



NHSMUN

National High School Model United Nations

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A Note on the NHSMUN Difference

Esteemed Faculty and Delegates,

Welcome to NHSMUN 2027! We are Armen Bagdassarian and Sabeeh Mirza, and we are elated to serve as this year's Secretaries-General. Thank you for choosing to attend NHSMUN, the world's largest and most diverse high school Model United Nations conference. As a space for collaboration, consensus, and compromise, NHSMUN strives to transform today's brightest thinkers, speakers, and collaborators into tomorrow's leaders. We believe that an emphasis on education through simulation is paramount to the Model UN experience.

Realism and Accuracy: Although a perfect simulation of the UN is never possible, we believe that one of the core educational responsibilities of MUN conferences is to educate students about how the UN System works. We strive to invite real UN, NGO, and field experts into each committee through our committee speakers program. Moreover, we arrange meetings between students and the actual UN Permanent Mission of the country they are representing. These exclusive resources are only available due to IMUNA's formal association with the United Nations Department of Global Communications and consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. No other conference goes so far to deeply immerse students into the UN System.

Educational Emphasis: At the heart of NHSMUN lies education and compromise. Part of what makes NHSMUN special is its diverse delegate base. As such, when NHSMUN distributes awards, we strongly de-emphasize their importance in comparison to the educational value of Model UN. In particular, our daises look for and promote constructive leadership and diplomacy that strive toward consensus, as real ambassadors do in the United Nations.

Research and a Dedicated Staff: Our staffers care deeply about delegates' experiences and what they take away from their time at NHSMUN. Our Directors spend over six months preparing Background Guides, in addition to Update Briefs written to reflect the rapidly changing nature of the topics to be discussed. Our staffers are trained rigorously to provide the best conference experience possible. Our daises provide thoughtful comments on submitted position papers. Our staff aims to tailor the committee experience to delegates' reflections and research, but also to facilitate an environment where all delegates' thoughts can be heard.

Empowering Participation: The UN relies on the voices of all of its member states to create resolutions. This is our philosophy at NHSMUN too. Our Rules of Procedure and our staff focus on making every voice in the committee heard, regardless of country assignment or skill level. Additionally, unlike many other conferences, we also emphasize delegate participation after the conference. Delegates spend countless hours researching topics critical to the UN and broader international sphere.

Delegates, it is our sincerest hope that your time at NHSMUN will be thought-provoking and stimulating. NHSMUN is an incredible time to learn, grow, and embrace new opportunities. We look forward to seeing you work both as students and global citizens at the conference.

Best,

Armen Bagdassarian
Secretary-General

Sabeeh Mirza
Secretary-General

Position Paper Requirements

Delegate research and preparation is a critical element of attending NHSMUN and enjoying the debate experience. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in your committee. We encourage and expect each of you to critically explore the selected topics and be able to identify and analyze their intricacies upon arrival to the conference.

The task of preparing for the conference can be challenging. To assist delegates, we have updated our [Beginner Delegate Guide](#) and [Advanced Delegate Guide](#). These guides contain more detailed instructions on how to prepare a position paper and excellent sources that delegates can use for research. Use these resources to your advantage. They can help transform a sometimes overwhelming task into what it should be: an engaging, interesting, and rewarding experience.

To accurately represent an NGO leader, delegates must be able to articulate their policies. Accordingly, NHSMUN requires each delegation (the one or two delegates representing a country in a committee) to write a position paper for each topic on the committee's agenda. More information about how to write and format position papers can be found in the [Research Guide](#). To summarize, position papers should be structured into three sections.

I: Topic Background – This section should describe the history of the topic as it would be described by the delegate's role. Delegates do not need to give an exhaustive account of the topic, but rather focus on the details that are most important to the delegation's policy and proposed solutions.

II: Country Policy – This section should discuss the delegation's policy regarding the topic. Each paper should state the policy in plain terms and include the relevant statements, statistics, and research that support the effectiveness of the policy. Comparisons with other global issues are also appropriate here.

III. Proposed Solutions – This section should detail the delegation's proposed solutions to address the topic. Descriptions of each solution should be thorough. Each idea should clearly connect to the specific problem it aims to solve and identify potential obstacles to implementation and how they can be avoided. The solution should be a natural extension of the character's policy.

Each topic's position paper should be **no more than 10 pages long** double-spaced with standard margins and 12 point font size. This is a maximum; **3–5 pages per topic is often a suitable length**. The paper must be written from the perspective of your assigned role and should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference.

Each delegation is responsible for submitting position papers on or before **February 26, 2027**. If a delegate wishes to receive detailed feedback from the committee's dais, their position paper must be submitted on or before **February 5, 2027**. The papers received by this earlier deadline will be reviewed by the committee dais and returned before February 26. Instructions on how to submit position papers will be shared directly with faculty advisors.

Submission instructions for position papers will be sent to faculty advisers via email. If delegations are unable to submit their position papers on time, please contact us at nhsmun@imuna.org.

Delegations that do not submit position papers will be ineligible for awards.

Committee History

In December 1961, the FAO and the UN General Assembly passed resolutions that established the World Food Programme (WFP) for a three-year trial period.¹ Within the next year, WFP faced its first major challenge when an earthquake hit Iran, and Thailand was struck with a hurricane. Fortunately, WFP was able to provide emergency food aid, and in 1965, the WFP was extended “for as long as multilateral food aid is found feasible and desirable.”²

Beginning in the 1980s, WFP gradually shifted away from its earlier emphasis on distributing food surpluses and increasingly focused on emergency relief and targeted food assistance. This transition also reflected growing recognition that food assistance should address the causes of food insecurity rather than provide only short-term relief.³

This evolution continued in 1999, when WFP adopted an updated development policy emphasizing the use of food assistance to create longer-term benefits for vulnerable communities. The WFP sought to “use assistance with food consumption to encourage investment, and leave behind a lasting asset.”⁴ The goal was to ensure that WFP assistance could leave communities with lasting benefits after direct food assistance ended. In 2005, the WFP was designated as the global lead agency for the Logistics Cluster, giving it responsibility for coordinating logistics during major humanitarian emergencies.⁵

WFP later strengthened its internal emergency coordination through its Operations Centre (OPSCEN) at its headquarters in Rome. The Operations Centre gathers information from WFP country and regional offices, helps maintain a common picture of developing crises, coordinates with other UN operations centers, and supports decision-making during emergencies. It also maintains a 24-hour hotline through which country and regional directors can report critical incidents.⁶

Throughout the decades, WFP has provided aid to countries consumed by conflict, natural disaster, and poverty. By 2025, WFP had become one of the world’s largest humanitarian organizations, assisting approximately 121 million people across more than 120 countries and territories. On any given day, WFP can have up to 4,300 trucks, 55 aircraft, and 135 ships on the move.⁷

WFP is funded entirely through voluntary contributions from governments, institutions, corporations, and individuals. The biggest donors in 2025 were the USA, followed by the European Commission and Germany.⁸ This funding model means that WFP’s ability to respond to emergencies depends heavily on donor support. Funding shortfalls can force the WFP to reduce assistance, prioritize among populations, or change the scale of its operations even when humanitarian needs remain high.

1 United Nations. World Food Programme. New York: United Nations, 1962. United Nations Digital Library. Accessed September 5, 2026, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/204613?ln=en&v=pdf>.

2 United Nations. “The World Food Programme: a three-year experiment that became indispensable.” UN News, October 9, 2020, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/10/1075052>.

3 House of Commons, International Development Committee. “The WFP—Origins and Transformation.” In *The World Food Programme: A Future of Food Aid?* Tenth Report of Session 2007–08, chap. 2. London: The Stationery Office, 2008, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmintdev/493/49305.htm>.

4 World Food Programme. *Enabling Development: Policy and Programme Approaches*. Rome: World Food Programme, 1999, https://executiveboard.wfp.org/document_download/WFP-0000030787.

5 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Cluster Working Group on Logistics: Executive Summary (Geneva: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, December 12, 2005), https://logcluster.org/sites/default/files/public/documents/logisticsclusterwgretreatexecutive20summary_061212.pdf

6 World Food Programme, “Emergency Preparedness and Response,” World Food Programme, accessed September 8, 2026, <https://www.wfp.org/emergency-preparedness-and-response>.

7 World Food Programme. “12 Things You May Not Know about the World Food Programme.” World Food Programme, July 22, 2026 <https://www.wfp.org/stories/12-things-you-may-not-know-about-world-food-programme>.

8 World Food Programme, “Contributions to WFP in 2025,” World Food Programme, updated February 16, 2026, <https://www.wfp.org/funding/2025>.

TOPIC A

The Sahel War

WFP | NHSMUN 2027



Introduction

Many issues have intersected in the Sahel region of Africa, where post-colonial political and economic challenges, climate change, and reduced international aid have exacerbated a growing humanitarian crisis. The Sahel region is located in a transitional climate zone between the “arid Sahara to the north, and the belt of humid savannas to the south.”¹ The region includes countries stretching from Mauritania and Senegal in the northwest to Chad and Cameroon in the southeast.² The United Nations Development Program projects that the overall population will reach 340 million people by 2050.³ Natural resource exports such as gold and crude oil, as well as farming, make up a substantial amount of the regional states’ economies.⁴ The region’s population is among the world’s youngest, as well as being predominantly Muslim and diverse in both ethnicity and caste.⁵

In the Sahel today, an increasingly dire humanitarian situation is occurring in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, who together comprise the Confederation of Sahel States (CSS). Each of these governments, which have emerged from recent coups d’état, has faced conflict with jihadist insurgencies originating from al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The military juntas leading the CSS formed the confederation after departing from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and finding an ally in the Russian Federation.⁶

While the World Food Programme cannot and should not attempt to solve the underlying political and security conflict, its contours are undermining the supply of humanitarian aid to the region. Jihadist groups, Russian paramilitaries, and state militias have stolen or blocked food supplies, climate challenges are exacerbating violence, and the CSS governments have increasingly restricted the operation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) altogether. Meanwhile, a dramatic reduction in the international aid funding provided by the United States has led to severe challenges for the future of the WFP and other organizations like it. In light of these crises, the Operations Center must plan a response that can transport life-saving aid through a tangled network of political actors, environmental challenges, and active warfare,

while also contending with aid cuts.

History and Description of the Issue

THE CONFEDERATION OF SAHEL STATES (CSS)

The modern CSS states were part of a series of regional empires situated along the bend of the Niger River: the Ghana, then the Mali, and finally the Songhai Empires.⁷ The Ghana Empire was the first known empire in the region beginning in the 6th century C.E., although humans have lived in the Sahel region since the Neolithic Period.⁸ During the later Ghana Empire, Muslim merchants began spreading their religion as they traded with local elites, and the empire had large cities with many mosques by the 11th century.⁹ However, the leaders of the empire did not convert to Islam, and it was not until the subsequent Mali Empire that Islam became the prevailing religion over animism.¹⁰ Animism is an umbrella term for sets of belief that find agency, spirituality and individual personhood in nature.¹¹ The empire’s wealth and broader conversion to the Muslim faith is best exemplified by Mansa Musa’s famous pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324 C.E.¹² Mali’s decline came



Location of the Sahel

Credit: M.Bitton

shortly after Musa's pilgrimage and reign, with regional trade shifting towards the coasts and away from Mali, and significant infighting over who would rule the empire.¹³ The internal tensions and economic pressure eventually led to Mali being supplanted by claimed successors from a previously conquered region, the Songhai.¹⁴

In the mid-16th century, the Songhai reached the peak of their political power, having control over much of the salt and gold trades in the Sahel region and part of the Sudan region, which overlapped to the south of the Sahel. Cities such as Timbuktu and Djenne flourished as centers of trade and education during this period.¹⁵ However, this control only lasted a few decades as increasingly fundamentalist Muslim rulers took control of the empire, alienating many of the smaller local and regional village authorities, who still held on to traditions and beliefs that predated the spread of Islam during the Ghana empire.¹⁶ Finally, in 1590, a Moroccan army, fitted with early muskets, marched on the Songhai, and devastated their forces; by 1600 C.E. the Sahel was left as a ravaged and depopulated Moroccan colony.¹⁷ In the following years, the regional trade of enslaved people, which had long existed,

became far larger, as Moroccan and European enslavers captured people throughout the Sahel and forcibly transported them to North America through the Triangular Trade.¹⁸

During the European colonization of Africa, the vulnerability of the Sahel region left in the wake of the Moroccan invasion became apparent as the French increasingly invaded and absorbed the scattered tribes, kingdoms, and states into their growing empire.¹⁹ In 1895, France formed French West Africa, their consolidated territorial authority for the larger region. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger all were part of this system, organized with a governor-general stationed in Senegal as its official head.²⁰ The states themselves were arbitrarily and repeatedly reorganized into new territorial boundaries, and famine was a challenge that the French repeatedly failed to contain. In fact, scholars have posited that the French approach to the Sahel region was a major contributor to growing crises, including environmental degradation, in the future.²¹ The colonial system effectively ended in the 1950s, when France held a constitutional referendum in both the home territory and all of its colonies, and the constituent states of French West Africa

declared independence or became autonomous states pending the transfer of power.²² By 1960, the Sahel was free of direct European administrative rule for the first time in more than half a century.

Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso inherited jumbled colonial borders, little domestic bureaucracy, and militaries built to suppress domestic resistance, rather than to defend state sovereignty. In the intervening decades since 1960, each country has experienced repeated coups, weak civilian institutions, and crises in the largely neglected rural regions, which have persisted as a breeding ground for dissent against centralized power since the very beginning of civilization in the Sahel. While each country has endured many eras of instability, the most relevant wave of crises began on August 18, 2020, when a group of Malian soldiers arrested their senior leaders, seized weapons, and then detained the President Aboubakar Keita.²³ The primary reason for the coup was the president's perceived failure to combat rising jihadist violence linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, sometimes referred to as ISIS).²⁴ In the intervening years since, Mali has endured repeated power struggles between civilian and military elements of its authority, and elections have been repeatedly cancelled; the current leader, Colonel Assimi Goita, led a coup against the president and then a civilian transitional government.²⁵ In May 2025, the government dissolved all political parties and delayed elections once again.²⁶

Burkina Faso, a neighboring country to Mali, experienced significant insecurity as a result

of the 2020 coup. The same armed groups who placed pressure on the Malian president ultimately collapsed the government of President Roch Marc Christian Kabore, who was deposed in a January 2022 coup led by Lieutenant Paul-Henro Damiba, a previously successful military leader.²⁷ Damiba's coup led to further chaos, in which the Burkinabe army was defeated across several major battles, and the country had lost 40 percent of its territory by 2023.²⁸ In September 2022, Damiba's government was overthrown by a 34-year-old captain in the Burkinabe army, Ibrahim Traore. Traore has dissolved political parties, sharply limited political activity, and delayed elections to at least 2029.²⁹ Finally, on July 26, 2023, Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum was captured by his own army, led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani.³⁰ Tchiani has proceeded to rule Niger undemocratically, dissolving political parties and suspending elections.³¹

The Alliance, or Confederation of Sahel States (often abbreviated as Alliance des Etats du Sahel, AES, or Confederation of Sahel States, CSS), was established in the wake of the most recent wave of coups in the region. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso's new military juntas found common ground in three key issues: the expansion of jihadist insurgency, the failure of Western powers such as France to help in containing them, and the perceived inadequacy of civilian governments' solutions to the crisis.³² Threats from ECOWAS, the regional economic union, solidified these interests into a confederation founded on mutual defense of their coup-formed governments. As ECOWAS backed down from

Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso inherited jumbled colonial borders, little domestic bureaucracy, and militaries built to suppress domestic resistance.

invasion threats and all three countries prepared to withdraw, their alliance became a key method of regional integration. As of today, the CSS has “a functional rotating presidency, a confederation treaty, a joint biometric passport, an investment bank, a joint customs duty, a flag, an anthem, a television channel, and a 5,000-strong unified military command.”³³


JAMA'AT NUSRAT AL-ISLAM WAL-MUSLIMIN (JNIM) AND ISLAMIC STATE SAHEL PROVINCE (ISSP)

The regional jihadist insurgencies that are challenging CSS states and feeding the humanitarian crisis stem from two main coalitions. Their rivalry, and their enmity with the juntas ruling the CSS, present a substantial and dire threat to regional stability.

Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) formed in 2017 from several prior al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Mali, and quickly grew from approximately 2,000 fighters to more than 5,000 by the present day, as of current estimates.³⁴ Its smaller rival, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), currently commands a few thousand fighters and relies on guerilla attacks, while

JNIM directly challenges CSS states in open war.³⁵ Both organizations had prior phases of indiscriminate attacks on civilians, but have more recently taken advantage of insecurity, poverty and discontent in neglected rural areas to recruit fighters and grow their regional support.³⁶ However, their growth has been tempered by their own rivalry, including their competition for territories, recruits, and lucrative smuggling and extortion schemes.³⁷

Both JNIM and ISSP have grown due to common conditions in the Sahel region: the conduct of state and regional security forces, resource and governance vacuums in rural areas left untouched for centuries, and intense resource competition worsened substantially by anthropogenic climate change.³⁸ It is important to understand the Sahel as one region in a far larger, interconnected continent. JNIM represents a growing response to economic and political crises that are not contained specifically to Francophone West Africa, or even Muslim-majority countries. In the face of these crises, both groups have offered economic opportunities to desperate people, while also operating protection and dispute resolution systems that French West Africa and the post-colonial states



Map showing approximate zones of control in Mali. The government only controls areas in red

Credit: Borysk5

failed to provide.³⁹

Both groups have also become increasingly capable of expanding activities into large urban centers. Despite heavy pressure from international law enforcement and JNIM itself, ISSP successfully targeted the Diori Hameni International Airport in Niamey, Niger's capital city, without any resistance from troops in the capital.⁴⁰ This growth in strategic capability has been attributed by analysts in the region to two major factors. The first is a new ISSP model of shifting from alliances that reflect pre-existing rural tensions, such as ethnically-charged attacks on civilians, toward instead building greater regional capabilities to attack urban centers. The other is the near-total lack of international or regional security attention toward the growing power of jihadist insurgency, leading to more foreign fighters joining JNIM and ISSP and contributing to growing regional, and potentially transnational force options for both groups.⁴¹

Both JNIM and ISSP have targeted civilians and humanitarian assistance as a core part of their strategy for more than a decade. JNIM has kidnapped foreigners in the region, including humanitarian workers, since the mid-2010s. These efforts have been largely successful in gaining resources, as post-coup governments in the CSS have paid as much as USD 11.8 million for the release of European nationals, as well as freeing hundreds of JNIM fighters.⁴² This kidnapping campaign has responded to these incentives by prioritizing the kidnapping of foreigners, and regional analysts predict that the Sahel will be a growing hotbed for kidnappings of foreign aid workers who can yield lucrative

ransoms.⁴³ Data in recent years has shown a growing targeting of both any civilian seemingly associated with CSS governments or foreign actors, as well as rising attacks on humanitarian infrastructure.⁴⁴ JNIM and ISSP have thus become major obstacles to the humanitarian resolution of the crisis in the Sahel today.

FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SAHEL REGION

A carousel of patrons has assisted the states in the Sahel with their regimes' legitimacy and solvency over the years. The most crucial in years past have been the recently-diminished Western powers, France and the United States. The complex regional and continental organizations of ECOWAS and the African Union have at times clashed and collaborated with the Sahel's regimes. Today, the Russian Federation has become a prime source of backing for the juntas who run Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

France, the former colonizer of the Sahel, was a key actor in the region leading Western counterterrorism efforts starting in the early aughts. Operation Barkhane, which concluded in June 2022, stationed approximately 5,000 troops throughout Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad, with the goal of assisting regional governments with preventing jihadist violence.⁴⁵ However, the French presence was largely unpopular with both the public and the post-coup juntas, who sought to gain public support by condemning the operations as neo-colonial failures that could not contain the rising threats of JNIM and ISSP.⁴⁶ France's own policies were often key factors in

Today, the Russian Federation has become a prime source of backing for the juntas who run Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.



Leaders of each of the three CSS states meet in 2024

Credit: GoitaAssimi

the public outrage, including their control of West African monetary policy through the CFA franc, decades of extractive economic dealmaking with unpopular leaders, and continued French support for elected officials perceived as ineffective and corrupt.⁴⁷ Leaders who promised the end of French involvement in the region during their coups were often cheered, and French forces were expelled from Mali in 2022, as well as Burkina Faso and Niger in 2023.⁴⁸ Niger also expelled the ambassador from France, triggering a broader contraction of Western economic, humanitarian, and military efforts in the region.⁴⁹

Russia's financial and military backing has been a key boon for the juntas that formed the CSS. In 2021, the Russian mercenary force, the Wagner Group, entered Mali to offer security assistance without any attached conditions, as many Western backers such as France had done.⁵⁰ In August 2023, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of the group, died in a plane crash only two months after his attempted coup against President Vladimir Putin. In the wake of his passing, the Wagner Group fractured, and the Russian state built a successor organization called the Africa Corps to provide the same services to the CSS,

under the direct control of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The Africa Corps has worked directly alongside Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and other African states in an expanded set of territories and for new purposes, including potential domestic law enforcement.⁵¹ In Mali, the Africa Corps has worked alongside government troops in counterinsurgency operations, but the joint operation has had mixed results, with significant territorial losses in the Africa Corps' operating regions in recent years. These operational setbacks have placed the reliability of a Russian security partnership in question.⁵²

Before 2025, USAID was a major donor for both humanitarian and economic development efforts in the Sahel, providing vital resources for healthcare, nutritional programs, universal education, and government improvement throughout the region's states.⁵³ In early 2025, the administration of Donald Trump worked to dismantle USAID after a preliminary review, and froze or terminated many of its awards, constituent programs, and functions. The remainder of the agency was absorbed into the State Department.⁵⁴ In the Sahel, these cuts included a significant amount of the total

healthcare spending in a large proportion of the countries. The end of USAID and its legacy will be critical background information as the WFP seeks to address the crisis.

The regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also taken major action in the region, particularly because of the coups taking place in CSS countries. ECOWAS is a regional assembly of West African states dedicated to promoting regional economic benefit, peacekeeping, and the preservation of human rights.⁵⁵ During the 2023 coup in Niger, the last of the CSS states to be led by a military junta, ECOWAS suspended Niger from the organization, “shut its borders, cut its electricity, and demanded that [President] Bazoum be reinstated.”⁵⁶ An ECOWAS standby force was activated, but ultimately stood down after the chairman, President Bola Tinubu of Nigeria, backed down from the punitive threats. The CSS states all departed from ECOWAS in January 2025, cutting off access to its regional courts and other peacekeeping efforts, although the organization remains dedicated to preserving inter-regional free travel.⁵⁷

The African Union (AU), meanwhile, has been largely on the sideline of the crisis in the Sahel, having recognized the ECOWAS suspension of the states’ membership, but not taking any further action of their own.⁵⁸ The current AU policy plan relies largely on the assumption of regional cooperation, and cannot move forward without it in many respects.

THE GROWING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Across Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, approximately 10 million people face acute hunger, a severe need for immediate food supplies.⁵⁹ At least some of these individuals are also part of the 3.5 million people trapped in besieged areas by fighting.⁶⁰ The CSS have limited economic policy options, a colonial legacy that may haunt them as economic and food catastrophes challenge the region.⁶¹ Displaced people, in particular, are also a population that desperately needs life-saving food assistance, being cut off from their jobs, communities, and homes.⁶² Subsistence farmers and the communities they serve with their extra product are also increasingly under pressure due to climate stress.⁶³

The CSS states remain on the CFA franc, a currency pegged to the French franc, and then to the euro.⁶⁴ They have vowed to exit the CFA franc system, which sharply limits their ability to exercise monetary policy. Instead, the CSS seeks to create a common Sahelian currency, which they argue will act as an extension and ratification of formal independence from France.⁶⁵ Whether the new currency will successfully allow these countries more flexibility, or serve as a force multiplier for crises such as growing global inflation, remains an open question based on what the Sahelian states do next.

Agriculture accounts for just under half of the entire regional gross domestic product (GDP) of the Sahel, as well as more than half of the labor force.⁶⁶ In the same region, temperatures

Across Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, approximately 10 million people face acute hunger.

are rising at rates 50 percent higher than the global average, and irregular rainfall has caused regular droughts and floods that have disrupted traditional agriculture and caused broader fragility and economic instability.⁶⁷ Water scarcity, in particular, has become a pressing issue beyond the agricultural sector. Over 50 percent of people in Burkina Faso and Niger lack access to safe drinking water, and only nine percent of people in Burkina Faso have access to handwashing facilities.⁶⁸ The growing drought and rainfall disruptions may also be contributors to violence. According to a study published in 2021, a “decrease in rainfall of one standard deviation in an area occupied by pastoralists results in a statistically significant increase in violence in neighboring farming communities, but only when the farmers and herders are of different ethnicities.”⁶⁹ The colonial-era borders and governance structures in the Sahel region may specifically intensify these tendencies, particularly with the relatively rapid rate of warming in the region.⁷⁰ Finally, erosion and desertification are growing crises that are depleting the amount of land that can be farmed even during less irregular rainfalls, resulting in growing conflict between farming and herding communities over arable land.⁷¹ The climate crisis

in the Sahel is a growing contributor to every major challenge the region is facing.

Displacement in the Sahel is growing at rapid rates, exacerbated by war, climate change, and government crackdowns on political action. As of 2022, far earlier than the modern day, nearly 2.5 million people were displaced, many of them Burkinabe.⁷² This pace has not slowed, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees predicts 5.6 million forcibly displaced and stateless people will be hosted in the Sahel region by the end of 2026.⁷³ Alongside the crises of climate stress and economic disaster amid widespread war, UNICEF has predicted that the Sahel region has approximately 1 million children under the age of 5 who are at risk of life threatening malnutrition.⁷⁴ These rapidly rising numbers present a crisis of delivery and scale for humanitarian aid, one that is particularly enhanced by the climate, security, and political challenges of today’s global system.



A WFP food distribution site near Bamako, Mali

Credit: DFID - UK Department for International Development

Current Status

EXACERBATING POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES

The behaviors of CSS states, JNIM and ISSP, and foreign paramilitary forces have each contributed to displacement, food insecurity, and a lack of access to humanitarian aid. Their actions are a critical lens through which to analyze how the World Food Programme can best assist embattled Sahelians. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has comprehensively documented potential war crimes in Burkina Faso from all combatants – jihadist and government forces alike.

From the government, HRW has accused combatants from both the Burkinabe military and the VDPs (Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, an auxiliary militia) of brutal counterinsurgency campaigns that have targeted civilians since the September 2022 coup.⁷⁵ The same report documents specific incidents, including a February 2024 attack in the northern Yatenga province where the military summarily executed at least 56 children.⁷⁶ The government also has conducted attacks alongside VDPs

that intentionally destroyed vital granaries and exacerbated hunger, such as in the village of Touka in July 2024.⁷⁷ Reprisals for JNIM attacks have also been swift, and Human Rights Watch alleges that the conduct of the armed forces has constituted internationally prohibited collective punishment.⁷⁸ Collective punishment is “the deliberate punishment of people for an offense that others committed.”⁷⁹ Finally, the military regime has engaged in potential ethnic cleansing against the Fulani minority. The Fulani make up 8 percent of the overall population of Burkina Faso, and historically have been predominantly Muslim cattle headers.⁸⁰ JNIM has heavily concentrated recruitment efforts on disenfranchised Fulani youth, and the entire minority has been systematically persecuted and marginalized by the highest levels of government. Fulani property has been seized, and groups of Fulani herders have been repeatedly targeted and relocated by the military and VDPs.⁸¹

Meanwhile, JNIM has been engaging in many of the same tactics and taking further action to disrupt the delivery of aid to Burkinabe communities. In the words of Human Rights Watch observers: “When a community has VDPs, JNIM treats that entire community as being allied

Protestors demonstrating in support of the 2022 coup in Burkina Faso

Credit: EKokou



with government security forces, making the community a target for retaliation, attacks, and intimidation.” Villages and towns where VDPs are present have been cut off from humanitarian convoys and supplies, and JNIM has targeted VDP positions nearby civilian settlements in their attacks.⁸² The government’s conscription of civilians to conduct military activities has put them in the crossfire of JNIM, as well; on August 24, 2024, Burkina Faso suffered its deadliest terrorist attack in history when JNIM massacred several hundred civilians who had been forced to dig trenches for the Burkinabe military.⁸³ There has been widespread failure to investigate military and VDP killings of civilians, while accused JNIM members and sympathizers have allegedly been denied any fair trial after being detained.⁸⁴

In addition to the JNIM kidnapping schemes, the organization has also found revenue streams that substantially contribute to economic hardship in the Sahel by controlling vital artery roadways and stealing livestock in massive quantities. JNIM has been at the head of a “sophisticated and lucrative operation” in which it collects stolen livestock from operatives and then sells them back into the legal livestock market to fund their forces.⁸⁵ Many countries, have seen spikes in cattle rustling since the war began in the Sahel region, and the livestock population’s instability in a time of severe drought and limited crop yield has enhanced the food insecurity crisis in the region.⁸⁶ The spread of crime and disruptions to the food supply in countries such as Ghana, which is not in the Sahel region, show a concerning expansion of the crisis. Meanwhile, taxing transport has become another revenue source for the jihadist forces. “Roads are critical spaces where there is overt interplay between illicit economies and violence.”⁸⁷ JNIM has looted and torched fuel supplies traveling along major roads, causing fuel shortages and massive cost hikes, and operated illicit drug-trafficking networks. Meanwhile, legal goods such as food supplies and humanitarian resources are being regularly looted.⁸⁸ In the words of a village chief

in Mali, “We cannot live without these roads. The terrorists know this better than we do.”

Since 2025, the CSS at large, and Burkina Faso in particular, have become increasingly hostile to humanitarian aid efforts, despite the critical challenges facing the Sahel. The aforementioned sovereigntist movement driving the junta in Burkina Faso (as well as in Mali and Niger) has placed restrictions on Western-founded non-governmental organizations, including requiring a Burkinabe country director. These directors are threatened with severe sanctions, including the revocation of their citizenship, if they do not comply with regime talking points and support the junta’s campaign against jihadist forces.⁸⁹

Non-governmental organizations serve as critical partners for the World Food Programme, among other international aid organizations. These links mean that restrictions and pressure campaigns could severely impact the viability of future aid efforts, even as the crisis grows. Local staff have been accused of foreign collusion and espionage, echoing the treatment of non-governmental organizations by the junta’s Russian partners.⁹⁰ The Burkinabe government has also begun a campaign against NGO data-gathering, including by forcing them to obtain a so-called “statistical visa” before they are legally allowed to conduct surveys or research.⁹¹ As of April 15, 2026, Burkinabe authorities had “dissolved 118 NGOs and associations, including many involved in human rights and community support activities, and suspended more than 350 others days later over alleged administrative non-compliance.”⁹²

While many humanitarian organizations remain dedicated to staying in the region, the landscape has increasingly become hostile to any international attention or assistance. In Mali, two French television channels were suspended over their reporting of the JNIM fuel blockade.⁹³ In Burkina Faso, food assistance is critically needed, especially with the onset of the lean season. The WFP has taken action to deliver assistance to besieged areas using the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service, while also attempting



Fuel truck drivers wait for a military escort before traveling into Mali

Credit: AFP/Getty

to develop national capacity in Burkina Faso for domestic responses.⁹⁴

THE CLIMATE AND SUPPLY CRISIS

Climate change and the crisis of supply chains have come together to cause major food insecurity in the Sahel region. The intersection of these issues presents both scientific and political questions for the WFP.

At the center of the agropastoral society that has lived for millennia in the Sahel is the cycle of rainfall, which has been substantially impacted by the advanced rate of warming in the region. A recent study in the *Journal of Climate Change and Health* analyzed climatic shifts in the Sahel and their contributions to conflict and crisis. One major shift in the region is the amount of extreme heat: the number of very hot days (temperatures exceeding 35 degrees Celsius, or 95 degrees Fahrenheit) is expected to rise by an additional 125 days per year by 2080, under the increasingly likely medium-to-high emissions scenario.⁹⁵ Meanwhile, recent data have already confirmed that heavy rainfall, which can present a number of risks to crops and contribute to

desertification by causing soil erosion, has risen. In Niger, rainfall levels were approximately 120–600 percent above the 1991–2020 average, depending on the region.⁹⁶ Desertification has rapidly expanded due to these rising temperatures and erratic rainfall, resulting in a substantial decrease in the amount of arable land in the Sahel. Approximately 80 percent of the region's farmland is considered degraded, losing both soil fertility and capacity to sustain vegetation. The many communities in the Sahel reliant on subsistence farming are increasingly threatened by these climate shifts.⁹⁷

Throughout 2025 and 2026, JNIM's blockade campaign has caused major chaos along the core roadways connecting Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – all landlocked nations – to major ports, from which they receive vital fuel and other resources.⁹⁸ Mali, in particular, has endured a “strategy of asphyxiation” along the Dakar-Bamako corridor, an axis between Senegal and Mali where insecurity threatens trade valued at \$1.17 billion U.S. dollars in the first nine months of 2025.⁹⁹ Bamako, the capital city of Mali and its largest population center, has been most affected.¹⁰⁰ According to a security

governance expert speaking to Peace Insight, JNIM “seeks to present itself as a protector of the local population, and establish influence [and dominance] over armed actors such as [the ISSP] and the national armed forces, which have so far been supported by Russian auxiliaries... now known as the Africa Corps.”¹⁰¹ As part of this strategy, JNIM has conducted attacks against armed fuel convoys, as well as harassing and intimidating civilians and forcing them to wear veils.¹⁰²

The blockade formally began on September 3, 2025, when JNIM banned fuel imports from Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mauritania, while also blocking people within the cities of Kayes and Nioro du Sahel from leaving, thereby placing two vital points along the corridor under their control and blocking imports of fuel.¹⁰³ The results were paralyzing, resulting in soaring food prices, suspended classes at universities, and staff withdrawals at the U.S. and U.K. embassies.¹⁰⁴ The effects of the blockade could even be observed through visible dimming from space.¹⁰⁵ Although the blockade was eased in early 2026, as of April 2026, it has resumed, and continued to disrupt oil supplies to Bamako, with the capital relying almost entirely on fuel that was delivered by the armed military escorts that successfully passed through JNIM attacks.¹⁰⁶

While food insecurity threatens both urban and rural areas in the Sahel region, the challenges facing both areas are starkly different. Urban areas, which have long been reliant on supplies shipped by road from farms, are especially vulnerable to fuel price spikes and food disruptions caused by JNIM blockades.

Meanwhile, rural areas are facing intense socioeconomic challenges due to climate change and desertification, including growing ethnic tensions and violence. The root causes and immediate needs of these problems must be answered in distinct ways by the WFP as it plans next steps in the Sahel.

The April 2026 resumption of the JNIM blockade in Bamako has produced the greatest threat to urban resources in the Sahel conflict thus far, with Secretary-General Guterres warning of a potential “disastrous domino effect” across West Africa if the city faces a collapse of supplies.¹⁰⁷ The city has experienced intense pressure and attacks from JNIM, and limited results have come from aid promises made by Russian allies of the junta.¹⁰⁸ Experts in the region predict that the future fall of Bamako would signal a massive turning point in the Sahel region, with threats to the governments of Burkina Faso and Niger, as well as the potential collapse of the Malian state.¹⁰⁹ Fuel plays a vital role in urban life, including for food security, as it contributes to cooking, transportation of food, and even the production of fertilizers for subsistence agriculture. The initial 2025 blockade caused fuel prices to shoot up 500 percent – from USD 25 per liter to USD 130 per liter. These prices have contributed to economic disruption and displacement, along with a growing food crisis in the city.¹¹⁰

Rural areas have become a source of militancy and banditry in Sahel countries, largely as a result of socio-economic pressures caused by climate change and ethnic tensions in the rural regions.¹¹¹ The Fulani minority, in particular, have been

The initial 2025 blockade caused fuel prices to shoot up 500 percent—from USD 25 per liter to USD 130 per liter.

increasingly marginalized in Sahelian societies, including Burkina Faso. Their primarily pastoralist economic niche has been diminishing in the Sahel for decades; the Middle East Institute describes the Fulani and other pastoralists as seeing “their land rights and access to resources jeopardized by unfavorable state policies, failures of rural governance, and periodic dislocations brought about by drought and violent conflicts.”¹¹² The mobility of their lifestyle made them increasingly the victims of competition over arable land as desertification and irregular rainfall caused widespread competition over access to crops.¹¹³ In turn, the growth of communal violence has fueled growing insurgent violence, and many members of the Fulani ethnic group are joining JNIM forces. As banditry has also exploded in the climate-stressed rural regions of the Sahel, JNIM and ISSP have increasingly recruited both battle-hardened local bandits and disillusioned pastoralist youths.¹¹⁴

THE IMPACT OF USAID CUTS

Under the Trump administration in the United States, USAID has ended as a program, and the impacts on the region will likely be substantial. The following section will be a limited¹¹⁵ rundown on the potential impacts of USAID funding losses.

The WFP’s prior reports have described a stark collapse in funding throughout the region. In the non-CSS state of Nigeria, the WFP predicted in January that it would reach only 72,000 people in February. Comparatively, the organization could reach 1.3 million people during the 2025 “lean season,” a period of two to three months.¹¹⁶ Prior programs, such as land restoration in the Sahel, produced USD 30 of value for every dollar spent; they will likely cease unless the WFP can acquire a total of USD 453 million to reverse the effect of the United States’ funding cuts.¹¹⁷ Over 13 million children are expected to suffer from malnutrition in 2026, and “rampant hunger [may] drive further unrest, displacement, and conflict across the region,” according to Sarah Longford, the Deputy Regional Director for West and Central Africa.¹¹⁸

A REcAP Network case study in the Lake Chad Basin, which neighbors the Sahel region, found that school spaces, social and community cohesion, and nutritional screening had all been largely curtailed after the cuts took place.¹¹⁹ As crises proliferate in the broader region, the cut in funding has become a major pressure point for Sahel governments to improve their governance and dedicate more resources to healthcare and food security.¹²⁰

The greatest healthcare challenge in the Sahel after the cuts to USAID may ultimately be malaria cases: an internal memo in 2025 predicted that an additional 12.5–17.9 million malaria cases would occur annually if the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) was ended, resulting in 71,000–166,000 deaths each year.¹²¹ While the Initiative was returned to operation after a brief freeze, it endured a funding cut of nearly 50 percent, and the memo may ultimately be a predictor for the implications of this decision.¹²² Similar programs addressing tuberculosis and HIV have endured similar cuts and periodic freezes, resulting in potential public health risks across several key areas.¹²³ The fragility of CSS states’ regimes, as well as their recent economic crises, pose a potential proliferation of these diseases amid an embattled and fragile healthcare system.¹²⁴ The World Food Programme has had strong past involvement in providing mosquito nets, which are a low-cost prevention tool for malaria.¹²⁵ With sharply reduced funding from PMI, the WFP may have an opportunity to expand its healthcare services.

A broader study of the dismantlement of the agency in the Lancet medical journal projected that “global aid cuts could lead to at least 9.4 million additional deaths by 2030, if the current funding trend continues,” according to CNN.¹²⁶ These deaths would present a major reversal in a program that, by 2021, had cut global child mortality by 39 percent since 2002.¹²⁷ Finally, in a recent analysis, the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission found that USAID cuts would result in 39 percent reductions in spending for nutrition worldwide.¹²⁸ That same study



WFP staff distributing aid in Gao, Mali

Credit: WFP/Mahamadou Abdourhamane

mentioned Mali, in particular, as a nation at risk of acute food insecurity, which would be particularly affected by USAID cuts in the coming year. Data collection on food insecurity will also be substantially impacted, resulting in the collapse of critical data infrastructure and impairing the ability of remaining humanitarian operations to respond to the growth of a crisis.¹²⁹

Bloc Analysis

POINTS OF DIVISION

Managing Aid: The WFP will have to contend with the divergence of aid due to state kleptocracy and diversion by JNIM and other regional forces. Delegates must find a way to prevent the loss of critical humanitarian supplies, while also keeping the flow of aid from slowing. Stronger tracking on supplies, direct delivery systems over airdrops, or restrictions on their distribution might be effective to reduce diversion. However, these might also reduce the overall amount of aid, especially to besieged areas.

The Rural-Urban Divide: Especially with the recent cuts to resources, the WFP must make decisions about how to address rural and urban issues. Both regions house many displaced individuals, and can cause state collapse or instability if left unsolved. While urban populations are traditionally easier to reach and disruptions to major cities are threatening to markets and political stability, the blockades enforced by groups such as JNIM present a threat of direct confrontation. Meanwhile, rural communities face isolation, agricultural losses to desertification, and rapidly proliferating banditry as assistance slows to a trickle.

Prioritizing Vulnerable Populations: Children constitute a large proportion of the Sahelian population, especially in major cities, and some delegates believe that prioritizing their well-being must come first. However, reductions in aid to other groups may feed the same instability that has proliferated recently. For instance, the Fulani minority have become increasingly isolated in rural communities, while also struggling economically, and these problems have driven some to join JNIM and ISSP.

Responding to CSS Regimes: Given the restrictions placed upon NGOs in the Sahel, the Programme must decide whether (and how) to work with regimes currently in place, or whether to attempt independent aid delivery given the intense control they seek. The regimes of the CSS are intensely nationalistic, and highly skeptical of international aid; they will likely demand local control of both relief supplies, and who receives them within their borders. While collaboration may increase the efficiency of aid delivery, it would also potentially harm groups the governments wish not to assist, such as the Fulani. Attempting independent deliveries may be seen as violations of laws or policies against neocolonialism and invite crackdowns on regional partners and the WFP itself.

Immediate Relief vs. Long-Term Resilience: Funding limitations will force the WFP to make difficult choices about the strategies that it employs to address the crisis in the Sahel. Whether to address the impact of emergent situations, or to build programs that resolve root causes of the conflict or environmental crisis, will be a pressing issue. Delegates might aim for a cheaper operation that provides immediate aid, or a more expensive one that aims for long-term stability in a certain issue area. For example, rural areas present both long-term environmental issues such as desertification and also warfare and food insecurity that may be more pressing to human life in the immediate moment. Deciding which of these issues to resolve with limited resources will become a critical element of the response.

ROLES OF THE OPERATIONS CENTER

Directors of Programme Policy: The directors of programme policy decide the broad-based strategies of the WFP, making key decisions that guide the larger goals of the organization. Many have operated other NGOs or worked in executive positions. Their jobs lend themselves to a long-term and strategic point of view. This group may focus on how limited resources

should be divided between immediate emergency assistance and longer-term programs, and which populations should receive priority as the WFP plans its response.

Directors of Political Affairs: The directors of political affairs represent the policy advocacy and diplomatic element of the WFP's mission, driving support from grantor countries. Many are former politicians, lobbyists, or staffers. They prioritize maintaining the WFP's future success and continuing to build its resources. This group may focus on relationships with donors and CSS governments, negotiating humanitarian access, and securing financial and political support from partners.

Directors of Partnerships and Advocacy: The directors of partnerships and advocacy partner with external organizations, partner governments, and advocacy groups to provide the grassroots support for the WFP's work. Many have worked in sales or campaigns in the past. Their roles bring them closer to day-to-day priorities, and more specific issues, than the Directors of Political Affairs. This group may focus on cooperating with local organizations, non-governmental organizations, community leaders, and other partners to identify needs and best reach impacted groups.

Directors of Operations Management: The directors of operations management handle day-to-day logistical issues, including staffing, logistics crises, and coordinating aid deliveries. These leaders of operations often come from security or corporate supply chain backgrounds, depending on their particular journeys. Their jobs bring them in daily contact with local stakeholders and encourage a more short-term point of view. Operations directors may prioritize maintaining the supply chain of humanitarian assistance, as well as finding practical solutions when disruptions threaten ongoing operations.

Directors of Security and Risk Management: The directors of security and risk management are dedicated to preventing and managing any

threat to the WFP's operations and staff. Often coming from security or military backgrounds, they act in advance of aid deliveries to plan courses, methods, and protection that will minimize the risk to any person delivering humanitarian aid. Their goals largely align with protecting the aid workers who deliver WFP supplies. Even when security measures could slow deliveries or increase costs, these directors will prioritize safeguarding staffers and goods, sometimes through new technology.

Directors of Supply Chain Management: The directors of supply chain management handle the logistical details of planning aid deliveries, including how to deliver aid, as well as how best to minimize the use of resources and streamline supply chains. They often come from corporate supply chain backgrounds, and look to build economies of scale for aid deliveries. Their goals align with maximal efficiency and cost-saving in day-to-day operations, to better serve WFP goals in the long run. These directors may focus on daily priorities, including procurement, transportation routes, warehousing, fuel availability, and efficient ways to move limited supplies.

Committee Mission

The World Food Programme is not meant to resolve the underlying conflict in the Sahel region. Instead, the organization's mandate requires that it address urgent food and nutrition needs while strengthening resilience and supporting national food-security systems. WFP's work can include emergency food and cash assistance, nutrition programs, school meals, support for agricultural livelihoods, and logistics services that help humanitarian assistance reach affected populations.¹³⁰

These responsibilities give the Operations Center a wide range of possible tools, but not unlimited authority. WFP's 2026–2029 Strategic Plan prioritizes meeting urgent needs during

crises, strengthening resilience to reduce future humanitarian needs, and helping governments strengthen their own food-security and nutrition programs.¹³¹ In the Sahel specifically, WFP has combined emergency assistance with programs that restore degraded land, support livelihoods and local food production, and improve communities' ability to withstand future shocks.¹³²

The ongoing warfare between JNIM, the ISSP, and the CSS states of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger is a pressing challenge that hinders aid, traps displaced people in war-torn regions, and invites foreign intervention in the form of Russian paramilitary groups. Humanitarian access is therefore itself a major component of the crisis. Across the Central Sahel, millions of people face acute hunger, while communities in besieged areas can be cut off from assistance entirely. WFP must therefore consider not only how much assistance to provide but also how it can safely and reliably reach populations living in areas affected or controlled by armed groups.¹³³

Meanwhile, the climate crisis is increasingly causing a crisis for Sahelian agriculture through the twin problems of desertification and elevated, unpredictable levels of rainfall and flooding; the reduced amount of arable land is part of a feedback loop of crime, chaos, and increased insurgent activity in the Sahel. WFP's role consequently extends beyond responding after food insecurity becomes an emergency. Its resilience programs in the Sahel have restored degraded land, supported food production and livelihoods, and sought to reduce communities' future dependence on humanitarian assistance.¹³⁴

Finally, the cuts to USAID and other international aid programs in recent years will substantially reduce the resources that WFP supplies will arrive alongside. Because the WFP depends on voluntary contributions, resource shortages force the WFP to prioritize among needs that may all be urgent. Delegates must therefore consider not only what interventions would be effective, but also which populations and programs should receive limited WFP resources and what

tradeoffs those choices create.¹³⁵

Delegates may negotiate with governments and humanitarian partners, adjust WFP operations, allocate resources, and develop strategies for delivering assistance. However, the Operations Center is not a military or political body and cannot resolve the conflict through military action or dictate the domestic policies of CSS governments.

Research and Preparation Questions

Your dais has prepared the following research and preparation questions as a means of providing guidance for your research process. These questions should be carefully considered, as they embody some of the main critical thought and learning objectives surrounding your topic.

TOPIC A

- 1** How can the World Food Programme streamline its operations and increase its financial resources in light of the cuts to USAID?
- 2** How can the World Food Programme assist people living or trapped in JNIM territory, while also considering the safety of its staff, potential diversion of aid, and the increasing demands for control of humanitarian organizations by the ruling CSS juntas?
- 3** With climate stress facing the region and desertification becoming increasingly inevitable, how will the WFP assist impacted populations with economic transition and help maintain the nutritional security of subsistence farmers?
- 4** How should the World Food Programme prioritize limited resources between urban populations, rural communities, displaced people, and other vulnerable groups when it cannot fully meet the needs of all affected populations?
- 5** How should the World Food Programme balance immediate, life-saving food assistance with longer-term investments in resilience, local food systems, and livelihoods that could reduce future humanitarian need?

Important Documents

TOPIC A

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