erschienen], 1983).

64 Neelofar Firdous, "Anglo-Russian Imperialism in Iran," Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 78 (2017): 864–68, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26906161>.

that Russia would have a difficult time getting to India.⁶⁵ As Britain exerted its influence over Iran, it gained control over the Persian Gulf, a Mediterranean sea right under Iran. Using these territories, Britain made trade routes and controlled Iran's finances.⁶⁶ Moreover, Britain and Iran engaged in various treaties and agreements that unfairly gave Iran the short end of the stick.

One example of an unfair treaty was the Treaty of Paris in 1857. This treaty removed Iran's territorial claims in the region. It also gave the British more power. It allowed them to have a place in Iran's government, as well.⁶⁷ In the treaty, the Shah had "to relinquish all claims to sovereignty over the territory and city of Herat and the countries of Afghanistan." This means he gave the land to the British.⁶⁸ Because of these pressures, there was lots of turmoil in Iran which eventually led to periods of social unrest like the Persian Tobacco project.

For context, the Shah at the time, Naser al-Din Shah Qajar, gave Iran's entire tobacco industry to Major G. F. Talbot. Talbot was a British businessman. Because of this, clerics rightfully protested. For the entire tobacco industry, Talbot paid 15,000 pounds to the Shah. Today, that would be USD 2.3 million.⁶⁹ The protests started getting out of hand and eventually, the clerics declared a fatwa. A fatwa is a ruling based on Islamic law, and since clerics are educated in Islamic law, they have the right to declare them. This particular fatwa was against tobacco. Specifically, the clerics said it was against Islamic values.⁷⁰ After this, tobacco usage drastically dropped since during this time, religious authority was still massively influential in Iran.

Finally, in 1892, the Shah took back the tobacco industry. After that, the protest ended.⁷¹ Because there was an influence of foreign powers, there was a sense of hatred among Iran's

citizens. Many wanted greater independence and the opposition of foreign influence. For example, there was the Persian Constitutional Revolution. Initially, this consisted of merchants protesting tariffs on Iranian goods. However, it soon became a bigger movement. People thought that selling oil to other countries would destroy Iran's economy, and many groups were formed to try to oppose foreign influence.⁷² However, out of fear of fighting Britain, the opposing groups soon disbanded in 1911.⁷³ Eventually, the revolution ended, but the people were still very unhappy with European imperialism.

At the same time, a British businessman was interested in oil in the Middle East. His name was William Knox D'Arcy. After negotiations, he was allowed to look for oil across the country. The Shah at the time granted this. This agreement was called the "D'Arcy Concession". He was allowed to look for oil and take it, and this agreement lasted for 60 years. In exchange, Iran received an initial payment of 20,000 pounds. Today, that is 3 million dollars. Also, Iran received a 16 percent royalty on all oil sales. This means that 16 percent of the money gained would be given to Iran. While these terms provided some financial benefit to Iran, they heavily favored D'Arcy and his investors, given how most of the profits went to Britain. The agreement covered an area of 500,000 square miles, comprising most of southern and central Iran. However, the concession was very vaguely written. A part of it stated that Iran "grants gratuitously to the concessionaire all uncultivated lands belonging to the State which the concessionaire's engineers may deem necessary". This gives D'Arcy free reign to any part of Iran that he desires.⁷⁴

After this, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was formed in 1909. The company was established to manage the extraction and transportation of oil from Iran, and it was very

65 Maryam Borjian, "The History of English in Iran (1836–1979)," JSTOR (Multilingual Matters / Channel View Publications, 2013), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt21kk1tj.7>.

66 Neelofar Firdous, "Anglo-Russian Imperialism in Iran," Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 78 (2017): 864–68, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26906161>.

67 "Treaty of Peace Between Great Britain and Persia," Canberra Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, May 2, 1857. <https://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/ATS/1901/60.html>.

68 "Treaty of Peace Between Great Britain and Persia."

69 Nikki R. Keddie, "Religion and rebellion in Iran," Cass, 1966.

70 Keddie, "Religion and rebellion in Iran."

71 Roy Mottahedeh, "The Mantle of the Prophet: Learning and Power in Modern Iran," (London: Chatto, C, 1985).

72 Sandra Mackey, "The Iranians Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation," (New York Plume, 1998).

73 Mackey, "The Iranians Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation."

74 James L. Gelvin, "The Modern Middle East," (Oxford University Press, USA, 2008).

important in the global oil industry. APOC was also central to the economic relationship between Iran and Britain, given that it was the direct line of access through which Iran could communicate with Britain and vice versa.⁷⁵ In the decades following the D'Arcy Concession, tensions began to escalate, mainly because of Iranian nationalization movements that opposed foreign influence. One in particular that was gaining steam was the movement led by Mohammed Mossadegh in the early 1950s. Mossadegh wanted nationalization because he wanted Iran to control the oil industry. He also disliked how unjust the D'Arcy Concession was.⁷⁶

During World War I, Iran was used as a battleground for British and Ottoman forces because of the state's strategic location.⁷⁷ The war destroyed Iran's economy, making it very hard for its population. There was widespread famine on top of destroyed infrastructure.⁷⁸ After the war, the British still controlled Iran's oil, which increased their influence in the country. Around this time, there was the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement. Although it was never approved, this agreement tried to formally let Britain fully control Iran's financial and military affairs.⁷⁹ It was strongly opposed by Iran's nationalists, which is why it was rejected. However, it exemplified the ongoing struggle for control between foreign powers and Iranian sovereignty.

When World War II happened, Iran became a transit route for Allied supplies to the Soviet Union. This made Iran a critical link in the supply chain known as the Persian Corridor.⁸⁰ This importance led to the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. This initial point of the invasion was to take oil fields, but it also resulted in increased control by the invaders.⁸¹ Eventually,

the allies dethroned Reza Shah and his son was put into power.

The wartime occupation had lasting impacts on Iran. On one hand, Iran saw increased trade and infrastructure development. For example, the Trans-Iranian Railway was constructed. This moved Allied supplies via train.⁸² However, the allies did not prioritize Iran's interests. They mainly focused on themselves. The occupation also strained Iran's resources. This led to inflation and shortages of goods. This made public discontent grow stronger.⁸³ Politically, the occupation exposed the weaknesses of Iran. The public was aware of foreign dominance. This contributed to nationwide backlash and anti-colonial sentiments.⁸⁴

Mossadegh's Rise to Power

Mossadegh became involved in Iran's politics in the early 20th century and soon became a prominent figure. In his early political years, he gained notoriety for advocating for a parliamentary democracy.⁸⁵ Born into an aristocratic family in 1882, Mossadegh was well-educated. He studied law in Paris and earned a doctorate in Switzerland, where he learned Western political ideas.⁸⁶ These influenced his views on government and law. Furthermore, it gave him the tools to plan Iran's potential as a democracy.⁸⁷

Mossadegh committed to democratic reforms, and this was evident in his early efforts. For example, he supported the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. This revolution aimed to create a parliament and limit the powers of monarchy.⁸⁸ Eventually, the Iranian parliament was created

75 Neveen Abdelrehim, Josephine Maltby, and Steven Toms, "Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Control: The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 1933—1951," *Enterprise & Society* 12, no. 4 (2011): 824–62, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23701572>.

76 Stephen Kinzer, "All the Shah's Men," (John Wiley & Sons, 2003).

77 Ryan Gingeras, "Fall of the Sultanate: The Great War and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1922," (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

78 Kenneth Pollack, "The Persian Puzzle," (Random House, 2004).

79 Philip Henning Grobrien, "The Origins and Intentions of the Anglo-Persian Agreement 1919: A Reassessment," *Iran*, June 2, 2022, 1–16, <https://doi.org/10.1080/05786967.2022.2080581>.

80 Kaveh Farrokh, "Iran at War, 1500-1988," (London: Osprey Publishing, 2011).

81 Farrokh, "Iran at War, 1500-1988."

82 Jerry A. Pinkepank, "The Second Diesel Spotter's Guide," (Kalmbach Publishing Company, 1973).

83 Pollack, "The Persian Puzzle."

84 Willem M Floor, "The Persian Gulf: Bushehr: City, Society & Trade," 1797-1947, 2016.

85 Hassan Mohammadi Nejad, "Elite-Counterelite Conflict and the Development of a Revolutionary Movement: The Case of Iranian National Front," www.proquest.com, 1970, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/302536657>.

86 Stephen Kinzer, "Inside Iran's Fury," *Smithsonian* (Smithsonian.com, October 2008), <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/inside-irans-fury-11823881/>.

87 Ervand Abrahamian, "The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations", (Editorial: New York, New York: The New Press, 2015).

88 Christopher De Bellaigue, "Patriot of Persia: Muhammad Mossadegh and a Tragic Anglo-American Coup," (New York: Harper Perennial,

in 1906 and was called the Majlis. Upon creation, Mossadegh was elected to parliament, where he openly opposed the idea of Reza Khan becoming Shah. For context, at this time the Shah was Shah Ahmad Shah Qajarn.⁸⁹

Mossadegh knew the sacrifices that Iran's people made to gain liberty. In a speech to parliament, he asked them if "it was to achieve dictatorship that people bled their lives away in the Constitutional Revolution?"⁹⁰ In 1925, the Majlis made Reza Khan the Shah, and the Pahlavi dynasty started. Mossadegh deeply opposed this decision, because he believed that this would lead Iran toward a dictatorial rule.⁹¹

Despite Mossadegh's open opposition to the Pahlavi regime, Reza Shah offered the role of Foreign Minister to Mossadegh. As expected, Mossadegh declined. Regardless, the Shah offered Mossadegh other positions, as well. These included the Chief Justice position and even the Prime Minister. He rejected all of these.⁹² During this period, Mossadegh emerged as an opponent to the Shah. He opposed the Shah's dictatorial rule, and he was also a vocal supporter of the rule of law and constitutional governance, evidently influenced by his teachings in the West.⁹³

In a couple of years, Mossadegh's predictions for Iran turned out to be correct. The Majlis was entirely under the Shah's control. Many parts of Iran's political system were changed entirely if not outright banned. The Shah outlawed opposition parties, and he even drove leaders to exile.⁹⁴ Mossadegh, himself, was removed from parliament, and he knew that he would soon be targeted for his openly anti-Shah stance.

This meant that his political career was soon to be over. He was faced with two choices. Mossadegh could either soften his stance on the Shah, which would allow him to return to parliament, or he could continue to oppose the regime, which would mean his potential assassination by the Shah. Mossadegh chose neither. He ran away to an estate sixty miles from Tehran in Ahmedabad.⁹⁵

In 1940, the Shah sent soldiers to his estate. They ransacked it, searching for incriminating evidence, but found nothing. After this, the soldiers illegally put Mossadegh under arrest, and he spent years in prison.⁹⁶ He returned to house arrest after his Swiss friend and courtier, Ernest Perron, got involved. However, Mossadegh was still unable to hold any political influence even after having returned to house arrest.

This changed during the Anglo-Soviet invasion.⁹⁷ The Shah was gone, and Iran was about to have its first free and fair elections since Reza Khan came into power. The British believed that Reza's son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was a more obedient and strong leader. They forced his father into exile until his death.⁹⁸ Eventually, Mossadegh was reelected in 1944. After getting his power within the government back, he focused on the British. Specifically, he focused on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and bringing it back under Iranian control.⁹⁹

As a minister, Mossadegh had a massive influence, mainly because of his vision for a truly independent Iran. However, his plans constantly faced roadblocks. The Shah and various Prime Ministers both gave Mossadegh difficulty. For example, Mossadegh pushed for an election reform bill in 1947 that

2013).

89 Farhad Diba, "Mohammad Mossadegh: A Political Biography," (London U.A.: Croom Helm, 1986).

90 Stephen Kinzer, "Inside Iran's Fury," Smithsonian (Smithsonian.com, October 2008), <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/inside-irans-fury-11823881/>.

91 Farhad Diba, "Mohammad Mossadegh: A Political Biography," (London U.A.: Croom Helm, 1986).

92 Stephen Kinzer, "Inside Iran's Fury," Smithsonian (Smithsonian.com, October 2008), <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/inside-irans-fury-11823881/>.

93 Ervand Abrahamian, "The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations", (Editorial: New York, New York: The New Press, 2015).

94 Stephen Kinzer, "Inside Iran's Fury," Smithsonian (Smithsonian.com, October 2008), <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/inside-irans-fury-11823881/>.

95 Kinzer, "Inside Iran's Fury."

96 N. Marbury Efimenco, "An Experiment with Civilian Dictatorship in Iran; the Case of Mohammed Mossadegh," *The Journal of Politics* 17, no. 03 (August 1, 1955): 390–90, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2127013>.

97 Stephen Kinzer, "Inside Iran's Fury," Smithsonian (Smithsonian.com, October 2008), <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/inside-irans-fury-11823881/>.

98 N. Marbury Efimenco, "An Experiment with Civilian Dictatorship in Iran; the Case of Mohammed Mossadegh," *The Journal of Politics* 17, no. 03 (August 1, 1955): 390–90, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2127013>.

99 Stephen Kinzer, "Inside Iran's Fury," Smithsonian (Smithsonian.com, October 2008), <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/inside-irans-fury-11823881/>.

would limit the Shah's influence in parliamentary elections. However, it failed because the monarchists interfered and did not allow the bill to pass.

Frustrated and angered by the corrupt royal family, Mossadegh officially announced that he would resign from politics.¹⁰⁰ However, this was an empty statement, and Mossadegh did not. However, he knew that he needed more power and influence, so he aimed for the highest seat in government, after the Shah: that of the Prime Minister.

In 1951, Mossadegh had an opportunity of a lifetime. Prime Minister Haj Ali Ramzara was assassinated, which left the seat empty. This was during a very tough period for Iran. Around the time this assassination took place, there were cries around the country for nationalizing Iran's oil.¹⁰¹ Eventually, Hossein Ala filled the vacant seat. However, this only lasted a little over a month. Ala did not want to oppose nationalization, because he could potentially get killed by extremists just as Ramzara was.¹⁰² Almost every politician who did not want to oppose nationalization refused to become Prime Minister because of this very possibility. Because of this, Mossadegh secured the seat in April of 1951. It was confirmed by the Majlis, and there was an overwhelming majority vote.¹⁰³ Crowds marched on nearly all streets within Tehran, and there were celebrations all over Iran. Members of the National Front gave fiery speeches praising Mossadegh's victory while also denouncing British influence.¹⁰⁴

Nationalization was the priority for Mossadegh and the National Front. However, other reforms were passed as well. For example, unemployed citizens were still paid, and forced labor in rural Iran was stopped, ending generations of serfdom in the state. Also, sick and injured workers were

compensated.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, Mossadegh introduced and passed the Land Reform Act in 1952, which forced landlords to put 20 percent of revenue into a fund for public projects like rural housing and pest control.¹⁰⁶ All of these initiatives increased support for Mossadegh. However, Britain continued making attempts to influence Iranian policy. Mossadegh had a clear stance on foreign influence: He was opposed to it. However, Iran's people wondered how he would remove foreign influence once and for all from Iran.

Current Status

Iranian Foreign Policy

There are many important aspects of Iran's foreign policy. In particular, foreign interference has been a seminal part of the country's relationship with the rest of the world. Iran has struggled with this, especially through times of conflict like World War II and the Cold War when Iran struggled with preserving its independence. Understanding the context behind Iran's foreign policy is crucial because it allows us direct insight into why Mossadegh held the position he did.¹⁰⁷

At the beginning of the 20th century, Iran was a very weak and corrupt state unable to block foreign powers. Because of this, foreign involvement took place constantly. For example, in August 1941, Britain and the Soviet Union invaded Iran because they wanted to secure the region's trade potential. The result of this invasion was that foreign policymaking was split up amongst the various factions in Iran.¹⁰⁸

Unfortunately, after WWII ended, the Cold War immediately followed. This worsened the rivalry between the East and

100 Kinzer, "Inside Iran's Fury."

101 Sepehr Zabih, "Aspects of Terrorism in Iran," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 463, no. 1 (September 1982): 84–94, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716282463001007>.

102 Ervand Abrahamian, "The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations", (Editorial: New York, New York: The New Press, 2015).

103 William L. Cleveland, and Martin Bunton, "A History of the Modern Middle East," Routledge & CRC Press, August 1, 2016, <https://www.routledge.com/A-History-of-the-Modern-Middle-East/Cleveland-Bunton/p/book/9780813349800>.

104 Cleveland and Bunton, "A History of the Modern Middle East."

105 Ervand Abrahamian, "The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations", (Editorial: New York, New York: The New Press, 2015).

106 Stephen Kinzer, "Inside Iran's Fury," *Smithsonian* (Smithsonian.com, October 2008), <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/inside-irans-fury-11823881/>.

107 Shahram Chubin, Sepehr Zabih, and Paul Seabury, "Relations With the Soviet Union," In *The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great Power Conflict*, DGO-Digital original, 1., 36–85, University of California Press, 1974. <https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.8306043.7>.

108 Chubin, Zabih, and Seabury, "Relations With the Soviet Union."



Workers in Abadan expressing their support for Mosaddegh

Credit: Staff of the magazine

West, which meant that Iran's foreign policy was getting increasingly complex given that Britain and the Soviets still had a stake in Iran's government. Eventually, the Allied powers withdrew from Iran in 1945. However, the Soviets were still in Northern Iran, where they assisted in establishing the Tudeh party, providing a base for domestic influence.¹⁰⁹ This increased Soviet economic assistance and political support in Iran. In exchange for this political support, Iran gave the Soviet Union many concessions, including a stake in the nation's oil.

While the Allied powers withdrew from Iran in 1946, the Shah still relied on the West for security. Naturally, the Soviets saw this as a dangerous development, given the Cold War tensions taking place. However, the Shah insisted on his right to determine Iran's stance, while also emphasizing that a relationship with the West would not clash with Iran-Soviet relations.¹¹⁰ However, the Soviets were not impressed and ties between the USSR and Iran were not mended. The Shah, scared that the Soviets and the West would engage in battle over Iranian control, tried to continue appeasing the Soviets.

¹⁰⁹ George Kirk, "The Middle East in the War." (New York, 1952)

¹¹⁰ Kirk, "The Middle East in the War."

¹¹¹ Shahram Chubin, Sepehr Zabih, and Paul Seabury, "Relations With the Soviet Union," In *The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great Power Conflict*, DGO-Digital original, 1., 36–85, University of California Press, 1974. <https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.8306043.7>.

¹¹² Chubin, Zabih, and Seabury, "Relations With the Soviet Union."

¹¹³ George Kirk, "The Middle East in the War." (New York, 1952)

¹¹⁴ Shahram Chubin, Sepehr Zabih, and Paul Seabury, "Relations With the Soviet Union," In *The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great Power Conflict*, DGO-Digital original, 1., 36–85, University of California Press, 1974. <https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.8306043.7>.

This meant that they made even more concessions to avoid war.¹¹¹

In January 1946, Iran eventually demanded Soviet troop withdrawal. They had US and UK backing and managed to report the USSR to the United Nations. This brought the Anglo-Soviet dispute in Iran to light on an international level. Naturally, this made tensions escalate between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. On March 24, 1946, Moscow removed all Soviet troops in Iran within a month and a half.¹¹² For the first time in a while, the government gained back some control over its foreign relations. When the USSR withdrew, it led many Iranians to believe that Moscow wanted to establish Iran as a "socialist satellite", meaning that the Soviets would use Iran to spread socialism.¹¹³ However, Iran's monarchy used this belief to its advantage. With the West's assistance, the Shah increased anti-Soviet propaganda.¹¹⁴ Following this, the US implemented its military and economic aid in Iran. They established missions to enhance Iran's security forces and, eventually, the US became the main Western power in Iran,

replacing Britain. The US had the intention of transforming Iran into an anti-communist Western ally. However, around this time, Iran saw a resurgence of nationalism sparked by Soviet removal in the region. What this meant was that many of Iran's citizens viewed any foreign involvement, whether from the East or the West, as detrimental to the state.

Despite all this, the United States did not focus on Iran until the early 1940s when they became aware of the country's economic influence.¹¹⁵ However, Iran always saw the US as a potential protector from the two superpowers, Britain and the USSR. Iran knew that the United States was wary of Soviet expansionism. The United States knew that Iran was a barrier against communist influence. Knowing this, the US provided greater economic and military assistance to the Iranian government. They wanted to strengthen its ability to resist Soviet pressures and stop the spread of communism to the West.¹¹⁶

However, the increase in US influence sparked apprehensions among certain citizens in Iran. Specifically, this was regarding foreign intervention in Iran's internal matters. In 1943, the Tehran government appointed Arthur Millspaugh as the director general of finance. Millspaugh was supposed to help fix Iran's postwar financial system with 60 other American staffers.¹¹⁷ While initially making progress, he was noted for having "aggressive tactics", especially when dealing with uncooperative officials in Iran. This led to criticism from the Majlis and the cabinet.¹¹⁸ The Shah wanted him to be replaced but that did not happen. Millspaugh ended up resigning in February 1945, and, luckily, his actions did not end up tarnishing US-Iran relations overall.¹¹⁹ However, there was still underlying skepticism from Iran's citizens as to whether or not Millspaugh's behavior was representative of foreign influence as a whole.¹²⁰

Additionally, the Truman Doctrine was established in 1947. This stated that President Truman would provide political and economic assistance to any country threatened by Soviet forces or Communist insurrection.¹²¹ While Iran was not specifically mentioned in this doctrine, it was undoubtedly aligned with this program.¹²² Given this, Iran received US assistance to help in containing communism. Aid was provided to Iran through the Point Four Program: national plans, military advice, organizing national police force, and economic aid. This was created in 1947 by the Morrison-Knudsen Company, an American Civil Engineering organization. This program would increase the efficiency of the military force. Furthermore, it would also add law enforcement duties among the civilian population.¹²³ This program led to the incorporation of hundreds of American experts in Iran's politics, allowing both countries to be in consistent contact with one another.

Despite all these US-Iran initiatives, there was an underlying revival of nationalism amongst Iran's population. Among those that advocated for a more unified, national front in Iran, was Mohammed Mossadegh. During this time, Mossadegh continued to advocate for a democratic parliamentary system. He wanted to ensure that Iran had ownership and control over its resources. Therefore, Mossadegh looked down upon any foreign involvement in Iran. During his time as Prime Minister, Mossadegh struggled with matters related to foreign policy, mainly because the Shah was still working closely with the US for security and economic purposes. US involvement did keep the Soviets away while also giving economic assistance to Iran. However, Mossadegh had to respond to cries all around Iran calling for greater nationalization and less reliance on foreign powers.

Nationalist and Separatist Movements

Many believe that Iran only has one ethnic group. In reality,

115 Chubin, Zabih, and Seabury, "Relations With the Soviet Union."

116 Shaul Bakhash, "The U.S. and Iran in Historical Perspective," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, September 28, 2009, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2009/09/the-u-s-and-iran-in-historical-perspective/>.

117 Lenczowski, "Russia and the West in Iran." Dec. 24, 1943, Dept. of State Decimal File 89

118 Lenczowski, "Russia and the West in Iran."

119 Lenczowski, "Russia and the West in Iran."

120 Gary R. Hess, "The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 89, no. 1 (1974): 117-46. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2148118>.

121 "The Truman Doctrine, 1947," United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine>.

122 Lenczowski, "Russia and the West in Iran." Dec. 24, 1943, Dept. of State Decimal File 89

123 Lenczowski, "Russia and the West in Iran."

several different ethnic groups make up Iran's culture. Many of these groups have lived among Iran's borders for centuries. Some of these groups are the Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Baluchis, Lurs, Armenians, Turkmen, Arabs, and Qashqai.¹²⁴ In the 20th century, as more nationalist movements grew, separatist groups formed as well. A separatist group is an ethnic group that separates from the larger group. In this case, the "larger group" were Iranians, and the separatist groups were the smaller ethnic groups that broke away from mainland Iran. These groups are seminal in making up Iranian culture and are important parts of the country's history.

Historically, separatist actions from the Kurds began during the Interwar period from 1919 to 1939. This is a period where there were many tribal revolts in Western Azerbaijan.¹²⁵ One of the leaders of the Kurdish separatist group was Simko Shishak, a violent man who planned several ethnic massacres during World War 1, mostly aimed at minority populations of Christian Assyrians and Armenians.¹²⁶ After the war ended, Shishak started a liberation war that would take back lands in Iran that previously belonged to the Kurdish people. In the process, he took control of several cities in Western Azerbaijan.¹²⁷ However, this revolt was soon crushed by Iran's army. In Battle, Simko Shishak and his soldiers were all killed. This happened in 2022.¹²⁸ While this was a relatively minor conflict in Iran's overall political landscape, the country's military response was seen as inefficient because of how long it took them to take action on the revolt.

Another Kurd group involved in the region was the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). The KDPI began their political activities in 1943 after the Anglo-Soviet invasion

during WWII.¹²⁹ Secretly, the Soviets gave the KDPI military and economic support, which allowed the KDPI to form the Republic of Mahabad to spread their influence to the Middle East.¹³⁰ Around this time, the Azerbaijani People's Republic was formed as well. It was located directly on Iran's northern border. Another group based in this location was the Azerbaijani Soviet Republics, who were funded by the Soviets just like KDPI.¹³¹ The Soviets secretly funding these separatist states is part of the reason why the Shah grew cold towards them.

The reason there were many Azerbaijani separatist groups was that the Shah suppressed their culture and language for decades. This made the will for independence among the Azeri people even stronger.¹³² Given that they both were separatist states, the KDPI and the Azerbaijani states had a close kinship, often doing military exercises together.¹³³

Soon, Iran's military went after these separatist groups, a move that many saw as inevitable. Small conflicts between these groups and Iran's military occurred during the 1940s, resulting in around 2,000 recorded casualties.¹³⁴ Iran's government was not entirely antagonistic towards these groups, however. Eventually, there were negotiations between the two warring sides. Through these negotiations, the Soviets deemed the Kurdish and Azeri situation unwinnable. They ended up pulling all support for the movements.¹³⁵ Given that there was no more external support from the Soviets for these two groups, both separatist republics fell by 1946.¹³⁶ No other significant separatist movements have begun by the Kurds and Azeris.

On the other side of the country, towards the East, there were

124 Central Intelligence Agency, "Iran - the World Factbook," www.cia.gov, May 7, 2024, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iran/>.

125 Wadie Jwaideh, "The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development," (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2006).

126 David Gaunt, "Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I," (Piscataway, Nj: Gorgias, 2006).

127 Philip G Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, "The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview," (Routledge, 1992).

128 Stephanie Cronin, "Riza Shah and the Disintegration of Bakhtiyari Power in Iran, 1921-1934," *Iranian Studies* 33, no. 3/4 (2000): 349-76, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4311378>.

129 Kreyenbroek and Sperl, "The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview."

130 Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, "The Foreign Relations of Iran," (Univ of California Press, 1974).

131 Donald Newton Wilber, "Iran, Past and Present from Monarchy to Islamic Republic," (Princeton University Press, 1982).

132 Tadeusz Swietochowski, "Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition," (New York: Columbia University Press, Cop, 1995).

133 Michael G Lortz, "Willing to Face Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces — the Peshmerga — from the Ottoman Empire to Present-Day Iraq," *Diginole*, January 1, 2005.

134 Lortz, "Willing to Face Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces — the Peshmerga — from the Ottoman Empire to Present-Day Iraq."

135 Wilber, "Iran, Past and Present from Monarchy to Islamic Republic."

136 A. C. Edwards, "Persia Revisited," *International Affairs* 23, no. 1 (January 1947): 52-60, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3017739>.

the Baloch people. These people were struggling under the same oppressive regime that the Kurds and the Azeri were struggling under. Historically the Baloch people lived in a region that was shared by both the Shah of Iran and the British Raj.¹³⁷ The British Raj was what India and Pakistan were called when it was ruled by Great Britain. It was also a very oppressive regime. The Shah of Iran, who was Reza Shah Pahlavi at this time, was also oppressive. Sandwiched between two oppressive regimes, the Baloch people needed a way to make their independence known and respected in the region.

Eventually, the political party “Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochistan” was formed early in 1931. The name roughly translates to “Society for the Unity of Balochs”. The party’s goal was to provide independence for the Balochi people.¹³⁸ For context, in 1947, Britain withdrew from India. With this, Britain passed the Indian Parliamentary Act. This act separated India and Pakistan into two separate states.¹³⁹ It also meant that any smaller states that bordered either India or Pakistan were not allies with the British anymore. Many of these smaller states were in the Balochi region. They had a choice to either become a state in Pakistan or India’s territory or to remain independent.¹⁴⁰ Three of the four states in the Balochi region acceded to Pakistan.¹⁴¹ Initially, the ruler of the fourth state declared independence for his state. His name was Ahmad Yar Khan, and he was the Khan of Kalat, the fourth Balochi state in the region.¹⁴² However, he quickly changed his mind. He immediately went back on his decision and accepted accession to Pakistan for Kalat.¹⁴³ His brother, Prince Abdul Karim, was furious and revolted against his brother’s decision in July 1948. He led an army of one thousand men against Pakistan. He also went against Iran, since the Shah opposed separatist groups.¹⁴⁴ The Baloch militants captured the area of Jhalawan,

a region in Kalat. They then used it as a base to stage further operations.¹⁴⁵ However, heavy casualties were suffered, which demoralized the Balochi militants. In the end, these militants surrendered and the region was recaptured by Iran’s military.¹⁴⁶

Although the surrender of these Balochi, Kurdish, and Azeri movements occurred only a few years before Mossadegh’s years as Prime Minister, there is a chance these insurgencies could rise again. As the country shifts to an independent and democratic state, it will only motivate members of these separatist states to rise again and make more attempts to gain their independence. Rather than continually suppressing these movements, the cabinet will have to seek out a middle ground. Specifically, the cabinet will have to look for stability in the country. The solution may include granting autonomy to the regions affected, or it may include. It may mean allowing the free expression of culture. Regardless, Iran must examine its status as a monoethnic country. If Iran wants to be free and stable, it may have to assimilate into a polyethnic state.

The Nationalization Act

Before the Nationalization Act, there had been another recent attempt at oil nationalization in Iran. This was the Majlis Oil Committee. Like the Nationalization Act, this committee was headed by Mossadegh. The committee recommended rejecting the Oil Supplemental Agreement, which modified the original oil concession agreement to be more favorable.¹⁴⁷ At the time, Prime Minister Razmara rejected the idea. However, he was soon assassinated, which allowed the Majlis to easily pass the bill. This nationalized Iran’s oil industry, and Mossadegh created the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), in 1951.¹⁴⁸

137 Farhan Hanif Siddiqi, “The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan,” (Routledge, 2012).

138 Tarun Vijay, “A Devi in Balochistan,” Times of India Blog (Times of India, August 2009), <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/indus-calling/a-devi-in-balochistan/>.

139 Syed Farooq Hasnat, “Global Security Watch—Pakistan,” (ABC-CLIO, 2011).

140 Ishtiaq Ahmed, “State, Nation, and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia.” London And New York: Pinter Publishers, 1999.

141 Syed Farooq Hasnat, “Global Security Watch—Pakistan,” (ABC-CLIO, 2011).

142 Tarun Vijay, “A Devi in Balochistan,” Times of India Blog (Times of India, August 2009), <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/indus-calling/a-devi-in-balochistan/>.

143 Vijay, “A Devi in Balochistan.”

144 Qaiser Butt, “Princely Liaisons. The Khan Family Controls Politics in Kalat,” The Express Tribune (The Express Tribune, April 21, 2013), <https://tribune.com.pk/story/538820/princely-liaisons-the-khan-family-controls-politics-in-kalat>.

145 Butt, “Princely Liaisons the Khan Family Controls Politics in Kalat.”

146 Martin Axmann, “The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baluch Nationalism,” (Oxford University Press, USA, 2008).

147 Simin Fadaee, “Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society,” (New York: Routledge, 2012).

148 Fadaee, “Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society”.

Halfway across the world, British emissaries and ministers were in a panic because of how badly this would affect their economy.¹⁴⁹ Immediately, the Shah passed a law on May 1st that canceled the Anglo-Iranian oil agreement.¹⁵⁰ However, Iran might have been too steadfast in their efforts to nationalize their oil, as the NIOC immediately faced problems. Firstly, a majority of the technicians and managers in the refineries were British. On June 28th, Mossadegh tried to appeal to these British citizens to stay in their refineries, but the former chairman of the AIOC ordered them to leave Iran. The situation turned dire. British warships suspiciously patrolled the gulf, and protests against British residents living in Iran would often turn into violent conflicts after police intervention.¹⁵¹

British Prime Minister Clement Attlee sent Richard Stokes, a member of the British elite, to Iran. Despite never having set foot in the Middle East before, Stokes was tasked with meeting with Mossadegh to reach an agreement regarding the NIOC. Stokes was instructed to offer Mossadegh a 50/50 split. However, Britain was to retain the drilling and export rights.¹⁵² Naturally, this was rejected immediately. Tensions grew even further. Stokes and Mossadegh met several more times, and during one of these meetings, Mossadegh agreed that if Iran's right to the oil industry was set in stone, concessions to the company would be given.¹⁵³ Stokes contacted the foreign office with the development. However, he was sternly told to return to London and break all negotiations with Iran, because Mossadegh's offer was too costly for the British.¹⁵⁴

In a last-ditch attempt, the UK appealed to the United Nations Security Council to prohibit the nationalization

of Iranian Oil.¹⁵⁵ Mossadegh was brought to speak for the delegates. There, he lamented the tiredness of Iran's people in the ongoing crisis.¹⁵⁶ On October 19th, the UNSC postponed the issue indefinitely because of a lack of consensus in the room.¹⁵⁷ The next day, American journalist James Reston commented on the event in the *New York Times*. He noted how "the Iranian oil dispute has done something that no other dispute in the history of the United Nations has been able to do, it has proved that it is possible to have an argument in the United Nations in which everybody loses."¹⁵⁸

Since the nationalization of Iran's oil was now an international matter, Mossadegh wanted to appeal to U.S. citizens. He compared Iran's struggle to the American Revolution, appearing in American television interviews several times and even touring cities, from New York to Washington.¹⁵⁹ In a confidential report to President Truman, Mossadegh had been classified as "supported by the majority of the population."¹⁶⁰ When the two met, Truman noted that America was sympathetic towards Iran. However, the negotiations were largely unsuccessful, potentially because Truman knew that Mossadegh's anti-foreign influence stance clashed with the Shah's acceptance of US economic assistance.¹⁶¹

Empty-handed, Mossadegh returned to Iran just in time for the 17th parliamentary election. This would decide who became a member of parliament in Iran. The National Front won votes from big cities like Tehran and Tabriz. However, in rural areas, the National Front was not the majority vote.¹⁶² Incidentally, these were the exact areas where there was increased political violence and protests because of the NIOC.¹⁶³ Moreover, among Mossadegh's aides, there was a concern that many of

149 Stephen Kinzer, "All the Shah's Men," (John Wiley & Sons, 2003).

150 Simin Fadaee, "Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society", (New York: Routledge, 2012).

151 Fadaee, "Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society".

152 Simin Fadaee, "Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society", (New York: Routledge, 2012).

153 Stephen Kinzer, "All the Shah's Men," (John Wiley & Sons, 2003).

154 Simin Fadaee, "Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society", (New York: Routledge, 2012).

155 Stephen Kinzer, "All the Shah's Men," (John Wiley & Sons, 2003).

156 Kinzer, "All the Shah's Men."

157 Simin Fadaee, "Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society", (New York: Routledge, 2012).

158 James Reston, "Iranian Oil Debate at U.N. Disappoints All Involved; Session Becomes Bore Soon after Its Start Case Reflects Change in World Body an Election Was Coming up Faces Tough Decision," *The New York Times*, October 16, 1951, sec. Archives, <https://www.nytimes.com/1951/10/16/archives/iranian-oil-debate-at-un-disappoints-all-involved-session-becomes.html>.

159 Simin Fadaee, "Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society", (New York: Routledge, 2012).

160 Fadaee, "Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society".

161 James Reston, "Iranian Oil Debate at U.N. Disappoints All Involved; Session Becomes Bore Soon after Its Start Case Reflects Change in World Body an Election Was Coming up Faces Tough Decision," *The New York Times*, October 16, 1951, sec. Archives, <https://www.nytimes.com/1951/10/16/archives/iranian-oil-debate-at-un-disappoints-all-involved-session-becomes.html>.

162 Stephen Kinzer, "All the Shah's Men," (John Wiley & Sons, 2003).

163 Kinzer, "All the Shah's Men."

these newly elected ministers were under the direct control of the British.¹⁶⁴ These two reasons made Mossadegh very paranoid that he could lose the majority of his voters. Because of this, he legally halted the election, out of fear that the results would reveal that he was not as popular as he was.¹⁶⁵

Mossadegh was aware that Iran was in a bad state. Several thousand Iranians were unemployed from oil sanctions at refineries, and the economy was in a dire state after Mossadegh's nationalization efforts stopped the West from assisting Iran economically.¹⁶⁶ Iran's citizens became poorer every day. Furthermore, the British Navy blocked ports.¹⁶⁷ Mossadegh's coalition began to fall apart, and the Prime Minister was desperate.¹⁶⁸ Believing that he was losing popularity, Mossadegh nominated his War Minister for the position of Prime Minister. This was because he was a member of the National Front and would continue the work that Mossadegh started. However, the Shah used his authority to refuse this proposed nomination. What resulted was the

dismissal of Mossadegh as Prime Minister.¹⁶⁹ In response, the National Front called for mass protests, which led to several deaths in major cities.¹⁷⁰ The Shah immediately backed down, and asked Mossadegh to form a new government, which leads to where the committee will take place.¹⁷¹

As of now, Mossadegh has attained “emergency powers for six months to decree any law he felt necessary for obtaining not only financial solvency, but also electoral, judicial, and educational reforms.”¹⁷² What this means is that the committee will take place right after Mossadegh was reinstated as Prime Minister. This is during the height of political instability, economic struggles, and foreign animosity. Over the next few months, the fate of the Iranian people and country will be determined based on the actions of his cabinet, both domestically and internationally.

164 James Reston, “Iranian Oil Debate at U.N. Disappoints All Involved; Session Becomes Bore Soon after Its Start Case Reflects Change in World Body an Election Was Coming up Faces Tough Decision,” *The New York Times*, October 16, 1951, sec. Archives, <https://www.nytimes.com/1951/10/16/archives/iranian-oil-debate-at-un-disappoints-all-involved-session-becomes.html>.

165 Stephen Kinzer, “All the Shah's Men,” (John Wiley & Sons, 2003).

166 Kinzer, “All the Shah's Men.”

167 Kinzer, “All the Shah's Men.”

168 Fadaee, “Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society”.

169 Sandra Mackey, “The Iranians Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation.” (New York Plume, 1998).

170 Stephen Kinzer, “All the Shah's Men,” (John Wiley & Sons, 2003).

171 Sandra Mackey, “The Iranians Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation.” (New York Plume, 1998).

172 Mackey, “The Iranians Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation.”

Different groups of people in a Demonstration supporting Nationalization of Oil Industry

Credit: fouman.com



Bloc Analysis

Points of Division

During the mid-twentieth century, there were many internal conflicts in Iran's government and different factions had different roles. This meant that there were many divisions in the country often centered around social and political forces. It is important to know the differences between these factions because only then can we truly understand the crises at hand.

The main divide is between the two parties. Firstly, some focus on economic development. Secondly, some focus on social reform. Those focused on economic development want to enhance Iran's geopolitical standing through oil nationalization. While social reformers also support oil nationalization, their primary focus is on workers' rights and welfare, looking to improve living conditions for Iran's citizens. Moderate centrists are those who stay on the middle ground. Similar to the last two, they support oil nationalization but want to look at issues with caution and stability, preventing any radical actions from groups like the clerics, or the Tudeh party. Bringing these groups closer would help the coalition government survive. Another group would be the diplomats. While not a formal bloc, diplomats are very influential and can provide knowledge about international relations to fellow

cabinet members. However, more often than not, diplomats have their political agendas unrelated to other blocs.

The relationship between these blocs is important because it will influence Iran's stance on regional and global issues. For example, economic modernizers might want to engage in foreign talks with Western powers while social reformers might want to focus on human rights. Meanwhile, moderate centrists might want a balanced approach to the issue.

It is important to balance these powers because that very balance will determine the country's trajectory and social development. Therefore, collaboration is of the utmost importance.

Economic Modernizers

The Economic Modernizers in Mossadegh's government want to make Iran's economy stronger through modernizing the country's infrastructure and expanding the industry. This would make Iran a bigger player in the international community, which is very important especially with the Cold War happening. These government officials prioritize the industrialization and stabilization of Iran's economy. Outside of this, they want to diversify Iran's exports. This would push the country to a stronger geopolitical power in the region.

Mossadegh addressing the UNSC

Credit: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum



One of the key parts of their focus is heavy industry. They wanted to invest in machinery that would help Iran become more stable and have more job opportunities because this would lay the foundation for long-term growth.¹⁷³ Also, the development of Infrastructure was another priority. This included building roads, railways, and ports that would promote trade. By making infrastructure more up-to-date, Iran could fit into the global economy in a way that would help attract foreign investment.

Some specific people that were important to Iran's economic strategy was Ali-Akbar Akhavi. Akhavi was the National Economy Minister and was able to influence national economic policies. He could also push for reforms that support growing Iran's industry.¹⁷⁴ Also, Mehdi Bazargan, who was the Managing Director of the National Iranian Oil Company. He was directly involved in the oil industry. This was essential because he managed the transition from foreign control to national control.

Social Reformers

In Mossadegh's government, social reformers wanted to introduce social change. They wanted to provide education, health care, and labor rights to the public. Social reformers believe that workers need benefits. This is not limited to higher-up members of the community. Staff at all levels should be able to acquire benefits and accomplish secure and confident skills in the community.

Dr. Sabar Mirza Farman Farmaian is the minister responsible for public health care matters. He played a great role in the process of health reforms.¹⁷⁵ He increased funding for public health. He also built hospitals and trained doctors and nurses. This was to ensure that every citizen could be treated, regardless of their position in society.¹⁷⁶

Labor rights were another major interest for the Social

Reformers. The Minister of Labor was Ibrahim Alemi. He led the struggle to ensure fairness and equal rights for workers.¹⁷⁷ They were required to join and promote their worker's organizations. This was done so that they could defend just wages. It was also so they could ask for reasonable work shifts and the safety of workers at their workplaces. This allowed them to speak their minds in political areas. By regulating labor conditions, they were looking to develop a more efficient and happy workforce. This was done so that it could boost the economy and stability.

Moderate Centrists

There were also moderate centrists in Mossadegh's cabinet. These politicians mainly wanted balance. More specifically, they wanted to balance economic development, as well as social stability. Their primary focus was to ensure that the government remained intact. Centrists tried to make slow but sustainable reforms. These would address Iran's needs. However, they would not provoke any social backlash. For example, they wanted to make industries more up-to-date. They also wanted infrastructure to improve. Finally, they wanted trade to increase. These would all be done at a stable pace. Centrists wanted to build a resilient economy. This was so that it could grow steadily. Also, it would ensure that development could last until the end of the century. Economic development was essential. However, social harmony also needed to be pursued. Centrists pushed for social reforms that addressed the public. However, they wanted to make sure that there was no resistance to these reforms. Given this, there is a chance these centrists could work alongside the social reformers.

Moderate centrists believed in communication. This includes communication with all influential groups in Iran. Some examples of influential groups are the clerics, as well as various political factions. For example, the Speaker of the National

173 Willem Floor, "Industrialization in Iran: 1900-1941", University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Occasional Paper, no. 23, 1984.

174 Shaul Bakhash, "The Politics of Oil and Revolution in Iran: A Staff Paper", Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1982. ISBN 978-0-8157-1776-8.

175 Narges Shahbazi, and Ehsan Mostafavi, "Scientists and Science Advocates: Dr. Sabar Mirza Farman Farmaian; Benefactor and Former Director of Pasteur Institute of Iran", Iranian biomedical journal vol. 22,1 (2018): 1-3.

176 Shahbazi, and Mostafavi, "Scientists and Science Advocates: Dr. Sabar Mirza Farman Farmaian; Benefactor and Former Director of Pasteur Institute of Iran".

177 Ervand Abrahamian, "The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations," New York: The New Press. p. 130., 2013, ISBN 978-1-59558-826-5.

Consultative Assembly, Abol-Ghasem Kashani, engaged with clerics. The political groups in Iran represent diverse interests. Because of this, the Moderate Centrists aimed to create widespread support for their policies.¹⁷⁸ This inclusive approach helped build consensus. It also helped stop conflicts arising from radical actions.

Moderate centrists had a cautious approach. They wanted to keep the government functioning. However, there are many different views within the cabinet, and Iran overall. Given this, how will moderate centrists prevent further unrest?

The Diplomats

Not all diplomats are ministers. However, they hold vital knowledge in politics. This is especially important if they are from different states. This is because they could add insight to the cabinet members, aiding the cabinet in decision-making. This insight would help the cabinet in decision-making. It would also ensure they have their influence in Iran's politics. Diplomats wanted to advance Iran's interests. Specifically, they wanted to make sure that Iran's sovereignty was secure amidst the Cold War tensions.¹⁷⁹

Balancing relations with the East and the West was very challenging. However, it was a big part of the diplomats' work. The Cold War era needed caution. Aligning too closely with either the United States or the Soviet Union was dangerous. Doing so could jeopardize Iran's already compromised sovereignty. Because of this, appeasement was critical.¹⁸⁰ Diplomats needed to maintain relations with both superpowers. For example, there was the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Nadir Arasteh. Arasteh was able to manage Iran's relationship with the East. Since he understood Soviet politics, he helped negotiate trade and the military. Also, there was the Ambassador to the United States, Nasrollah Entezam. Entezam also balanced Iran's relations with the West. He focused on economic aid. Also, he helped advocate for Iran's independence and non-alignment. These Ambassadors

focused on diplomacy. This ensured that Iran could navigate the geopolitics around them.¹⁸¹

Committee Mission

Iran's parliament is known informally as the Majlis. They have been the legislative body of Iran for almost half a century. The Majlis' priority is to ensure that Iran's people have welfare. The ministers in the Majlis represent many different backgrounds in Iran, which means that they all hold individual powers. As a whole, the Majlis can draft, debate, and pass laws related to anything in Iran. They can approve the national budget, for example. Also, they are responsible for approving international agreements. Individually, though, each minister has a different position. This means that their priorities might be different from other ministers.

Iran's cabinet must understand its position. Currently, the cabinet is preparing to map out Iran's future after the AIOC was nationalized. The cabinet will be unable to influence countries like the United Kingdom because this country has a strict position on the issue. However, this does not mean the cabinet is powerless. The cabinet could form ties with states that are not rich in oil. Also, they could partner with other countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Moreover, the cabinet should decide how Iran can make its economy bigger to ensure that crises do not happen in the future. Cabinet ministers must also handle unrest at home. For example, the quality of life in Iran is decreasing. If this continues, organizations that oppose the government will gain more support. Some examples would be the clerics or the Shah, himself. Since they lost a majority of their power to Mossadegh, they could see this as an opportunity to get their power back.

These next few months are incredibly important. They will decide what country Iran will be in decades to come. Cabinet members must make sure to push for Iran's position as a new

178 Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954," eds. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 43.

179 Lawler and Mahan, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954."

180 Shahram Chubin, Sepehr Zabih, and Paul Seabury, "Relations With the Soviet Union," In *The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great Power Conflict*, DGO-Digital original, 1., 36–85, University of California Press, 1974. <https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.8306043.7>.

181 Chubin, Zabih, and Seabury, "Relations With the Soviet Union."

powerful and independent country. If the ministers remain committed to the people's needs, they can foster unity and forge Iran a bright future. In a moment of history marked by revolution and instability, Iran finally has the chance to mark change in the region, free from political violence.

Committee Representatives

Agriculture Minister - Khalil Taleghani

After receiving his degree in construction engineering, Taleghani became a faculty member at Tehran University. Eventually, he worked as the technical director for the Golpayegan Dam to control rivers, irrigate fields, and produce energy approved by the Ministry of Agriculture in the government while simultaneously serving as the Minister of Agriculture in 1951. Though he quit after 18 months, Taleghani returned and was responsible for the joint fund of Iran and the US to build construction projects in the country. Moreover, he spearheaded the construction of the Amir Kabir Dam designed to provide water electricity, and oil production in Qom.¹ His contributions were recognized and honored by the Shah, highlighting his role as a force behind the nation's efforts to modernize its agricultural and energy sectors during a period of turmoil.

Ambassador to the Soviet Union - Nadir Arasteh

Before his tenure as the Ambassador, Arasteh repeatedly held various ministerial posts within the Iranian government.² His diplomatic efforts were vital in tackling various unresolved financial and logistical issues between the two countries that had been ongoing since World War II. During his time in office, Arasteh attempted to address these issues, which mirrored the more prominent political battles of the era. Specifically, on July 21, 1949, Arasteh presented a list of complaints from the Iranian government to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Complaints consisted of the payment owed to the National Bank of Iran by the USSR State Bank, amounting to over 11 million grams of pure gold and USD 8.6 million, significant unpaid debts from the Iranian railways, and the operation of the Soviet-Iranian Fishery Company.³ Arasteh emphasized the importance of resolving these issues to strengthen good-neighborly relations. His involvement exemplified Iran's efforts to balance Western and Soviet influences and navigate the internal and external factors affecting its foreign policy to ensure equitable treatment from the Soviet Union.

Ambassador to the United States - Nasrollah Entezam

Born as a member of the Qajari royal family, Entezam has worked in politics for his entire life.⁴ Over the past decades, he has held various influential positions within the Iranian government. These include representing the APOC when it negotiated its terms in Geneva in 1933.⁵ During the Anglo-Soviet Occupation, he served in multiple ministerial positions, including Public Health, Post, Roads, and Foreign Affairs.⁶ With experience in nearly every aspect of the Iranian government, Entezam's position as ambassador to the United States serves as a bridge between Iran and the West. Despite heightened tensions with the United Kingdom, Entezam can leverage his connections in the First World to advance both his interests and those of his country.

Culture Minister - Mehdi Azar

Although Azar came from a family of clerics and politicians, he studied and practiced medicine until the formation of the

1 Robert L. Rosenberg, "Qum-1956: A Misadventure in Iranian Oil", *Business History Review*. (Spring 1975). 49 (1):87. doi:10.2307/3112963.

2 Paul Preston, Michael Partridge, Bülent Gökay, "British Documents on Foreign Affairs Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print: From 1951 through 1956," *Near and Middle East 1951*, LexisNexis, 2005 - 392 p., p. 240.

3 Jamil Hasanli, "Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History," f. 82, op. 2, d. 1217, ll. 57-62.

4 Paul M. Edwards and Spencer C. Tucker, "Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History," *The Journal of Military History* 65, no. 1 (January 2001): 244, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2677496>.

5 Geoff Berridge and Lorna Lloyd, "The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy," (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

6 Arash Azizi, "Nasrollah Entezam: The Only Iranian President of the United Nations General Assembly," *The Independent Persian*, September 23, 2019, <https://www.independentpersian.com/node/21701>.

National Front.⁷ Azar served as the Secretary for Foreign Relations and was imprisoned in 1949 for his political activities.⁸ Now, as Minister of Culture, Azar dictates the educational and cultural institutions of Iran. He maintains connections to clerics and religious institutions due to his family's ties but also personally exhibits strong sympathies for Western social ideologies.⁹ As Iran solidifies itself as a neutral and independent power in the Middle East, Azar will steer the balance between Westernization and traditional values in modern Iranian culture.

Finance Minister - Bagher Kazemi

Kazemi had a background in politics from a young age, studying law and political science at the University of Tehran and then serving as a diplomat to the United States after graduation.¹⁰ Kazemi would continue his studies in the United States, but would soon after be placed in various minor ministerial positions in Iran. In 1932 he was appointed Governor of the East Azerbaijan Province.¹¹ Now, as the Finance Minister Kazemi is tasked to use his skill set and connections to solve two of Iran's biggest problems. He must find a way to lessen the impact of the oil crisis on the Iranian economy and help bring trade back to the country. Furthermore, during this period of weakness, he must ensure no instability can occur in his regions of influence in northern Iran.

Foreign Minister - Hossein Navab

A career diplomat, Navab served in various roles before his current ministerial position, including as consul for the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, but most significantly as consul general for the mission in New York.¹² Now as the Foreign Minister in the Cabinet, Navab is tasked with maintaining relationships, both positive and negative with all other countries of the World. As Iran breaks away from its one-sided terms with the United Kingdom, Navab's contacts in consulates across the globe could steer Iran towards breaking or forming new alliances.

Interior Minister - Gholam Hossein Sadighi

Known as the founding father of sociology in Iran, Sadighi was a loyalist to Mosaddegh who served as his interior minister and was quite popular amongst the people.¹³ Being the interior minister, Sadighi's responsibilities include being responsible for internal affairs like public security and supervision of local and regional governments.

Justice Minister - Abdolali Lotfi

Iranian politician and judge, Lotfi, was one of the communists who were considered a dangerous threat to Iran.¹⁴ Being the minister of justice, Lotfi is managing Iran's justice system. This role involves managing the legal framework, overseeing trials, and ensuring the proper functioning of the courts. His responsibilities also extend to maintaining law and order within the country.

7 Harvard Library, "Interview with Mehdi Azar," Iranian Oral History Project - Curiosity Digital Collections, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20211226152601/https://curiosity.lib.harvard.edu/iranian-oral-history-project/catalog/32-azar__mehdi06.

8 Harvard Library, "Interview with Mehdi Azar,"

9 Ervand Abrahamian, "The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations", (New York, Ny: New Press, 2015).

10 Dawood Kazemi, "Notes from the Life of Bagher Kazemi," Oral History, 2024, <https://oral-history.ir/show.php?page=books&id=612>.

11 Kazemi, "Notes from the Life of Bagher Kazemi,"

12 Mortimer Epstein, "The Statesman's Year-Book," Palgrave Macmillan EBooks (Palgrave Macmillan, 1934), 1200, <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230270633>.

13 Hamid Sabi, "Review of A Leaderless Revolution: The Stark Choice Facing Iranians," Iranwire. October 2022. <https://iranwire.com/en/politics/108564-a-leaderless-revolution-the-stark-choice-facing-iranians/>.

14 Abrahamian, "The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations".

Labor Minister - Ibrahim Alemi

Thrust into a relatively new position formed in the wake of mass labor strikes and unionization, Alemi must work towards ensuring the workers of Iran are content and focused on improving the economy.¹⁵ Alemi studied law in France, gaining an understanding of the complex labor rights and laws in Western society.¹⁶ As Labor Minister Alemi will be the one to take charge of any internal labor disputes, especially as British administrators and workers leave in masse. With the formation of the NIOC, Alemi must also tackle the question of how Iran will unionize to protect itself from foreign influence.

Managing Director of the National Iranian Oil Company - Mehdi Bazargan

Born into an Azerbaijani family in Tehran, Bazargan studied engineering abroad in France after finishing secondary school.¹⁷ After finishing his studies and compulsory military service, he became the first head of the engineering department at the University of Tehran.¹⁸ Due to his experience in linguistics and politics he became deputy prime minister, until the Nationalization Act was finalized.¹⁹ Now, as the director of the National Iranian Oil Company, the largest and most influential corporation in Iran, Bazargan must leverage his engineering and political skills to ensure the company can survive without foreign backing.

Member of Parliament - Ahmad Zirakzadeh

Born into an extremely influential religious family, his father served as a cleric traveling the country and settling in the Bakhtiari region.²⁰ During the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, some khans sent their sons to France to study abroad to experience Western culture.²¹ After their return, Gholamhossein, the son of one of those khans, shared his father's experiences of democracy and nationalism.²² Zirakzadeh would also study in France and soon after joined the National Front in hopes of recreating those same Western ideals in Iran.²³ Now he serves as the Parliamentary Member who represents Tehran, the most politically active and important city in Iran. As its representative, he aims to recreate the same society he once studied in, now in his home country.

Member of Parliament - Asghar Parsa

One of the youngest members of the Iranian Parliament, Parsa represents Khoy, a district in Western Azerbaijan.²⁴ Although he was originally born in Khoy, Parsa worked as a diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after attending the University of Tehran.²⁵ As the deputy for the Office of Treaties, he oversaw many signing ceremonies and worked closely with foreign delegations both in the West and Middle East.²⁶ The region that Parsa currently represents is one of the most democratically free but unstable districts in Iran. Parsa's election is largely considered to be the most free election of the period.²⁷ However, many separatist movements are active within the region to form an independent Southern Azerbaijan. Parsa will have to balance both

15 Abrahamian, "Oil Crisis in Iran: From Nationalism to Coup D'etat," (Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, Ny: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

16 Abrahamian, "Oil Crisis in Iran: From Nationalism to Coup D'etat."

17 The Associated Press, "Mehdi Bazargan, Former Iran Premier, Dies," The New York Times, January 21, 1995, sec. Obituaries, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/21/obituaries/mehdi-bazargan-former-iran-premier-dies.html>.

18 Kourosh Rahimkhani and Mehrzad Boroujerdi, "Iran's Political Elite," The Iran Primer, October 11, 2010, <https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-political-elite>.

19 Rahimkhani and Boroujerdi, "Iran's Political Elite."

20 Harvard Library, "Interview with Zirakzadeh, Ahmad," Iranian Oral History Project - CURIOSity Digital Collections, 1986, https://curiosity.lib.harvard.edu/iranian-oral-history-project/catalog/32-ZIRAKZADEH_AHMAD01.

21 "Interview with Zirakzadeh, Ahmad,"

22 "Interview with Zirakzadeh, Ahmad,"

23 "Interview with Zirakzadeh, Ahmad,"

24 Ali Parsa, "Asghar A. Parsa: A Biography in Pictures," Archive.org, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20040613013811/http://www.geocities.com/asghar_p/.

25 Abrahamian, "The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations".

26 Ali Parsa, "Asghar A. Parsa: A Biography in Pictures," Archive.org, 2004, https://web.archive.org/web/20040613013811/http://www.geocities.com/asghar_p/.

27 Parsa, "Asghar A. Parsa: A Biography in Pictures."

his responsibilities to the people of Khoy and the National Front as the Cabinet convenes.

Member of Parliament - Hossein Fatemi

The youngest Foreign Minister in Iranian History, Fatemi was a journalist and newspaper publisher who became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1951. He was described as exceptionally bright and self-assured, becoming the most significant member of Mossadegh's government where he proposed the nationalization of Iranian oil and gas assets.²⁸ Fatemi was unafraid to openly criticize Reza Shah made enemies with powerful politicians and was under police surveillance.²⁹ Not to mention, Fatemi juggled writing speeches for Mossadegh and Makki, producing communiqués/declarations, dispelling propaganda, and mediating arguments among the members of the National Front.³⁰ With his unwavering commitment to Iranian sovereignty, Fatemi needs to ensure Iran's economic autonomy and effectively manage diplomatic relations.

Member of Parliament - Hossein Makki

Iranian politician, orator, and historian, Makki served as a member of Parliament since 1947. Previously he worked for the National Iranian Railroad Company and founded the socialist and nationalist party also referred to as the backbone of the National Front.^{31,32} Makki took an interest in Mossadegh's values and became a founding member of the National Front. As a member of the Parliament, he was dedicated to the nationalization of oil, evident in his speech that stalled an oil agreement that Nationalists opposed for four days.³³ With his background, his ability to sway public opinion and articulate the nationalist perspective in both political and academic spaces will be useful.

Member of Parliament - Karim Sanjabi

Professor at Tehran University Law School and politician, Sanjabi was appointed as the Minister of Education.³⁴ Sanjabi was also considered a firefighter for the Mossadegh Government, his legal skills were useful when Mossadegh nationalized foreign oil interests.³⁵ He spent his younger years advocating for the freedom and democracy of Iran and opposed many of the Shah's acts, spending five years in jail for his outspokenness.³⁶ Despite his anti-imperialist views, he does not seek conflict with the Western powers. Many diplomats who have engaged in discussions with him believe that while there may be hostility, relations will remain cordial as long as Sanjabi remains in the picture.³⁷ Popular amongst the people, Sanjabi is critical in maintaining support for the government's policies and national unity.

National Economy Minister Ali-Akbar Akhavi

Akhavi serves as a key figure in the cabinet due to his specialization and experience in economics. Having studied economics in University he has the most expertise on the Oil Nationalization and its repercussions compared to any other member of

²⁸ Alidad Mafinezam, Aria Mehrabi, "Iran and its Place Among Nations," Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 30. 2008. ISBN 978-0-275-99926-1.

²⁹ Bahram Afrasiabi, *Memoirs and Struggles of Dr. Hossein Fatemi*, (1987, in Farsi), p. 83

³⁰ Reza Nazem, *Seyyed Hossein Fatemi and the Political Transformation in Iran*, (in Farsi), p. 24-25

³¹ Ehsan Yarshater, "Chronology of Iranian History Part 3", Encyclopædia Iranica. Bibliotheca Persica Press.

³² Abrahamian, "The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations".

³³ Ali Rahnama, "Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and Spooks," Cambridge University Press. p. 306. (24 November 2014). ISBN 978-1107076068.

³⁴ Wolfgang Saxon, "Karim Sanjabi, Politician, 90, Foe of Shah and Islamic Militants," The New York Times, July 7, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/07/obituaries/karim-sanjabi-politician-90-foe-of-shah-and-islamic-militants.html>

³⁵ Youssef Ibrahim, "A Bridge between Two Worlds in Iran," The New York Times, February 16, 1979, sec. Archives, <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/02/16/archives/a-bridge-between-two-worlds-in-iran-karim-sanjabi-man-in-the-news.html>.

³⁶ Ibrahim, "A Bridge between Two Worlds in Iran."

³⁷ Ibrahim, "A Bridge between Two Worlds in Iran."

the Cabinet or Parliament.³⁸ As the National Economy Minister Akhavi's primary responsibilities lie in managing Iran's trade partners and managing its macroeconomic policies. As the oil crisis continues to unfold he can act as an expert in economic policy to the cabinet to lessen the impact of the British pull-out from Iran. Furthermore, as Iran attempts to diversify its exports he will be vital in securing new long-term trade partners for Iranian goods.

Permanent Representative to the United Nations - Aligholi Ardalan

Of all of the current ministers and parliamentary members, no one has more experience in Foreign Affairs than Aligholi Ardalan. From 1924 to 1927 he served as deputy of the Iranian embassy in Berlin, then joined the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the age of 30.³⁹ He soon after became political officer at the Iranian Embassy in Washington DC, and now functions as Iran's direct connection to the United Nations.⁴⁰ Although Iran diplomatically has missions to several nations, the UN's various committees allow for a forum for Iran to appeal any current and previous injustices perpetrated against them. Not only can the UN help with mediating any multilateral disagreements or crises, but Ardalan can also form relationships with newly independent and neutral states.

Post and Telegraph Minister - Seyfollah Moazzami

As the brother of Abdullah Moazzami, a current parliamentary member, and having studied and worked as an electrical engineer for several years, this newly created position was perfect for Moazzami.⁴¹ Iran currently faces a major issue in that many of its regions are unable to maintain communications with each other. To remedy this, Moazzami's position as the Post and Telegraph Minister was created to unite both big cities like Tehran with rural areas like Kermanshah.⁴² Those rural areas have relied on their internal communication systems for decades, however, this level of autonomy has led to revolts and instability in the past.⁴³ Moazzami must find a way to unite Iran at a time when the country is most fragmented.

Public Health Minister - Sabar Farmanfarmaian

First son of Persian Qajar prince and nobleman Abdol Hossein Mirza Farmanfarma, Farmanfarmaian was a doctor and researcher. In 1939, he spent his time in the military service as a physician, then was appointed as the manager of the Malaria Eradication and Control Program in 1943.⁴⁴ Farmanfarmaian devoted part of his life to controlling malaria in different parts of the world such as Asia and Africa.⁴⁵ Described as a warm-blooded man, he is a valuable asset to the cabinet to modernize Iran and improve the well-being of its citizens, strengthening the government's credibility in promoting social welfare and public health.

Roads Minister - Javad Bushehri

Bushehri was born in the port city Bushehr in 1893 and studied in England and Switzerland. Following his return to Iran, he became a member of the Majlis. While in Iran, however, he had a strained relationship with Reza Shah, and he left for Europe out

38 Harvard Library, "Interview with Zirakzadeh, Ahmad," Iranian Oral History Project - CURIOSity Digital Collections, 1986, https://curiosity.lib.harvard.edu/iranian-oral-history-project/catalog/32-ZIRAKZADEH_AHMAD01.

39 Roham Alvandi, "The Shah's Détente with Khrushchev: Iran's 1962 Missile Base Pledge to the Soviet Union," *Cold War History* 14, no. 3 (April 14, 2014): 423–44, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2014.890591>.

40 "Iran's Ali Gholi Ardalan on Improving East-West Relations (1951)," The Mossadegh Project, 2024, <https://www.mohammadmossadegh.com/biography/ali-gholi-ardalan/1951-san-francisco-peace-conference/>.

41 Abrahamian, "Oil Crisis in Iran: From Nationalism to Coup D'état."

42 Abrahamian, "The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations".

43 Abrahamian, "The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations".

44 Narges Shahbazi and Ehsan Mostafavi, "Scientists and Science Advocates: Dr. Sabar Mirza Farman Farmaian; Benefactor and Former Director of Pasteur Institute of Iran," *Iranian biomedical journal* vol. 22,1 (2018): 1-3.

45 Shahbazi and Mostafavi, "Scientists and Science Advocates: Dr. Sabar Mirza Farman Farmaian; Benefactor and Former Director of Pasteur Institute of Iran."

of fear that the Shah would arrest him.⁴⁶ After the Shah was exiled, Bushehri came back and was made the Minister of Agriculture in 1948. In 1951, Bushehri became the minister of roads, an important position, including overseeing road safety and urban planning, amongst others.⁴⁷

Speaker of the National Consultative Assembly - Abol-Ghasem Kashani

Raised by a religious family, Kashani was a cleric and politician.⁴⁸ He was always against foreign intervention, thus gaining favor from the majority of the Iranian population. Because he supported the Nazis, Ayatollah Kashani was detained and sent away by the British to Palestine in 1941.⁴⁹ Though he still remained against foreign, mainly British, domination of Iran's oil sector. Following his exile, he protested upon his return in 1950. Upset by the unfair payment disparity between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Kashani was among the few mujtahids to support Mosaddeq's efforts to nationalize the oil industry.⁵⁰ His position can be useful towards maintaining popular support, especially among conservatives, and for reinforcing the government's stance on sovereignty.

⁴⁶ Ardeshir Zahedi, "The Memoirs of Ardeshir Zahedi", Ibex Publishers, 2012.

⁴⁷ Zahedi, "The Memoirs of Ardeshir Zahedi".

⁴⁸ Nozhan Etezadosaltaneh, "Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows," Fair Observer, September 28, 2017. https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/iran-coup-iranian-america-relations-mossadegh-world-news-today-97231/#

⁴⁹ Sohrab Sobhani, "The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988," (PhD thesis). Georgetown University, 1989.

⁵⁰ Abrahamian Ervand, "Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic", I.B.Tauris, 1993. p.108

Research and Preparation Questions

Your dais has prepared the following research and preparation questions as a means of providing guidance for your research process. These questions should be carefully considered, as they embody some of the main critical thought and learning objectives surrounding your topic.

Topic A

1. With oil being the backbone of Iran's national economy, should cabinet members focus on finding new trade partners, potentially in other regions of the world, or should they attempt to diversify Iran's economy away from its heavy reliance on oil?
2. How do the ideological divisions within Iran's government, particularly between Mossadegh's nationalist faction and the Shah's more conservative allies, influence the country's approach to resolving the current oil nationalization crisis?
3. While Mossadegh's government and the British have fundamentally different goals for the future of Iran's oil industry? Is there room for compromise that could satisfy both sides without undermining Iran's sovereignty?
4. How can Mossadegh's government maintain their levels of popularity amongst their citizens and prevent civil unrest under the economic challenges that Iran is facing with the lack of oil exports?
5. What countries do your characters believe Iran should ally itself with while navigating its precarious geopolitical location in the Cold War? Developed Western countries? Newly developing countries?
6. How can Iran best rid their country of foreign influence and maintain their sovereignty despite international calls denouncing their oil nationalization?

Important Documents

Topic A

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