



**NHSMUN**

**UNHSC (1991)**

**UPDATE PAPER**

**Secretary-General**  
**Terry Wang**

**Director-General**  
**Jordan Baker**

**Delegate Experience**  
**Nastasja Vásquez**  
**Ximena Faz**

**Global Partnerships**  
**Pierce Jau Hunter**  
**Natalia Carrillo**

**Under-Secretaries-General**

**Nachiketh Anand**  
**Alina Castillo**

**Seonghyun Chang**  
**Naina Dhawan**

**Ximena Faz**  
**Kellie Fernandez**

**Grace Harb**  
**Adiva Ara Khan**

**Anshul Magal**  
**Analucia Tello**

**Sofia Velasco**  
**Renata Venzor**

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to NHSMUN 2025! My name is Fiona Zheng and I will be your Assistant Director for Session 1 in the Historical United Nations Security Council. I am so excited to meet all of you soon.

I was first introduced to NHSMUN during my Sophomore year of High School and was immediately interested in joining the conference because of its location. Born and raised in NYC, I was so excited to participate in one of the biggest MUN conferences in my hometown. At the conference, I had the chance to meet delegates from all over the world. As a single delegate representing North Korea, I was beyond nervous. But with each session, the encouragement and constructive feedback from the conference directors fueled my growth. Their guidance taught me invaluable lessons in diplomacy, critical thinking, and perseverance. These experiences shaped my vision for future MUN conferences, inspiring me to foster an environment where delegates are empowered to debate, collaborate, and negotiate within a competitive yet diplomatic setting. Leaving NHSMUN, I knew it was not going to be my last time there. As a first-time staffer, I am excited to see what session 1 has to bring for this committee!

Outside of NHSMUN, I am a freshman at New York University (NYU), studying Economics and Global Liberal Studies. I am involved with the NYU Model UN club and will be chairing for collegiate-level NYUMUNC this coming April. As a New Yorker, I love the city and would never trade it for anything! Aside from academics, I am a huge espresso lover. I love cafe hopping, and working at a cafe during the school year has taught me a lot about coffee. In addition to lattes, I also love eating pizza.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me or my director, Darwin Bryen. We are more than happy to help out and look forward to reading the position papers. Lastly, I wish you all the best of luck with your preparations and hope you make the most of your time here in the greatest city in the world!

Best,

Fiona Zheng

[nhsmun.hsc@imuna.org](mailto:nhsmun.hsc@imuna.org)

United Nations Historical Security Council

Session 1



**Secretary-General**  
**Terry Wang**

**Director-General**  
**Jordan Baker**

**Delegate Experience**  
**Nastasja Vásquez**  
**Ximena Faz**

**Global Partnerships**  
**Pierce Jau Hunter**  
**Natalia Carrillo**

**Under-Secretaries-General**

**Nachiketh Anand**  
**Alina Castillo**  
**Seonghyun Chang**  
**Naina Dhawan**  
**Ximena Faz**

**Kellie Fernandez**  
**Grace Harb**  
**Adiva Ara Khan**  
**Anshul Magal**  
**Analucia Tello**  
**Sofia Velasco**  
**Renata Venzor**

Hello Delegates!

My name is Adeeb Harb, and I cannot wait to be your Historical Security Council Session 2 Assistant Director for this year's NHSMUN.

My MUN career began in High School. I started attending conferences across the UAE, gaining more skills and knowledge after each experience! These events hold a special place in my heart, as they allowed me to develop a lot as a person and meet so many new people. This will be my first time at NHSMUN, as I have never attended as a delegate, so I cannot wait for the conference to begin.

Currently, I am pursuing my degree in Computer Information Technology at Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT Dubai). Even though it's quite different from politics or other disciplines associated with MUN, I have always found it quite interesting.

Moving away from my academic side, I LOVE to listen to music and currently play four instruments (but mainly the guitar). I also consider myself an athletic person; I play three sports consistently—football, basketball, and volleyball—but I do enjoy others occasionally as well, especially padel or table tennis! I am also a fan of chess.

I really encourage you to take advantage of attending NHSMUN. Regardless of how much previous experience you have, use the conference to meet new people, develop a skill, or step out of your comfort zone a bit; you will thank yourself later!

The topics of “The War in the Gulf 1991” and “The Situation in Yugoslavia 1991” may appear challenging, but I am excited to see you conquer their dynamic aspects through your debates and resolutions. With NHSMUN being mere weeks away, I cannot wait to see what you all have to offer.

In the meantime, if you have any questions, do reach out to us at any point. As the HSC dais, Reuben and I are here to help!

Best,

Adeeb Harb

[nhsmun.hsc@imuna.org](mailto:nhsmun.hsc@imuna.org)

United Nations Historical Security Council

Session 2





UNHSC (1991)

NHSMUN 2025



**TOPIC A:**  
**THE SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA (1991)**

Photo Credit: Danilo Škofič

## Introduction

The situation in the Balkan Peninsula has attracted the international community's attention. The outbreak of conflict in Slovenia and Croatia has pushed the region into further instability. Serbia's general election in 1990 marked an important step from the one-party system to a more democratic one.<sup>1</sup> However, the elections only increased the deepening conflicts between the various ethnic groups of Yugoslavia. The slowing economic growth of the country has caused even greater conflict between the various republics.

There was high-income inequality across the country, with Croatia and Slovenia being some of the most developed republics of Yugoslavia. Their high level of development created conflict and distrust from the other republics that demanded more resources to advance as well. The divisions over how to solve these matters were even more important as the 1990 elections began. As these issues appeared and more Yugoslavians considered how they should vote, nationalist sentiment began to rise across the country.<sup>2</sup> More people began to consider the idea of having their republic break off and become independent.

At the same time, Yugoslavia suffered from hyperinflation, unemployment, and foreign debt. This was based on several factors. For instance, the socialist, centralized system in place after World War II prevented innovation and efficient production. This would eventually lead to stagnation. Foreign investors were not interested in the country, and everyday people saw their wages stop growing. Wealthier regions like Slovenia and Croatia felt burdened by helping poor areas, especially Kosovo and Macedonia.<sup>3</sup> Most of all, the end of the Cold War changed the way international trade was conducted, isolating Yugoslavia more. These challenges created the perfect conditions for a nationalist movement. Leaders began blaming other groups for economic problems rather than fixing internal issues.

Delegates should consider the quickly changing conditions in Yugoslavia. The situation in Slovenia and Croatia is far from being solved, and the poor economy increases the risk

of government collapse. The rise of nationalism could set off events that negatively influence peace and security in the future. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) should formulate useful policies and actions before it is too late.

## 1990 Serbian General Elections

The economic decline destroyed public trust in the government and also fueled desperation among ethnic groups. As inflation soared and unemployment rates reached unexpected heights, people blamed their bad economic situation on others, allowing historic ethnic tensions to grow again. Political leaders took advantage of this by presenting themselves as champions of their ethnic communities and pointing to other groups as responsible for the economic situation.<sup>4</sup> This would create a dangerous environment where citizens organize themselves based on ethnic groups instead of as united Yugoslavians.<sup>5</sup> National and ethnic identities began to clash against each other.

This cycle of blame and finger-pointing strengthened ethnic rivalries and destroyed any hope for a united national identity. President Josip Broz Tito's vision for a Yugoslavian identity began to crumble among the various ethnic groups. As a result, the worse the economic situation became, the less the likelihood of cooperative governance existed. Nationalist parties were able to exploit these grievances in the critical 1990 elections. Their actions would add significant weight to the knowledge of how the economic factors and political

1 Dragoljub Popović, *Transition to Democracy*, (Paderborn: Brill, 2021), chap. 11, [https://doi.org/10.30965/9783657791026\\_012](https://doi.org/10.30965/9783657791026_012).

2 Vladislav Sotirovic, "1990 Yugoslav Election And The Destruction Of The Country," *CounterCurrents*, March 18, 2023, <https://countercurrents.org/2023/03/1990-yugoslav-election-and-the-destruction-of-the-country/>.

3 Leonard Kukić, "Origins of regional divergence: economic growth in socialist Yugoslavia," *The Economic History Review* 73, no. 4 (2020) pp. 1097-1127, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.12967>.

4 Žižmond, Egon. "The Collapse of the Yugoslav Economy." *Soviet Studies* 44, no. 1 (1992): 101-12. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/152249>.

5 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2010).

movements set the stage for the rise of nationalism and the falling apart of Yugoslavia. The multi-party elections set to take place in November 1990 will be a key moment for Yugoslavia. For the first time, citizens will be able to vote for multiple parties and shift toward democratic governance.<sup>6</sup> However, the democratic process can make a growing problem become even worse. Through such elections, Yugoslavians will be able to vote for the party that best represents their interests. However, these parties are mainly based on ethnic lines and are extremely loyal to their respective republics. With growing tensions and a lack of cooperation between parties, the elections may make current issues worse.

Leading up to the 1990 elections, a 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was convened, where party leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) argued over the country's future.<sup>7</sup> This conference resulted in serious disagreements between the Slovenian and Serbian delegates. The main point of contention was how representation within

the conference should look like. The Serbian representatives made up the largest ethnic group within the conference and argued for a one-vote-per-person policy.<sup>8</sup> This would allow Serbs to have the largest representation in the conference and effectively allow them to dictate the entire country's policies.<sup>9</sup> The Croatian and Slovenian representatives saw this as a threat to their political influence and fought against the new rules. Instead, they proposed a system that gives more autonomy to the republics.<sup>10</sup> This would dilute Serbian power and allow the smaller groups to have more control over their borders. Regardless, both proposals would create a deeper political crisis in Yugoslavia. The Serbian proposal would make Serbia the most powerful republic, while the Croatian and Slovenian proposals would slowly decrease the role of the SKJ. In the end, the Slovenian and Croatian delegates left the conference in protest.<sup>11</sup> The SKJ was dissolved as a result, and Yugoslavia transitioned to a multi-party system. All of the other republics followed the central government. The republics' governments

6 Chuck Sudetic, "Yugoslavia Holds Free Vote for First Time since 1940's," *The New York Times*, April 9, 1990, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/09/world/upheaval-in-the-east-yugoslavia-holds-free-vote-for-first-time-since-1940-s.html>.


7 Davor Pauković, "Last Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Causes, Consequences and Course of Dissolution," *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 1, no. 1 (December 22, 2008): 21–33, <https://hrcaj.srce.hr/35202>.

8 Lenard J. Cohen, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia," *Current History* 91, no. 568 (November 1, 1992): 369–75, <https://doi.org/10.1525/cuh.1992.91.568.369>.

9 Cohen, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia," *Current History* 91, no. 568 (November 1, 1992): 369–75, <https://doi.org/10.1525/cuh.1992.91.568.369>.

10 Cohen, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia," 369–75.

11 Paula M Pickering and Mark Baskin, "What Is to Be Done? Succession from the League of Communists of Croatia," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 41, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 521–40, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2008.09.001>.



Franjo Tudman

Credit: Unknown author

also became multi-party.<sup>12</sup>

In November 1990, the multi-republic elections of Yugoslavia were held. Each republic held its elections, which saw a wide variety of parties competing against each other for control within each republic. Many former SKJ party members decided to become the communist party of each republic.<sup>13</sup> However, their status as the main communist party stayed and would hurt them in the elections. The people were already dissatisfied with communist rule for several years and saw its government as unable to fix the economy.<sup>14</sup> Rising nationalism also fueled the popularity of many such parties. They would unite under coalitions to support each other in the elections against the communist party.

In the election, the Slovenian Democratic Union (SDS) won over 50 percent of the vote in Slovenia.<sup>15</sup> The SDS took advantage of the general dissatisfaction with the central government and especially the economic policies, which were seen to only benefit Serbia. Most Slovenians felt that they were being economically hurt by a centralized system that did not effectively address their needs.<sup>16</sup> The party's call for independence sounded very appealing to the voters, who believed that autonomy would bring better economic management and political representation. As time passed, more and more party leaders within the SDS began to call for a referendum to vote on Slovenia's independence from Yugoslavia.<sup>17</sup> This referendum would become the first sign of Yugoslavia breaking up. The same upward spiral of the nationalist sentiments went on in Croatia, too, where the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) gained about 43 percent of the vote in Croatia.<sup>18</sup> Under the leadership of Franjo Tuđman, HDZ followed an extensive nationalist line,

emphasizing the identity and sovereignty of the Croats.<sup>19</sup> They also focused on Croatia's economic decline since many Croats blamed Serbia for their economic struggle and looked to independence as a way to help their economy. The HDZ's success reflected a collective desire for self-determination and a rejection of perceived Serbian dominance within the federal structure.

This wave of nationalist victories in the multi-party elections showed that the communist parties had no chance of keeping their dominance in Yugoslavia. Internal divisions had made the party weak, and it clearly showed in widespread defeats across the major republics. However, the communist party still found support in its core base, Serbia and Montenegro. These two republics had benefited the most from communist rule before the death of Tito and remained some of the more developed republics in Yugoslavia.<sup>20</sup> The remnants of the SKJ were also primarily Serbian, which gave them a strong base of support in the republic. When the elections came around, Serbia was dominated by Slobodan Milošević and his Socialist Party (SPS), which garnered around 70 percent of the vote in Serbia.<sup>21</sup> Milošević's campaign focused on bringing together Serbs across all republics while preserving a centralized state. He exploited fears of losing power amid rising nationalism in Slovenia and Croatia. This would position him as a defender of Serbian interests. His approach not only consolidated his power but further polarized society, where the majority of Serbs saw the other republics' movements toward independence as serious threats.<sup>22</sup> This situation was even more complex in Bosnia and Herzegovina because of its multi-ethnic composition. These elections, however, underlined deep divisions among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Each ethnic group began to rally behind their nationalist parties. For Bosniaks, their party was

12 Pickering and Baskin, "What Is to Be Done? Succession from the League of Communists of Croatia," 521–40.

13 Cohen, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia," *Current History* 91, no. 568 (November 1, 1992): 369–75, <https://doi.org/10.1525/cuh.1992.91.568.369>.

14 Cohen, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia," 369–75.

15 Republic of Slovenia - Government Communication Office, "The First Multiparty Elections of 1990 | Government Communication Office," archive.ph, August 5, 2012, [https://archive.ph/20120805211041/http://www.ukom.gov.si/en/media\\_relations/background\\_information/elections/elections\\_in\\_slovenia\\_in\\_2002/the\\_first\\_multiparty\\_elections\\_of\\_1990/](https://archive.ph/20120805211041/http://www.ukom.gov.si/en/media_relations/background_information/elections/elections_in_slovenia_in_2002/the_first_multiparty_elections_of_1990/).

16 Reuters, "Roads Sealed as Yugoslav Unrest Mounts," *The New York Times*, August 19, 1990, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/19/world/roads-sealed-as-yugoslav-unrest-mounts.html?sq=Tudjman&scp=7&st=nyt>.

17 Reuters, "Roads Sealed as Yugoslav Unrest Mounts,"

18 Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, *The Balkans* (Routledge, 2007).

19 Bideleux and Jeffries, *The Balkans*

20 Bideleux and Jeffries, *The Balkans*

21 Chuck Sudetic, "Yugoslavia Holds Free Vote for First Time since 1940's,"

22 Vladislav B. Stirovic. "The Multi-Party Election in Serbia in 1990". Centre for Geostrategic Studies in Belgrade. 4-7 [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340885441\\_The\\_Multi-Party\\_Elections\\_in\\_Serbia\\_in\\_1990](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340885441_The_Multi-Party_Elections_in_Serbia_in_1990)

the Party of Democratic Action, while the Croats supported the HDZ. For the Serbs, the Serbian Democratic Party began to gain support as it distinguished itself from the SPS by leveraging Serbian nationalism.

As the UNSC debates how it should respond to the crisis in Yugoslavia, it must consider the complicated political divisions that separate the republics. While it seems like a simple power struggle on the surface, the situation is much more complex, with ethnic divisions and distrust. A political solution will be much harder to find unless all ethnic groups can find a compromise that allows them to live together in harmony. However, the solution could also lie in a peaceful breakup of Yugoslavia. Regardless of what the decision is, the UNSC must look past the power struggle and understand the underlying ethnic conflicts that have made this region so volatile and unpredictable.

## Rising Nationalism

In Macedonia, nationalism took hold through the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). It attracted support by emphasizing a Macedonian identity and the desire for independence.<sup>23</sup> For many, economic issues were a priority, as they felt poor compared to other republics like Slovenia and Croatia. Macedonia suffered from poor infrastructure and limited investment, making the idea of independence more attractive. The VMRO-DPMNE pushed the importance of cultural preservation and the value of heritage, which added to locals' anger with Yugoslavia and created more feelings of disparity. Ultimately, this narrative led to economic problems becoming political ones as well, linking the two fields together deeply.<sup>24</sup> The party's success confirmed how economic struggle could be used to gain

support. Similar successes across other republics would bring many consequences, both social and political.

Serbian nationalist movements aimed to maintain the group's dominance across Yugoslavia.<sup>25</sup> Leadership, especially under Slobodan Milošević, pushed for a federation that would promote their interests across the republics. This was the opposite of the separatist desires in other regions. Milošević encouraged policies that ensured Serbian dominance, which contributed to many diplomatic and social tensions.<sup>26</sup> His rise to power was rooted in economic dissatisfaction among the Serbs. Support for his beliefs grew, especially during the Yugoslavian economic crisis in the 1980s. He framed high unemployment and low industrial output as the exploitation of Serbs by other regions rather than pointing to existing systemic challenges. The 1986 Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) Memorandum also increased nationalistic feelings by making Serbs seem like a group that has suffered many injustices throughout history.<sup>27</sup> With that, demands for more control grew among the Serbs, leading to greater tensions in their relations with other republics. This was also made more complex by Milošević's aggressive nationalist acts outside Serbia; backing ethnic Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and centralizing power in Belgrade were not well-received actions in other areas.<sup>28</sup> For example, in Macedonia, this was seen as a direct threat to their potential freedom. Milošević tried to form better connections with Macedonia, but many of his attempts undermined local autonomy, adding to their negative views on the matter. Such factors affected the already tense relationship between Serbia and the remaining republics.<sup>29</sup>

Croatian nationalism was the opposite of the Serbian aspiration. Croatian leaders' goal was eventual independence from Yugoslavia through growing autonomy.<sup>30</sup> The Croatian

23 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan babel: the disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the war for Kosovo* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), <https://archive.org/details/balkanbabeldisin0000rame>.

24 Ramet, *Balkan babel: the disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the war for Kosovo*.

25 Vesna Pestic, "Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis," United States Institute of Peace, April 1, 1996, <https://www.usip.org/publications/1996/04/serbian-nationalism-and-origins-yugoslav-crisis>.

26 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia* (Itrondheim: Cambridge University Press, 2005), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492136>.

27 Catherine Baker, *The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 1010-1012, <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12343>.

28 Baker, *The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s*.

29 Ramet, *Balkan babel: the disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the war for Kosovo*.

30 "The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990–1992," Office of the Historian, accessed February 1, 2025, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/>



Democratic Union (HDZ), led by Franjo Tuđman, promoted independence to increase nationalistic feelings among the people. Overall, this movement surrounded sovereignty and the creation of a Croatian nation-state.<sup>31</sup> This movement is also considered to have links to 19th-century movements, where Croats sought autonomy under Habsburg rule.<sup>32</sup> The HDZ employed this narrative to begin gaining support for the new movement. Croatia's more successful economic state, growing tourism sector, and discovery of fertile grounds in the late 1980s were all grounds for independence. Leaders felt that they should have more freedom to use their resources without having to contribute to poor regions. At the same time, the protection of Croatian culture and identity against Serbian dominance was a large contributor to this aspiration.<sup>33</sup> Ethnic tensions between Serbia and other republics served as a warning for Croatia's possible future. Tuđman's leadership once again emphasized Croatia's historical mission for independence and the need to protect its pride and heritage. Still, this movement emerged in a complicated time; with Milošević's clear mission for dominance, minority Serbs in Croatia were afraid of

discrimination or marginalization through such movements.

Slovenian nationalism was also based on the economy.<sup>34</sup> Since it was among the more developed republics, it sought independence to maintain its prosperity. Milan Kučan's leadership argued that Slovenian contributions provided more advantages to poor areas than returned to Slovenia, making separation the only logical option.<sup>35</sup> They found that remaining a part of Yugoslavia, with uneven wealth distribution, would lead to backsliding. Similarly to Croatia, Slovenia had a lucrative tourism sector, thriving banking sector, and solid industrial production. It also boasted a higher living standard compared to other republics. Its people felt that they did not benefit from Yugoslavian policies and did not receive much return for their contributions to other regions.<sup>36</sup> Slovenia felt especially exploited when the economy got worse in the 1980s, as their industrial output was held back, with much of their output going to support other republics rather than Slovenia itself. With that, calls for independence grew. While less prominent in this case, Slovenia has also historically sought independence on several fronts, deeming the desire for

breakup-yugoslavia.

31 Office of the Historian, "The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990–1992."

32 Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvrf8bft>.

33 Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*.

34 Office of the Historian, "The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990–1992."

35 Marie-Janine Calic, *A History of Yugoslavia* (Munich: Purdue University Press, 2019), [https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=purduepress\\_ebooks](https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=purduepress_ebooks).

36 Calic, *A History of Yugoslavia*.

Slobodan Milosevic  
 Credit: Stevan Kragujević



a unique identity a generational mission rather than a new idea. These many perspectives contributed strongly to the independence movement, with a 1990 referendum showing that the majority—over 88 percent—voted in favor of secession.<sup>37</sup>

Bosniak nationalism is also relevant here, as the movement emerged most clearly in 1990. Bosniaks started protecting their identity through the leadership of Alija Izetbegović and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA).<sup>38</sup> It showed a desire for balance between a multi-ethnic future and one that guaranteed Bosniak rights, religiously and culturally. This movement differs from the others in that it was not rooted in ethnicity but in heritage. The rise of solid movements in Croatia and Serbia made matters more complicated for Bosnia. As a result, Izetbegović advocated for Bosnia to remain a part of Yugoslavia but with more autonomy to safeguard regional interests.<sup>39</sup> Despite this, tensions in neighboring republics signaled that violence would be a likely result.

When nationalist leaders grew to power, their missions marginalized many. Policy areas, including employment, military, and political representation, varied, with each republic seeking power above the others. Milošević's leadership, for one, strongly disadvantaged Albanians and Croats, directly discriminating against them in many instances.<sup>40</sup> The Serbian push for centralization resulted in economic dissatisfaction and noticeable gaps across regions, angering the people. Croatian and Slovenian leaders also showed preference through their policies, often at the expense of minorities that were forgotten economically. The multi-ethnic composition of Bosnia also makes the general situation all the more complex.<sup>41</sup>

The elections strengthened ethnic identities at the expense of a collective Yugoslav one. Citizens started to see their fellow men as an ethnicity and not as part of one national community. Parallel, each republic articulated its vision based on nationalist ideologies. For example, Slovenia considered independence

as the only way to avoid recession, Croatia wanted a state that would be independent but at the same time assure full sovereignty to Croatian nationality, and Serbia's government saw a centralized state for the protection of Serb nationality interests above the rest of the republics. Once nationalistic parties came into office, they often pursued policies beneficial to their ethnic populations at the expense of those from other ethnic groups. This furthered economic disparities and fueled discontent among minority populations.<sup>42</sup>

## Conclusion

The multi-party elections of 1990 in Yugoslavia were not just a political event; they were a dramatic change that underlined the ethnic and national divisions within the country. As the elections took place, it was clear that the general economic decline really shaped the political landscape and thus influenced the rise of nationalist parties within the different republics.

This was a movement toward future conflicts as each republic now vocalized its concept based on the ideas of nationalism. Slovenia's immediate push for independence, Croatia's emphasis on sovereignty, and Serbia's dream of a centralized state all reflected how serious these divisions became. Such proposals—ones that will address not only political autonomy but also economic cooperation among the republics—will be crucial in advancing stability and reconciliation. By the end of 1990, it became clear that Yugoslavia's political landscape was unstable and would remain forever changed. Ethnic differences, economic inequalities, and conflicting interests across the country make it difficult to keep a united front. At the same time, these disparities have weakened the government, allowing calls for independence to echo louder across Yugoslavia.

The development of nationalist powers across the republics raises the important question of whether Yugoslavia will

37 Office of the Historian, "The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990–1992."

38 Marko Attila Hoare and Harun Karčić, *The History of Bosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day* (London: Saqi Books, 2007), <https://ece.ceu.edu/publications/karcic/2007/24557.html>.

39 Hoare and Karčić, *The History of Bosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day*.

40 Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia*.

41 Hoare and Karčić, *The History of Bosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day*.

42 Malešević, Siniša. 2024. "Grounding Civic Nationhood: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslav Nationalism, 1918–91." *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 66 (1–2): 8–35. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2024.2357057>.

survive fragmentation. The possibility of a compromise remains unclear. The complex relationship between politics and the economy suggests that peace in Yugoslavia requires dynamic solutions that account for many different issues. As the committee goes on to discuss the conflict resolution-related issues, it must also reflect on how these historical developments inform the current debates: delegates will have to balance how to foster dialogue between parties in conflict and how to recognize historical grievances based on economic inequality. They should consider proposals that address both political autonomy and economic cooperation. Understanding how these electoral outcomes shaped subsequent events and declarations of independence and armed conflict will provide the necessary context in which effective resolutions can be formulated.



UNHSC (1991)

NHSMUN 2025



## TOPIC B: THE GULF WAR (1991)

Photo Credit: US Air Force

## Introduction

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait began on August 2, 1990, and drastically changed the security dynamics beyond the Middle East region. The invasion represented a major breach of international law. It shocked Middle Eastern countries and united the international community against Saddam Hussein's actions. The adoption of Security Council resolutions 660 and 661 condemning the invasion and placing economic sanctions on Iraq have yet to make a significant impact on Saddam Hussein's resolve.<sup>1</sup> Since passing two United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions, the international community has taken action to counterbalance the geopolitical effects of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Yet the diplomatic and economic tensions among different countries are far from being resolved.

Despite actions from the UN Security Council (UNSC), Iraq maintains its illegal occupation of Kuwait. Discussions amongst countries allied against the invasion have continued to circle diplomatic and militaristic solutions to this crisis. Many diplomats have argued for much stronger sanctions and continued international pressure to force Saddam Hussein to back down from his invasion. They believe that the international community should not punish an invasion with more military action.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, a diplomatic solution would also avoid the loss of life and destruction that would come with an intervention. Others also argue that the role of the UN is to preserve peace in times of crisis.<sup>3</sup> This means that it would be going against the original purpose of the UN Charter to authorize any military action against the Iraqi occupation.

However, more are starting to call for increased intervention against Iraq. Some point to the increasingly critical humanitarian situation in Kuwait. Shortly following the invasion, around 400,000 Kuwaitis left the country, making up nearly half of the population.<sup>4</sup> Aside from the destruction left by the invasion, Iraqi forces also committed several acts of violence against the Kuwaiti population. This included imprisonment, torture, and public executions for those who were suspected to be a part of the resistance movement. Additionally, many Kuwaitis were also falsely imprisoned

and sent to prisons in Iraq. These atrocities being committed by the Iraqi government increased calls for more immediate action to remove Iraq from Kuwait's borders.

The UNSC will now need to decide on its next approach towards protecting international law and the citizens of Kuwait. This Update Paper serves as the current look into the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Delegates will be tasked with considering the various factors at play in this situation and deciding on what they believe is the best course of action. With Iraq taking time to solidify its current position, the UNSC must act soon to take the actions needed to restore the government of Kuwait.

## Diplomatic Efforts and Sanctions Against Iraq

Following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 661, the UNSC began to evaluate the effectiveness of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq. The sanctions in Resolution 661 included a freeze on Iraqi assets in other countries and heavily restricted trade with Iraq.<sup>5</sup> The main focus of these sanctions was to harm Iraq's finances by heavily impacting its ability to sell oil. Additionally, the sanctions focused on cutting off the supplies the Iraqi Army depended on. This included many spare parts, weapons trade, and other components that would support

1 Alastair Finlan, *The Gulf War of 1991* (New York: Rosen Publishing, 2009); United Nations Security Council, Resolution 660 (1990), *The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, S/RES/660* (1990) ¶ (August 6, 1990), [https://undocs.org/S/RES/660\(1990\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/660(1990)); United Nations Security Council, Resolution 661 (1990), *The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait, S/RES/661(1990)* ¶ (August 6, 1990), [https://undocs.org/S/RES/661\(1990\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/661(1990)).

2 Finlan, *The Gulf War of 1991*

3 Finlan, *The Gulf War of 1991*

4 Medical News Today, "Public Health Impact of 1990 Iraq Invasion of Kuwait," Archive.org, 2023, <https://web.archive.org/web/20091214094850/http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/26891.php>.

5 Kristian Ulrichsen, "From Desert Storm to Implementation Day, a Gulf of Expectations," Baker Institute, January 19, 2016, <https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/iran-agreement-us-gcc-relations>.

the military.<sup>6</sup> Despite this wide-ranging set of sanctions, the impact of them did little to force Iraq to withdraw. Not only did Saddam Hussein refuse to pull back his troops, but Kuwaiti citizens suffered as a result. The sanctions meant that many Kuwaiti citizens would also be getting less food and resources since they could no longer trade with the rest of the world.

As a result, the UNSC decided to consider adopting a resolution to impose a naval blockade to prevent any trade from occurring with Iraq.<sup>7</sup> This was one of the first escalating steps the UN took to counter Iraq. This blockade would require a multinational force of countries working together to block any shipping from happening. It would be the first UNSC resolution of this crisis to allow for the use of military ships and soldiers to enforce a resolution. To accomplish this, a coalition of countries needed to be formed to carry out the naval blockade. As a result, a coalition with over 30 countries began to come together to unite and carry out the UNSC's resolutions to counter Iraq's aggression.<sup>8</sup> This effort highlights the importance of collective acting in dealing with conflicts globally. The coalition was one of the largest multinational alliances that had ever been formed and showed the power of the UN in bringing countries together against a common aggressor. While it did seem to run counter to the UN's mission for long-term peace, this crisis was not too dissimilar from the Korean War, where a coalition of countries fought under the UN flag against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.<sup>9</sup> Regional groups like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) also played a vital role in fostering dialogue and coordinating responses. Their role as the main regional bloc that was impacted by the invasion gave the GCC a unique opportunity to lead discussions on how to respond to Iraq's actions. The GCC was instrumental in developing blockade plans and also hosted a majority of the soldiers that were

now arriving in the region from coalition countries.<sup>10</sup> GCC countries also argued for a much stronger stance against Saddam Hussein and were some of the loudest supporters of an interventionist approach to the crisis. This was because of Iraq's supposed chemical weapons stockpiles that it could use on GCC countries.<sup>11</sup> Additionally, Iraq's army was one of the largest in the region, which posed a major risk to some of its weaker neighbors. These factors made it clear to the GCC that drastic action needed to be taken.

Another major point of international cooperation was related to the refugee crisis following the Iraqi invasion. The invasion was disastrous, displacing hundreds of thousands of people, which led to a refugee crisis. Around 400,000 refugees fled Kuwait, making up nearly half of the entire country's population.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, other countries organized mass evacuations for foreign workers who were trapped in the occupied country. The Kuwaiti locals, foreign workers, and all the vulnerable groups took asylum in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.<sup>13</sup> The massive influx of refugees placed a major strain on the resources of neighboring countries. There were often shortages of shelter, food, and basic medical care. Agencies like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Red Crescent provided aid, from food to shelter and medical care. Aid workers traveled to the region to help families rebuild and find long-term housing for those who had been displaced.<sup>14</sup> However, finding a way to give humanitarian aid while also avoiding further conflict is necessary, which poses a major challenge. Proposals such as humanitarian-safe zones for refugees and supplies seemed to be the best suitable option, protecting civilians without involving military forces.<sup>15</sup> The UN must look for ways to minimize the potential for civilian casualties while making sure they can remove the Iraqi presence in Kuwait.

6 Ulrichsen, "From Desert Storm to Implementation Day, a Gulf of Expectations."

7 Ulrichsen, "From Desert Storm to Implementation Day, a Gulf of Expectations."

8 Abdulwahab Al-Qassab, "The GCC in Turmoil: Repercussions of the Gulf Crisis on Iraq-GCC Relations," Arab Center Washington DC, May 18, 2021, <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-gcc-in-turmoil-repercussions-of-the-gulf-crisis-on-iraq-gcc-relations/>.

9 Al-Qassab, "The GCC in Turmoil: Repercussions of the Gulf Crisis on Iraq-GCC Relations."

10 John Anthony, "After the Gulf War: The GCC and the World," U.S. - GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee Inc., July 1, 1992, <https://ncusar.org/publications/Publications/1992-07-01-After-the-Gulf-War.pdf>.

11 Anthony, "After the Gulf War: The GCC and the World."

12 Alan Greenblatt, "Twenty Years Later, First Iraq War Still Resonates," Npr.org (National Public Radio, February 24, 2011), <https://www.npr.org/2011/02/24/133991181/twenty-years-later-first-iraq-war-still-resonates>.

13 Greenblatt, "Twenty Years Later, First Iraq War Still Resonates,"

14 "UNIKOM: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission - Background," United Nations, 2019, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unikom/background.html>.

15 United Nations, "UNIKOM: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission - Background."

Despite widespread support for sanctions and the blockade, enforcing such measures effectively remains a challenge. Limiting cooperation with Iraq can have negative effects on neighboring countries' economies and security.<sup>16</sup> Long-term sanctions may seriously impact Jordan and Turkey, who have already begun facing economic difficulties due to their reliance on trade with Iraq. At the same time, Iraq has already begun seeking out new ways to sustain its economy and military, especially through smuggling operations. Typically, many states advocate for sanctions. However, economic pressures may deem them inefficient or disproportionate in the long run. While it is clear that there is unity against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, international cooperation on this issue presents itself as a major challenge. As a committee, delegates must find ways to ensure that this current trend of cooperation and collaboration is maintained. This means continuing to strengthen the partnerships and coalitions within the UN effort. The GCC remains a critical partner in this crisis, and the UNSC must consider ways to make sure that they have the full support of the GCC. Only through a united front amongst UNSC and GCC members will the international

community be able to truly work towards liberating Kuwait.

## Foreign Influences and External Concerns

The Gulf War has had quite a heavy impact on various countries surrounding it, whether it is Saudi Arabia or Iran. Saudi Arabia is very close to Kuwait and the main area of the conflict. Riyadh had to increase its defenses against any potential attacks from the Iraqi front.<sup>17</sup> This conflict has also increased tensions between various Gulf states and Iran, which shows the region's volatility and fragility about political stability and security.<sup>18</sup> Understanding these impacts is very crucial for attempting to even synthesize solutions that could allow for long-term peace. Picturing how Saudi Arabia responded to the situation is important to understand the bigger picture behind the scenes of the Persian Gulf. Before the initial stages of the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia and Iran were gradually expanding their strategic footprint across the Middle East.<sup>19</sup> The indirect feud between Riyadh and Tehran began to show that the more

<sup>16</sup> Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), [https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691037721/the-gulf-conflict-1990-1991?srltid=AfmBOoozMjdH6itQ6pJry4HjlvGtCY83xO2Uzcv57HgYff-YT3nH\\_cLp](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691037721/the-gulf-conflict-1990-1991?srltid=AfmBOoozMjdH6itQ6pJry4HjlvGtCY83xO2Uzcv57HgYff-YT3nH_cLp).

<sup>17</sup> Joshua Teitelbaum, et al., "The Persian Gulf War and its aftermath," Encyclopedia Britannica, last updated February 6, 2025, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saudi-Arabia/The-Persian-Gulf-War-and-its-aftermath>.

<sup>18</sup> Ariel Jahner, "Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf," *The International Affairs Review*, May 16, 2024, <https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/l6vkmgjzj5sk9nsb56l3e8t9u3dnuu>.

<sup>19</sup> Teitelbaum, et al., "Foreign policy since the end of the Persian Gulf War,"

Refugees from the Gulf War

Credit: National Archives at College Park





Caricature of Saddam Hussein used on a US PSYOP leaflet

Credit: U.S. military

involved in different conflicts in the Middle East, the more complex the region became. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 builds on the political instability in the Middle East, which further escalated since the Iran-Iraq war in 1980.<sup>20</sup>

Another point to consider besides the worsening regional dynamics in the Middle East could be the level of international response. How the diplomatic feud between Saudi Arabia and Iran unfolds could influence the shaping of the regional dynamics, which could set the tone for addressing long-term peacebuilding in the Persian Gulf. As the situation in the Persian Gulf develops rapidly, Saudi Arabia and Iran's further actions could tell how different countries in the Middle East and the international community would engage in this matter. The worsening regional dynamics in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East at large could exacerbate the risk that foreign countries could intervene in the situation to gain some degree of strategic foothold in the Gulf region. The growing political risk at regional and international levels, therefore, suggests that immediate actions should be taken appropriately. UNSC should recognize the importance of the factors that entertain behind the scenes and connect the dots for action before it is too late to do so.

<sup>20</sup> Ranj Alaaldin, "How the Iran-Iraq war will shape the region for decades to come," Brookings, October 9, 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-the-iran-iraq-war-will-shape-the-region-for-decades-to-come/>.

<sup>21</sup> S/RES/660 (1990); S/RES/661(1990).

<sup>22</sup> "The Gulf War, 1991," Office of the Historian, accessed February 6, 2025, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/gulf-war>.

Various countries attempted to use non-military strategies to minimize the negative effects of the region's volatility. UN Security Council resolutions 660 and 661 concern the economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait.<sup>21</sup> Such decisions reflect the fact that the deteriorating conditions on the ground translate to economic indicators, suggesting a decline in financial stability. Any future non-military response would likely build on the Security Council resolutions. Measures such as border monitoring and diplomacy to build confidence worked to varying rates of success. Agreements and regional diplomacy have ensured Kuwait's right to exist without any further violence. These approaches showcase the importance of pacifist methods in such a volatile region to maintain peace.

The Gulf War has had a devastating impact on oil production and has caused volatile oil prices worldwide. Recall that Kuwait's oil fields suffered extensive damage due to Iraq's actions, creating uncertainty in energy markets.<sup>22</sup> That is without accounting for the other Gulf states, which are quite literally next to the conflict, with most of those states bordering Kuwait, who were also affected. Gulf states, which are heavily dependent on oil, faced economic instability, showcasing the



need to diversify incomes to reduce oil dependency, an effort which has recently gained traction and been applied in various sectors in various gulf countries.<sup>23</sup>

At the same time, external actors influenced the issue significantly. Propaganda—both local and foreign—also plays a large role in the issue. Iraq employed many propaganda and messaging tactics to counter their influence. These mainly included justifying the invasion, shifting the blame to foreign factors, and rallying regional support through pro-Iraqi narratives. This was a strong example of the use of propaganda as a weapon to control a conflict.<sup>24</sup> In this case, its main goals were to maintain government legitimacy and keep up a positive perception. Hussein’s regime used state-controlled media to spread its narrative of the invasion. The intention was for Iraq to appear as the real protector of Arab nationalism.<sup>25</sup> They also emphasized the idea that Western powers interfered in Kuwaiti affairs to diminish Iraq’s power and development. State-run outlets, such as the Iraqi News Agency or Baghdad Radio, spread information that explained the invasion as an anti-colonialism effort rather than an attack.<sup>26</sup> This tactic was commonly used in Soviet campaigns when trying to gain local support. Still, Hussein’s attempts to rally the support of neighboring states by framing himself as a protector of the region failed; most Arab states saw through this tactic, with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) condemning Hussein’s regime’s actions directly.<sup>27</sup>

Propaganda was not a one-sided tactic, however. Western media broadcasted an opposing narrative, framing Iraq as a dictatorship. Human rights abuses were widely reported. However, their validity was challenged at times. The most controversial of such cases was the “Nayirah testimony,” when

a Kuwaiti girl claimed Iraqi soldiers removed babies from incubators in a hospital, leading to their deaths.<sup>28</sup> The report gained a lot of traction. However, it was later exposed to have been coordinated by Hill & Knowlton, an American public relations company.<sup>29</sup> Public trust was heavily shaken after that, as more reports confirmed British and American governmental influence on narratives across several conflicts. The media plays an important role in this conflict because it is among the first to be covered heavily through satellite television. CNN was the most active in this and had a significant impact on the public’s perception of the situation.<sup>30</sup> Controlling sources of information was important for Iraq. The regime limited foreign journalists’ capacities and spread inaccurate information about its military to cause fear in the West.<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, the US military managed battlefield reporting closely, providing information from within the action itself.<sup>32</sup>

## Conclusion

As the issue progresses, the Gulf War has revealed the complex interactions that take place between diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and the economic instability that can take place during conflicts. The conflict remains divided between states seeking stronger sanctions and diplomatic measures and those that believe military intervention is the only solution. The true effectiveness of resolutions 660 and 661 is yet to be seen, as its contents are slowly taking effect. Still, early developments show Hussein’s government remains defiant.

At the same time, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) continues its efforts in coordinating relief and response efforts. Saudi Arabia has become a hub for military preparations and safeguards if diplomatic measures fall through. Iran is also

23 Michael Renner and Paul Aarts, “Oil and the Gulf War,” MERIP, July/August, 1991, <https://merip.org/1991/07/oil-and-the-gulf-war/>.  
 24 Gareth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, vol. 16, no. 2 (Washington D.C.: American Sociological Association, 1986), <https://doi.org/10.2307/1317437>.  
 25 Leventhal, *Iraqi Propaganda and Disinformation During the Gulf War: Lessons for the Future*.  
 26 Leventhal, *Iraqi Propaganda and Disinformation During the Gulf War: Lessons for the Future*.  
 27 “Chapter II. The Gulf Crisis and Japan’s Foreign Policy - Diplomatic Bluebook 1991,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Japan, 1991, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-2-1.htm>,  
 28 Al Miskin, “The News Industry,” MERIP, July/August 1992, <https://merip.org/1992/07/the-news-industry/>.  
 29 Democracy Now, “A Debate on One of the Most Frequently Cited Justifications for the 1991 Persian Gulf War: Did PR Firm Hill & Knowlton Invent the Story of Iraqi Soldiers Pulling Kuwaiti Babies From Incubators?” *Democracy Now*, December 2, 2003, [https://www.democracynow.org/2003/12/2/a\\_debate\\_on\\_one\\_of\\_the](https://www.democracynow.org/2003/12/2/a_debate_on_one_of_the).  
 30 Casey Capachi, “Wolf Blitzer reflects on covering the Gulf War 25 years ago,” *CNN*, March 1, 2016, <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/01/politics/wolf-blitzer-gulf-war-iraq-kuwait-cnn/index.html>.  
 31 “Corrupting the Public Record,” The White House - President George W. Bush, accessed February 3, 2025, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ogc/apparatus/corrupting.html>.  
 32 David Benjamin, “Censorship in the Gulf,” Auburn University, 1995, <https://webhome.auburn.edu/~benjadp/gulf/gulf.html>.

a key player here, strategically observing the crisis from the sidelines. Many European countries and the Soviet Union have continued engaging with Iraq diplomatically, seeking a peaceful resolution and showing the international implications of the conflict. Furthermore, the United States continues to push for a unified global stance against Iraq.

Humanitarian concerns surrounding both refugees and individuals still residing in Kuwait have also emerged. As with many other crises, constant access to essential services and products cannot always be guaranteed. Discussions on establishing safe zones and humanitarian corridors have begun, with no official consensus yet. As the crisis continues, the world awaits Iraq's action. Will Hussein succumb to international pressure, or will the situation see new events unfold? The committee's challenge remains attempting to balance the immediate responses on a global scale while still being able to account for any future scenarios and long-term planning. Diplomacy, sanctioning, and humanitarian aid must take priority to work together and address crises effectively. By focusing on these factors, the committee can work on creating solutions that can address both current challenges and any future events, thus laying the foundation for a more peaceful and stable future. Finally, innovative and sustainable approaches must remain a priority for all organizations and states to ensure peace and prosperity in the Persian Gulf.

## Works Cited

### Topic A

#### Non-UN Sources

- Baker, Catherine. *The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 1010-1012. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12343>.
- Banac, Ivo. *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvrf8bft>.
- Bideleux, Robert, and Ian Jeffries. *The Balkans*. Routledge, 2007.
- Calic, Marie-Janine. *A History of Yugoslavia*. Munich: Purdue University Press, 2019. [https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=purduepress\\_ebooks](https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=purduepress_ebooks).
- Cohen, Lenard J. "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia." *Current History* 91, no. 568 (November 1, 1992): 369–75. <https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1992.91.568.369>.
- Hoare, Marko Attila, and Harun Karčić. *The History of Bosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day*. London: Saqi Books, 2007. <https://ece.ceu.edu/publications/karcic/2007/24557.html>.
- Kukić, Leonard. "Origins of regional divergence: economic growth in socialist Yugoslavia." *The Economic History Review* 73, no. 4. 2020. Pp. 1097-1127. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.12967>.
- Office of the Historian. "The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990–1992." Accessed February 1, 2025. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia>.
- Pauković, Davor. "Last Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Causes, Consequences and Course of Dissolution." *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 1, no. 1 (December 22, 2008): 21–33. <https://hrcak.srce.hr/35202>.
- Pesic, Vesna. "Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis." United States Institute of Peace. April 1, 1996. <https://www.usip.org/publications/1996/04/serbian-nationalism-and-origins-yugoslav-crisis>.
- Pickering, Paula M, and Mark Baskin. "What Is to Be Done? Succession from the League of Communists of Croatia." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 41, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 521–40. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2008.09.001>.
- Popović, Dragoljub. *Transition to Democracy*. Paderborn: Brill, 2021. Chap. 11. [https://doi.org/10.30965/9783657791026\\_012](https://doi.org/10.30965/9783657791026_012).
- Ramet, Sabrina P. *Balkan Babel: the disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the war for Kosovo*. Colorado: Westview Press, 1999. <https://archive.org/details/balkanbabeldisin0000rame>.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. *Thinking about Yugoslavia*. Trondheim: Cambridge University Press, 2005. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492136>.
- Republic of Slovenia - Government Communication Office. "The First Multiparty Elections of 1990 | Government Communication Office." archive.ph, August 5, 2012. [https://archive.ph/20120805211041/http://www.ukom.gov.si/en/media\\_relations/background\\_information/elections/elections\\_in\\_slovenia\\_in\\_2002/the\\_first\\_multiparty\\_elections\\_of\\_1990/](https://archive.ph/20120805211041/http://www.ukom.gov.si/en/media_relations/background_information/elections/elections_in_slovenia_in_2002/the_first_multiparty_elections_of_1990/).
- Reuters. "Roads Sealed as Yugoslav Unrest Mounts." *The New York Times*, August 19, 1990, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/19/world/roads-sealed-as-yugoslav-unrest-mounts.html?sq=Tudjman&scp=7&st=nyt>.
- Siniša Malešević. "Grounding Civic Nationhood: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslav Nationalism, 1918–91." *Canadian Slavonic Papers*. July 10, 2024. 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2024.2357057>.
- Sotirović, Dr. Valdislav. "1990 Yugoslav Election And The Destruction Of The Country." *CounterCurrents*. March 18, 2023. <https://countercurrents.org/2023/03/1990-yugoslav-election-and-the-destruction-of-the-country/>.

- Sotirović, Dr. Vladislav. "The Multi-Party Elections in Serbia in 1990," ResearchGate, April 24, 2020. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340885441\\_The\\_Multi-Party\\_Elections\\_in\\_Serbia\\_in\\_1990](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340885441_The_Multi-Party_Elections_in_Serbia_in_1990).
- Sudetic, Chuck. "UPHEAVAL in the EAST; Yugoslavia Holds Free Vote for First Time since 1940 (Published 1990)." *The New York Times*, April 9, 1990, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/09/world/upheaval-in-the-east-yugoslavia-holds-free-vote-for-first-time-since-1940-s.html>.
- Zizmond, Egon. "The Collapse of the Yugoslav Economy." *Soviet Studies* 44, no. 1 (1992): 101–12. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/152249>.

## Topic B

### UN Sources

- United Nations. "UNIKOM: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission - Background." 2019. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unikom/background.html>.
- United Nations Security Council. Resolution 660 (1990). *The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait*. S/RES/660 (1990). August 6, 1990. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/660\(1990\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/660(1990)).
- United Nations Security Council. Resolution 661 (1990). *The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait*. S/RES/661(1990). August 6, 1990. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/661\(1990\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/661(1990)).

### Non-UN Sources

- Alaaldin, Ranj. "How the Iran-Iraq war will shape the region for decades to come." Brookings. October 9, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-the-iran-iraq-war-will-shape-the-region-for-decades-to-come/>.
- Al-Qassab, Abdulwahab. "The GCC in Turmoil: Repercussions of the Gulf Crisis on Iraq-GCC Relations." Arab Center Washington DC. May 18, 2021. <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-gcc-in-turmoil-repercussions-of-the-gulf-crisis-on-iraq-gcc-relations/>.
- Anthony, John. "After the Gulf War: The GCC and the World." U.S. - GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee Inc. July 1, 1992. <https://ncusar.org/publications/Publications/1992-07-01-After-the-Gulf-War.pdf>.
- Benjamin, David. "Censorship in the Gulf." Auburn University. 1995. <https://webhome.auburn.edu/~benjadb/gulf/gulf.html>.
- Capachi, Casey. "Wolf Blitzer reflects on covering the Gulf War 25 years ago." CNN. March 1, 2016. <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/01/politics/wolf-blitzer-gulf-war-iraq-kuwait-cnn/index.html>.
- Democracy Now. "A Debate on One of the Most Frequently Cited Justifications for the 1991 Persian Gulf War: Did PR Firm Hill & Knowlton Invent the Story of Iraqi Soldiers Pulling Kuwaiti Babies From Incubators?" Democracy Now. December 2, 2003. [https://www.democracynow.org/2003/12/2/a\\_debate\\_on\\_one\\_of\\_the](https://www.democracynow.org/2003/12/2/a_debate_on_one_of_the).
- Finlan, Alastair. *The Gulf War of 1991*. New York: Rosen Publishing, 2009.
- Freedman, Lawrence, and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995. [https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691037721/the-gulf-conflict-1990-1991?srsId=AfmBOozMjdh6itQ6pjry4HjlvGtCY83xO2Uzcv57HgYff-YT3nH\\_cLp](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691037721/the-gulf-conflict-1990-1991?srsId=AfmBOozMjdh6itQ6pjry4HjlvGtCY83xO2Uzcv57HgYff-YT3nH_cLp).
- Greenblatt, Alan. "Twenty Years Later, First Iraq War Still Resonates." Npr.org. National Public Radio, February 24, 2011. <https://www.npr.org/2011/02/24/133991181/twenty-years-later-first-iraq-war-still-resonates>.
- Jahner, Ariel. "Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf." *The International Affairs Review*. May 16, 2024. <https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/l6vkmgjzj5sk9nsb56l3e8t9u3dnuu>.
- Jowett, Gareth S., and Victoria O'Donnell. *Propaganda and Persuasion*. Vol. 16, no. 2. Washington D.C.: American Sociological Association, 1986. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1317437>.
- Leventhal, Todd. *Iraqi Propaganda and Disinformation During the Gulf War: Lessons for the Future*. Abu Dhabi: The

- Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2019. <https://www.ecssr.ae/en/publications/iraqi-propaganda-and-disinformation-during-the-gulf-war-lessons-for-t>.
- Medical News Today. "Public Health Impact of 1990 Iraq Invasion of Kuwait." Archive.org. 2023. <https://web.archive.org/web/20091214094850/http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/26891.php>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Japan. "Chapter II. The Gulf Crisis and Japan's Foreign Policy - Diplomatic Bluebook 1991." 1991. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-2-1.htm>.
- Miskin, Al. "The News Industry." MERIP. July/August 1992. <https://merip.org/1992/07/the-news-industry/>.
- Office of the Historian. "The Gulf War, 1991." Accessed February 6, 2025. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/gulf-war>.
- Renner, Michael, and Paul Aarts. "Oil and the Gulf War." MERIP. July/August, 1991. <https://merip.org/1991/07/oil-and-the-gulf-war/>.
- Teitelbaum, Joshua, et al. "Foreign policy since the end of the Persian Gulf War." Encyclopedia Britannica. Last updated February 6, 2025. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saudi-Arabia/Foreign-policy-since-the-end-of-the-Persian-Gulf-War>.
- Teitelbaum, Joshua, et al. "The Persian Gulf War and its aftermath." Encyclopedia Britannica. Last updated February 6, 2025. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Saudi-Arabia/The-Persian-Gulf-War-and-its-aftermath>.
- The White House - President George W. Bush. "Corrupting the Public Record." Accessed February 3, 2025, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ogc/apparatus/corrupting.html>.
- Ulrichsen, Kristian. "From Desert Storm to Implementation Day, a Gulf of Expectations." Baker Institute. January 19, 2016. <https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/iran-agreement-us-gcc-relations>.

The National High School Model United Nations Conference (NHSMUN) is a project of IMUNA, a non-profit organization formally associated with the United Nations Department of Global Communications (UNDGC). IMUNA is dedicated to promoting global issues education through simulation.

Written by Adeeb Harb, Seonghyun (Shawn) Chang, Terry Wang, and Fiona Zheng

Edited by Jordan Baker, Seonghyun (Shawn) Chang, Ana Margarita Gil, Grace Harb, Christian Hernandez, Therese Salomone, and Terry Wang.

© 2025 IMUNA. All Rights Reserved.

