

A foggy, rainy street scene in New York City. Tall brick buildings line the street, and the ground is wet and reflective. Yellow taxis and a bus are visible in the traffic. A person with a black umbrella is walking across the street. A blue semi-transparent banner is overlaid in the upper middle section of the image.

NHSMUN

National High School Model United Nations

Table of Contents

A Note on the NHSMUN Difference.....	3
Position Paper Requirements.....	4
Committee History.....	5

Topic A: The Situation in the Falkland Islands (1982).....6

Introduction.....	7
History and Description of the Issue.....	7
Current Status.....	14
Bloc Analysis.....	21
Committee Mission.....	22

Topic B: The Situation in Lebanon (1982).....23

Introduction.....	24
History and Description of the Issue.....	24
Current Status.....	32
Bloc Analysis.....	35
Committee Mission.....	38

Research and Preparation Questions.....	40
Important Documents.....	41

A Note on the NHSMUN Difference

Esteemed Faculty and Delegates,

Welcome to NHSMUN 2027! We are Armen Bagdassarian and Sabeeh Mirza, and we are elated to serve as this year's Secretaries-General. Thank you for choosing to attend NHSMUN, the world's largest and most diverse high school Model United Nations conference. As a space for collaboration, consensus, and compromise, NHSMUN strives to transform today's brightest thinkers, speakers, and collaborators into tomorrow's leaders. We believe that an emphasis on education through simulation is paramount to the Model UN experience.

Realism and Accuracy: Although a perfect simulation of the UN is never possible, we believe that one of the core educational responsibilities of MUN conferences is to educate students about how the UN System works. We strive to invite real UN, NGO, and field experts into each committee through our committee speakers program. Moreover, we arrange meetings between students and the actual UN Permanent Mission of the country they are representing. These exclusive resources are only available due to IMUNA's formal association with the United Nations Department of Global Communications and consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. No other conference goes so far to deeply immerse students into the UN System.

Educational Emphasis: At the heart of NHSMUN lies education and compromise. Part of what makes NHSMUN special is its diverse delegate base. As such, when NHSMUN distributes awards, we strongly de-emphasize their importance in comparison to the educational value of Model UN. In particular, our daises look for and promote constructive leadership and diplomacy that strive toward consensus, as real ambassadors do in the United Nations.

Research and a Dedicated Staff: Our staffers care deeply about delegates' experiences and what they take away from their time at NHSMUN. Our Directors spend over six months preparing Background Guides, in addition to Update Briefs written to reflect the rapidly changing nature of the topics to be discussed. Our staffers are trained rigorously to provide the best conference experience possible. Our daises provide thoughtful comments on submitted position papers. Our staff aims to tailor the committee experience to delegates' reflections and research, but also to facilitate an environment where all delegates' thoughts can be heard.

Empowering Participation: The UN relies on the voices of all of its member states to create resolutions. This is our philosophy at NHSMUN too. Our Rules of Procedure and our staff focus on making every voice in the committee heard, regardless of country assignment or skill level. Additionally, unlike many other conferences, we also emphasize delegate participation after the conference. Delegates spend countless hours researching topics critical to the UN and broader international sphere.

Delegates, it is our sincerest hope that your time at NHSMUN will be thought-provoking and stimulating. NHSMUN is an incredible time to learn, grow, and embrace new opportunities. We look forward to seeing you work both as students and global citizens at the conference.

Best,

Armen Bagdassarian
Secretary-General

Sabeeh Mirza
Secretary-General

Position Paper Requirements

Delegate research and preparation is a critical element of attending NHSMUN and enjoying the debate experience. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in your committee. We encourage and expect each of you to critically explore the selected topics and be able to identify and analyze their intricacies upon arrival to the conference.

The task of preparing for the conference can be challenging. To assist delegates, we have updated our [Beginner Delegate Guide](#) and [Advanced Delegate Guide](#). These guides contain more detailed instructions on how to prepare a position paper and excellent sources that delegates can use for research. Use these resources to your advantage. They can help transform a sometimes overwhelming task into what it should be: an engaging, interesting, and rewarding experience.

To accurately represent a country, delegates must be able to articulate its policies. Accordingly, NHSMUN requires each delegation (the one or two delegates representing a country in a committee) to write a position paper for each topic on the committee's agenda. More information about how to write and format position papers can be found in the [Research Guide](#). To summarize, position papers should be structured into three sections.

I: Topic Background – This section should describe the history of the topic as it would be described by the delegate's country. Delegates do not need to give an exhaustive account of the topic, but rather focus on the details that are most important to the delegation's policy and proposed solutions.

II: Country Policy – This section should discuss the delegation's policy regarding the topic. Each paper should state the policy in plain terms and include the relevant statements, statistics, and research that support the effectiveness of the policy. Comparisons with other global issues are also appropriate here.

III. Proposed Solutions – This section should detail the delegation's proposed solutions to address the topic. Descriptions of each solution should be thorough. Each idea should clearly connect to the specific problem it aims to solve and identify potential obstacles to implementation and how they can be avoided. The solution should be a natural extension of the country's policy.

Each topic's position paper should be **no more than 10 pages long** double-spaced with standard margins and 12 point font size. This is a maximum; **3–5 pages per topic is often a suitable length**. The paper must be written from the perspective of your assigned country and should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference.

Each delegation is responsible for submitting position papers on or before **February 26, 2027**. If a delegate wishes to receive detailed feedback from the committee's dais, their position paper must be submitted on or before **February 5, 2027**. The papers received by this earlier deadline will be reviewed by the committee dais and returned before February 26. Instructions on how to submit position papers will be shared directly with faculty advisors.

Submission instructions for position papers will be sent to faculty advisers via email. If delegations are unable to submit their position papers on time, please contact us at nhsmun@imuna.org.

Delegations that do not submit position papers will be ineligible for awards.

Committee History

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was created in 1945 through the UN Charter as one of the six main organs of the United Nations. It was established with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Since its first meeting on January 17, 1946, the Security Council has been housed at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City but has held sessions in other cities.¹ The Council comprises 15 members – 10 non-permanent and five permanent members. The five permanent members are known as the P5, which includes China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.² The ten non-permanent members are allocated based on a geographic representation quota and serve two-year terms each. The seat breakdown is as follows: five for African and Asian states, one for Eastern European States, two for the Latin American and Caribbean States, and two for Western European and other States.³ Currently, these include Bahrain, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Pakistan, Panama, and Somalia.⁴

Each member of the Security Council has one vote. An affirmative vote of nine members passes resolutions in the Security Council. However, only the P5 possesses the unique “right to veto” any resolution. If a P5 member votes “no” to a presented resolution, veto power is activated, and the resolution fails automatically.

The Security Council has passed 2,827 resolutions thus far. These resolutions focus mainly on the peaceful resolution of international disputes through negotiations and arbitration.⁵ Peacekeeping missions are one of the Council’s most visible forms of conflict management. These missions work to protect civilians, facilitate political processes, promote human rights, and more.⁶ Since the establishment of the UNSC, over two million peacekeepers from 125 countries have served in 71 peacekeeping missions.⁷ Unlike the General Assembly, decisions made by the Council are legally binding and must be carried out by member states. According to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council can enforce its decisions by imposing economic sanctions, ordering an arms embargo, or enacting military action.⁸

¹ “What is the Security Council?” United Nations Security Council, last accessed September 21, 2024, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council>.

² “The UN Security Council,” Council on Foreign Relations, last accessed September 21, 2024, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council>.

³ “FAQ Security Council,” United Nations, last accessed September 21, 2024, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/faq>.

⁴ United Nations Security Council. “What is the Security Council?”/United Nations Official Website. Security Council. 2020. <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/current-members>.

⁵ Council on Foreign Relations, “The UN Security Council,” “Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 2024 Security Council,” United Nations, last accessed September 21, 2024, <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-2024/>.

⁶ “Maintain International Peace and Security,” United Nations, last accessed September 21, 2024, <https://www.un.org/en/our-work/maintain-international-peace-and-security>.

⁷ “UN Peacekeeping,” Better World Campaign, last accessed September 21, 2024, <https://betterworldcampaign.org/un-peacekeeping>.

⁸ “Security Council,” United Nations, last accessed September 21, 2024, <https://www.un.org/en/model-united-nations/security-council>.

TOPIC A

HSC | NHSMUN 2027

The Situation in the Falkland Islands (1982)



Introduction

On April 3, 1982, the United Nations Security Council met at a pivotal moment. For nearly 150 years, both the Argentine Republic (Argentina) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) have claimed sovereignty over the same archipelago in the Atlantic. The UK calls the territory the Falkland Islands; Argentina calls it the Islas Malvinas.¹ The islands themselves are small and sparsely populated, but the dispute raises fundamental questions about decolonization and the right of people to choose their political future.² As diplomatic relations crumble and military activity increases, the Security Council urgently needs to solve this crisis.

The dispute has roots in the eighteenth century. Argentina argues that it inherited Spain's rights to the islands after independence. It relies partly on *uti possidetis juris*, a principle under which new states inherit the relevant borders of former colonies.³ Argentina's independence movement began in 1810, and it declared independence in 1816. The UK bases its claim on the 1766 settlement of Port Egmont. British forces took control of the islands in 1833 after demanding that Argentine authorities leave. The UK has administered the islands since then.⁴

Domestic politics have made the situation more tense. Argentina's military government, which took power in 1976, faces economic problems and growing public opposition. Its leaders see the islands as a powerful symbol of national unity.⁵ Meanwhile, the UK faces spending cuts and debates over its military role abroad. Argentine leaders have read British defense cuts as a sign that the UK might not fight to defend the islands.⁶ During the first months of 1982, talks made little progress. Strong nationalist language and an incident on South Georgia Island increased tension. Neither side has publicly declared war, but the risk of armed conflict is growing.⁷

The Security Council must weigh competing claims while seeking to reduce tension. Delegates should consider how talks, mediation, and other peaceful steps could prevent fighting. Their choices may affect both the islands' future and confidence in the UN's ability to keep peace.

History and Description of the Issue

SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE (1690–1833)

Sovereignty is a principle of international law that gives a state the independence and authority to govern a territory. The sovereign state can propose and execute different laws in its territory without any external interference. This is called domestic jurisdiction.⁸ In the Falklands, both Argentina and the UK claim control and authority on the islands.

Sovereignty disputes for the Falkland Islands can be traced back to early settlements and historical claims from France, Spain, the UK, and what is now Argentina.⁹ In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands first appeared on maps made by European ships exploring South Atlantic trade routes. European powers believed that the discovery, exploration, and occupation of a territory served as a legal basis for claiming sovereignty.¹⁰ As a result, the first sea voyages to the region were the basis for future territorial claims.

The Spanish Empire argued that the islands were part of their American domains due to their early European expansion to the Americas. They relied on historical documents such as the 1493 Papal Bull *Inter Caetera* and the 1494 *Tordesillas*



Map of the Falkland Islands

Credit: Eric Gaba

Treaty. In these documents, Spain and Portugal divided among themselves a large portion of the territories and “all those to be discovered in Indian lands.”¹¹ Under this interpretation, the islands remain within the area assigned to the Spanish Crown. In the following centuries, Spanish cartographers continued to record the archipelago in formal documents.

The United Kingdom (UK) argued their sovereignty claims through British expeditions. In the late 17th century, the UK made small expeditions to the region. In 1690, Captain John Strong sailed through the strait that separates the two main islands, naming it the Falkland Channel.¹² No formal settlements were established in any of these cases. However, the UK used these expeditions to justify its future presence in the archipelago.

The strategic importance of the islands grew significantly during the 18th century. The Falklands’ location in the South Atlantic Ocean turned the islands into a key point for navigation, sailing, fishing, and food supply.¹³ Many European powers showed an increasing interest in establishing permanent settlements in the area.

This marked the start of sovereign tensions.

The first disputes started in 1764 when France founded Isla Soledad under Louis Antoine de Bougainville. Spain protested the French settlement, arguing that the islands already belonged to the Spanish Crown. Meanwhile, in 1765, British Commodore John Byron was sent to the Falklands to survey the territory. Although the French already had settlements in Port Louis, he was instructed to build a fort in Port Egmont. Using the fort, the British Crown claimed the Falklands, and John MacBride established a permanent British settlement there in 1766. France then transferred the settlements to Spain in 1767.¹⁴ Tensions between the UK and Spain lasted until 1770, when Spanish forces expelled British authorities from Port Egmont. Nonetheless, in 1771, the two states agreed to allow the temporary return of the British.¹⁵

In 1774, the United Kingdom decided to withdraw its settlement from Port Egmont due to economic difficulties and crises in their other colonies.¹⁶ Yet, this did not mean they renounced their sovereignty over the Malvinas. Historian Mary Cawkell argues the British left their flag and a

plaque at Port Egmont, intending to come back.¹⁷ These two symbols were later destroyed by Spain under the orders of Ramón de Cassara in 1777. From the Spanish perspective, the British withdrawal allowed Spain to continue exercising effective and exclusive control over the archipelago.

Over the following decades, Spain maintained a continuous administrative presence on the islands. The Falklands became a part of Spain's Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata (which would become modern Argentina). Governors appointed from Buenos Aires oversaw local activities, and the territory was considered part of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata. Through the Viceroyalty, Spain exercised effective control over the islands for much of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

The situation changed with the independence movements in Latin America. In 1810, the May Revolution began in Buenos Aires, giving rise to the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata (what is now Argentina). This new administration argued that they had inherited the territories that had previously belonged to the Viceroyalty under *uti possidetis juris*.¹⁸ This principle states that newly formed sovereign states should inherit their prior colonial borders. This principle was widely used in Latin America to define the borders of the new independent states.¹⁹

After Spanish forces withdrew in 1811, the islands lacked central authority for several years.²⁰ Beginning in 1820, authorities connected to Buenos Aires claimed possession, granted economic concessions, supported settlement,

appointed officials, regulated fishing, and created the Political and Military Command of the Malvinas in 1829.²¹

From Argentina's perspective, the decision to establish the Political and Military Command of the Malvinas Islands represented a formal declaration of its sovereignty over the territory.²² However, the United Kingdom protested the measure and reaffirmed its own historical claims to the islands. These actions stirred up the dispute.²³ Tensions escalated further when Luis Vernet, the administrator appointed by Buenos Aires, tried to regulate the fishing activities of foreign vessels in the region. In 1831, because of a conflict with US ships, the USS Lexington attacked facilities on the islands, challenging Buenos Aires's authority. This situation led to greater instability in the archipelago.²⁴

Finally, in January 1833, British forces arrived on the islands and demanded the withdrawal of the Argentine authorities. Following this episode, the United Kingdom established continued control over the territory.²⁵ Argentina rejected the occupation, arguing that it had been deprived of its territory. Since then, both countries have developed different historical interpretations of the events that took place between the 16th and 19th centuries.²⁶

Argentina emphasizes the legacy of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, Spanish administration, and the acts of government carried out after independence. Their claims are based on *uti possidetis juris*. The United Kingdom highlights early British explorations, the establishment of Port Egmont, and the continuity

Finally, in January 1833, British forces arrived on the islands and demanded the withdrawal of the Argentine authorities

of its claim dating back to the 18th century. The UK defends its claim by arguing that the islands had no government when the British first settled there. These historical differences formed the basis of the sovereignty dispute that continued throughout the 19th and 20th centuries and eventually led to the crisis of 1982.²⁷

EVOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE (1833-1945)

Historically, the islanders, although culturally distinct from the British, were aligned with the UK since 1833. British colonization of the Falkland Islands began officially in 1840. In 1841, British officials and civilians were sent to the Falkland Islands to create infrastructure, settlements, and government offices to support a colony. During the nineteenth century, British authorities strengthened their presence in the islands by establishing formal institutions, appointing governors, and encouraging settlement. As previously discussed, all these activities demonstrate effective control over the territory. In 1843, the Falkland Islands officially became a Crown Colony, giving the British government direct responsibility for the administration of the territory. Over time, the islands developed their own economy based largely on sheep farming and wool production. Due to their geographic isolation, the islanders maintained closer economic and cultural ties with the UK than with mainland South America.²⁸ Port Stanley became the capital of the Falklands and would be an important docking point throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Before the creation of solid steel steamships, many ships on their last leg would stop at Port Stanley for repair. During the Californian gold rush, many ships docked at the port. In addition to having a busy port, in the early 1900s, large-scale sheep ranching created an economic boom for the island. The residents throughout this period identified themselves as British.

For much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the sovereignty dispute remained relatively quiet. However, Argentina

continued to reject British control and renew its diplomatic protests.²⁹ The islands themselves remained sparsely populated and geographically isolated, limiting their political significance compared to other international disputes occurring at the time.

However, the strategic importance of South Atlantic territories such as the Falklands and other archipelagos peaked during the twentieth century. Advances in naval technology, global trade routes, and military planning increased interest in territories located near key maritime passages.³⁰ Vessels traveling between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans often passed near the southern tip of South America. As a result, control of islands in the region became increasingly relevant for both commercial and military purposes.

World Wars I and II further highlighted the strategic value of the Falkland Islands. During World War I, the waters surrounding the archipelago became the site of the Battle of the Falkland Islands in 1914, when British naval forces defeated a German squadron.³¹ The battle demonstrated the military importance of maintaining naval facilities and supply points in the South Atlantic. Although the islands were not heavily populated, their location made them valuable for monitoring maritime activity and supporting military operations.

At the same time, Argentina experienced a rise in nationalism. Throughout the twentieth century, Argentine governments increasingly emphasized the Malvinas sovereignty issue as part of the country's national identity. Schools, public institutions, maps, and official documents regularly portrayed the islands as an integral part of Argentine territory.³² As a result, generations of Argentines grew up learning that the islands rightfully belonged to their country and that their recovery remained a national objective.³³ During World War II, 6.5 percent of islanders volunteered for the British Armed Forces. To put this in perspective, only 4.3 percent of the United States population volunteered for the US Army,

despite 72 percent of Americans supporting the war. Additionally, the islanders shared the same experiences as British civilians during the war. Islanders went through the same blackouts, wartime privations, and rationing. At the time, islanders overwhelmingly felt connected to the metropole.

By the mid-twentieth century, decolonization had become one of the central issues in international politics. Following World War II, many colonies around the world gained independence, and newly created international organizations began to question the legitimacy of colonial rule. This changing global environment created new opportunities for Argentina to present its claims on the Falkland Islands before the international community.³⁴

UN INVOLVEMENT AND DECOLONIZATION

After World War II, the dispute over the Falkland Islands entered a new phase. Before then, the conflict had consisted mainly of diplomatic exchanges between Argentina and the United Kingdom. However, the creation of the United Nations in 1945 allowed both parties to present their positions to the international community and

seek a peaceful solution.

One of the UN's objectives was to advance the process of decolonization. The hope was for colonies to determine their political future peacefully. Chapter XI of the UN Charter details the responsibilities of parent states. Among these obligations was the requirement to periodically report to the UN on the state of their overseas territories.

In 1946, the United Kingdom included the Falkland Islands on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, in accordance with Article 73(e) of the Charter.³⁵ A non-self-governing territory does not have an independent government and is controlled by other states. The inclusion of the islands on this list did not resolve the issue of sovereignty, but it brought the case to the attention of the United Nations. This allowed it to be examined within the broader context of decolonization.

Argentina responded by pointing out that the classification of the islands as a non-self-governing territory did not alter its rights over the archipelago. From Argentina's perspective, the Malvinas constituted a territory inherited from the former Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata. For

Port Stanley 1961

Credit: Harley D. Nygren



this reason, the Argentine government began to more actively present its claims before United Nations bodies, asking the UN to recognize that a sovereignty dispute existed.

As the issue began to be discussed at the UN, one of the main legal debates of the conflict emerged: Which principle of international law should apply to the Falkland Islands? On the one hand, the United Kingdom defended the principle of self-determination: that the population has the right to freely decide its political future. They maintained that the inhabitants of the islands, the majority of whom identified as British, should participate in any decision regarding the territory's future.³⁶

Argentina argued that the applicable principle was that of territorial integrity, which protects a state's territory against occupation or alterations by another state. From this perspective, the population that settled after 1833 could not decide on the sovereignty of a territory. Consequently, the Argentine government claims the dispute should be resolved between the two states without input from the inhabitants of the islands.

This difference between self-determination and territorial integrity became the main obstacle to reaching an agreement. While the United Kingdom insisted on protecting the interests and will of the islanders, Argentina prioritized the recognition of its historical rights over the territory. The coexistence of these two principles explains why the dispute proved particularly complex from the perspective of international law.

A major turning point occurred in 1965 when the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065 (XX).³⁷ The resolution recognized the existence of a sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom and invited both governments to negotiate a peaceful solution. While the resolution did not determine the sovereignty issue, it represented an important diplomatic victory for Argentina. The resolution acknowledged that a dispute existed and encouraged negotiations. The resolution called for negotiations to find a peaceful solution, considering the United Nations Charter, as well as the interests of the islands' inhabitants.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that Resolution 2065 did not determine which of the two states had sovereignty over the archipelago. Nor did it expressly recognize the islanders' right to self-determination. Instead, it confirmed the existence of an international dispute that should be resolved through dialogue. Consequently, the resolution was interpreted differently by both parties. Argentina viewed it as international recognition of the sovereignty dispute, while the United Kingdom continued to maintain that any solutions must include the islanders.

In the years that followed, the General Assembly adopted new resolutions related to the Falkland/Malvinas issue, including Resolutions 3160 (XXVIII) of 1973 and 31/49 of 1976. Although each addressed specific aspects of the conflict, all reiterated the need for Argentina and the United Kingdom to continue negotiating. They also asked both countries to refrain from taking unilateral measures while the dispute remained unresolved.

While the United Kingdom insisted on protecting the interests and will of the islanders, Argentina prioritized the recognition of its historical rights over the territory

ISLANDERS' POSITION AND RISING TENSIONS (1965–1981)

During the 1960s and 1970s, several rounds of negotiations took place between the two governments.³⁸ Discussions focused on possible formulas for cooperation, administration, and even the eventual transfer of sovereignty. However, these talks proved difficult because they involved not only the interests of Argentina and the United Kingdom but also the wishes of the islanders themselves.

During this time, a distinct Falkland Islander identity had emerged. Most islanders were descendants of British settlers and viewed themselves as culturally British. They spoke English, followed British traditions, and generally opposed becoming part of Argentina. This created a significant challenge for negotiations, as many islanders feared losing their political rights, cultural identity, and way of life under Argentine administration.³⁹ At the same time, many Argentines viewed the issue through a different lens. Rather than focusing on the identity of the islanders, they emphasized historical sovereignty and territorial integrity. From this perspective, the islands were

considered a part of Argentina that had been occupied by a foreign power since 1833. These contrasting viewpoints made compromise increasingly difficult.

The discovery of valuable natural resources further increased the importance of the territory. Throughout the 1970s, growing interest in fisheries, potential oil reserves, and control over maritime resources raised the economic value of the South Atlantic. In addition, the islands offered potential advantages regarding access to Antarctica and surrounding ocean areas, making them more significant than their small population might suggest. By the late 1970s, negotiations had largely stalled. Argentina became increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress, while the United Kingdom remained unwilling to pursue solutions that ignored the wishes of the islanders. As diplomatic efforts weakened, political tensions grew on both sides. By 1982, the dispute had evolved far beyond a historical disagreement over colonial claims and had become a complex conflict involving national identity, strategic interests, self-determination, and international diplomacy.⁴⁰

Photo of a Argentine Super Étendard (SUE) fighter taken during the first months of 1982

Credit: Unknown author



Current status (1982)

CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARGENTINA AND THE UK

As diplomatic dialogue lost momentum, both countries were undergoing profound political and economic transformations. This would change the way they perceived the dispute. In May 1979, Margaret Thatcher took office as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom following the Conservative Party's victory. Her government inherited a troubled economy. In response, Thatcher launched a broad program of economic reforms, which included reducing public spending. As part of this process, the Ministry of Defense launched a comprehensive review of British military capabilities. The aim was to concentrate resources on strategic commitments for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the Cold War

To revive sovereignty negotiations, the British explored new alternatives. The UK attempted to balance the wishes of the islanders with Argentine claims. Between 1979 and 1980, one of the most innovative proposals of the negotiation process emerged – the “leaseback” or “retro-lease” system. Under this scheme, the United Kingdom would recognize Argentine sovereignty over the islands. However, they would remain under British administration for an extended period of several decades. The model was inspired by the agreement the United Kingdom had with Hong Kong.⁴¹ Argentina was hopeful that the Falklands would be theirs in the future.

However, the proposal was met with strong resistance even before it was formally negotiated. The Falkland Islanders almost unanimously rejected this arrangement. They feared it implied recognition of Argentine sovereignty. They had never expressed a desire to change their political ties with the United Kingdom. Also, the British Parliament, believing they already owned the islands, viewed the proposal as unnecessary.⁴² Pushback from the Islanders and Parliament led the British government to abandon the initiative. From Argentina's perspective, the failure of the leaseback reinforced the notion that the UK had no intention of considering Argentine sovereignty.⁴³

These defense priorities were reflected in the Defense Review presented in June 1981 by Secretary of State for Defense John Nott. The document proposed significantly reducing the budget allocated to the Royal Navy through the early decommissioning of several surface ships and the reduction of the British naval presence in regions considered peripheral. Among the measures considered was the withdrawal of HMS Endurance, the United Kingdom's only permanent patrol vessel in the South Atlantic.

Although the decision was primarily based on budgetary considerations and a redefinition of strategic priorities, Buenos Aires interpreted it as London losing interest in the islands. This perception would have profound consequences in the months that followed. It helped reinforce the conviction that the United Kingdom would likely avoid a military confrontation to preserve a territory held with waning interest.

Among the measures considered was the withdrawal of HMS Endurance, the United Kingdom's only permanent patrol vessel in the South Atlantic

At the same time, Argentina was facing a crisis of a very different nature. After five years of military rule, the National Reorganization Process was undergoing rapid economic and political deterioration. The financial liberalization promoted during the second half of the 1970s had significantly increased foreign debt and weakened numerous industrial sectors. Added to this was the impact of the international recession of the early 1980s, which reduced Argentine exports and worsened the government's fiscal problems. During 1981, inflation exceeded 100 percent, gross domestic product shrank significantly, and social discontent towards the regime grew.⁴⁴ The mounting economic difficulties coincided with a gradual loss of legitimacy for the military junta. Both domestic problems and growing international isolation over human rights violations weakened the junta.

The political instability was also reflected in leadership changes within the government itself. In March 1981, General Roberto Viola replaced Jorge Rafael Videla as de facto president, intending to implement a more flexible policy in response to the economic crisis. However, divisions among the various branches of the military quickly limited his ability to act. Just nine

months later, on December 22, 1981, Lieutenant General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri assumed the presidency with the backing of key sectors of the army and the navy. Prominent among the latter was Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, who for years had maintained that diplomatic negotiations had reached an impasse and that Argentina should consider more forceful alternatives to change the status quo on the islands.⁴⁵

Lord Edward Shackleton's earlier economic report, published in 1976, noted that the Falklands had considerable economic potential. This was thanks to the development of the fishing industry and the possible existence of oil in the surrounding continental shelf. Although these estimates were preliminary, the report revitalized British interest in the archipelago and fueled Argentine concerns that the UK wanted to consolidate its presence in the South Atlantic. While the United Kingdom was reducing some of its military capabilities in the region, it was beginning to recognize the islands' greater economic value. Thus, it was difficult to interpret the UK's true intentions, increasing uncertainty between the two governments.

Similarly, diplomatic negotiations remained at a standstill. The United Nations decolonization

The HMS Endurance

Credit: Alan Broomhead



mechanism had not produced any substantial progress. Both London and Buenos Aires faced growing internal pressures that influenced their foreign policy decisions. Even more troubling, both governments began to interpret each other's actions through increasingly flawed perceptions. While Argentine authorities viewed defense budget cuts as evidence of a diminishing British commitment to the islands, the Thatcher government still believed Argentina would only use diplomatic pressure to claim sovereignty. These perceptions, based on differing assumptions about the adversary's willingness to use force, set the stage for a rapid escalation of the crisis.

DIPLOMACY ON THE BRINK OF WAR

The beginning of 1982 marked a decisive turning point in the Falkland (Malvinas) dispute. For more than fifteen years, negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom had produced little progress. Still, they maintained the controversy within diplomatic channels. By January 1982, however, political leaders in both countries increasingly questioned whether further negotiations could achieve a meaningful breakthrough. At the same time, a series of political decisions, diplomatic misunderstandings, and local incidents would lead to an international crisis. Although neither government publicly abandoned its commitment to peaceful negotiations, events unfolded at a pace that rapidly reduced opportunities for compromise.

During January, Argentina's military government continued to evaluate possible alternatives for advancing its sovereignty claim. While diplomatic negotiations formally remained the preferred course of action, senior military officials expressed growing skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the United Nations process. Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy, argued that nearly two decades of negotiations had failed to produce substantive concessions from the United Kingdom.

Within the Argentine Armed Forces, discussions increasingly focused on contingency plans if diplomatic efforts continued to stall. Although no final decision had yet been made regarding military action, planning activities became more frequent during the first weeks of the year. British policymakers interpreted these developments differently. The government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher remained primarily concerned with domestic economic reforms and broader Cold War commitments. Intelligence assessments noted Argentina's dissatisfaction with the negotiations. However, they concluded that Buenos Aires would continue relying on diplomatic pressure rather than military force.

This assessment reflected a broader belief within Whitehall that the sovereignty dispute, despite periodic tensions, remained fundamentally manageable through political dialogue. Consequently, no significant reinforcement of British military capabilities in the South Atlantic was undertaken during the opening months of 1982.

The diplomatic climate deteriorated further as both governments adopted increasingly inflexible positions regarding sovereignty. Argentina continued to argue that the negotiations required by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2065 should produce tangible progress toward resolving the territorial dispute. British officials, however, maintained that any proposal affecting the constitutional status of the islands required the consent of the Falkland Islanders. These fundamentally different interpretations of Resolution 2065 made progress appear unlikely.⁴⁶ Rather than narrowing the gap between the parties, successive diplomatic exchanges reinforced the perception in both capitals that the opposing government lacked genuine willingness to compromise.

The first major crisis of 1982 occurred on the island of South Georgia, a British Overseas Territory approximately 1,400 kilometers east of the Falkland Islands. On March 19, Argentine scrap metal workers arrived at an abandoned

whaling station at Leith Harbour to dismantle, under legal contract, industrial equipment. Shortly after their arrival, members of the group raised the Argentine flag without obtaining prior authorization from British authorities. Although the workers themselves were civilians, British officials interpreted the incident as a deliberate political demonstration rather than a routine commercial activity.⁴⁷ The event immediately elevated tensions between London and Buenos Aires and raised concerns that Argentina might be testing the UK's willingness to defend its South Atlantic territories.

The British government responded by demanding that the Argentine personnel comply with existing immigration procedures and remove the national flag. When these requests were not immediately fulfilled, London ordered HMS Endurance, the Royal Navy's ice patrol vessel stationed in the South Atlantic, to proceed toward South Georgia while transporting a unit of Royal Marines. Although the deployment represented a relatively limited military response, Argentine officials viewed it as an unnecessary escalation of a dispute that they considered administrative in nature.⁴⁸ Both governments therefore interpreted the same incident through different lenses. The UK viewed the arrival of the workers as a challenge to its authority. Argentina saw the dispatch of military personnel as the United Kingdom reinforcing its control over the territory.

As diplomatic exchanges became increasingly confrontational, decision-making accelerated within the Argentine government. Throughout the final weeks of March, members of the ruling junta held a series of meetings. They evaluated

the UK's response and reassessed available policy options. Military leaders concluded that the South Georgia incident demonstrated the growing fragility of the existing diplomatic framework. They argued that prolonged negotiations would continue to allow British administration of the islands without addressing Argentina's sovereignty claim. Although opinions differed on the risks of military action, confidence grew that the United Kingdom would be reluctant to undertake a major military operation far from Europe.⁴⁹ This notion was further backed after the UK announced significant reductions in naval activities the previous year.

These assumptions rested upon several strategic calculations. Argentine decision-makers believed that any British response would probably be limited to diplomatic protests or economic measures. They expected the United States to encourage rapid negotiations between the parties rather than support a prolonged military confrontation. British policymakers, by contrast, continued to underestimate the possibility that Argentina would authorize a full-scale operation against the islands. Intelligence assessments recognized increasing tensions but generally concluded that the risks of initiating an armed conflict remained relatively low.⁵⁰ As a result, each government entered the final days of March with very different understandings of each other's intentions.

Domestic developments in Argentina further complicated the situation. On 30 March 1982, the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) organized large demonstrations across the country under the slogan "Peace, Bread,

Argentine decision-makers believed that any British response would probably be limited to diplomatic protests or economic measures

and Work.” Protesters demanded political liberalization, economic reforms, and an end to military rule. Security forces attacked protesters with tear gas, guns, and water cannons, arresting hundreds of participants.⁵¹ While the effect of these protests on the junta’s decision is debatable, the government faced both domestic opposition and an escalating dispute with the United Kingdom.

During the final forty-eight hours of March, Argentine military planning shifted from contingency preparations toward operational execution.⁵² On March 31, the ruling junta authorized the seizure of the Falkland Islands. They came to the conclusion that diplomacy had been exhausted and delaying action would reduce Argentina’s strategic advantages.⁵³ Argentina believed that a limited military operation would compel renewed negotiations over sovereignty. Meanwhile, the UK still considered an armed invasion unlikely despite the events happening in the South Atlantic.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THE EVE OF THE CONFLICT

By early April 1982, the Falkland (Malvinas)

dispute had become an imminent threat to international peace and security.⁵⁴ For members of the United Nations Security Council, the situation presented an unusually complex challenge. Unlike many disputes considered by the Council during the Cold War, the Falkland (Malvinas) controversy combined unresolved questions of colonialism, territorial sovereignty, self-determination, and the prohibition of the use of force under the Charter of the United Nations. While the United Kingdom exercised effective administration over the islands, Argentina maintained that British control represented the continuation of a colonial occupation initiated in 1833.⁵⁵ These competing legal interpretations meant that any discussion within the Security Council would inevitably extend beyond military developments. They would address broader principles of international law that lacked universally accepted interpretations.

The positions of the two principal parties remained fundamentally incompatible. Argentina continued to argue that the sovereignty dispute should be resolved through negotiations addressing decolonization, consistent with numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.⁵⁶ British



*Argentine Marines during
Operation Rosario*

Credit: Unknown author

representatives, while recognizing the existence of a diplomatic dispute, maintained that no transfer of sovereignty could occur without the consent of the Falkland Islanders. Consequently, even if both governments remained committed in principle to peaceful dispute settlement, they disagreed over the legal framework within which the negotiations should occur. By early April 1982, neither side had demonstrated a willingness to modify these core positions.

Military developments further complicated the diplomatic landscape. Although neither government had publicly declared war, both had adopted increasingly visible military measures during the preceding weeks. British authorities had reinforced their limited military presence in South Georgia through the deployment of Royal Marines aboard HMS Endurance, while Argentine military planning had advanced from contingency preparations toward operational readiness. Intelligence assessments available to both governments remained incomplete and, in several respects, inaccurate.⁵⁷

Argentine officials largely concluded that the UK would avoid a large-scale military response because of domestic political constraints, defense reductions, and the geographical distance separating the islands from Europe. British decision-makers had earlier assumed that Argentina would refrain from initiating military action, assuming that diplomatic pressure remained Buenos Aires' preferred instrument for advancing its sovereignty claim. These reciprocal miscalculations significantly increased the possibility that events could escalate beyond the control of political leaders.⁵⁸

The broader international environment further heightened the importance of the dispute. The crisis unfolded during one of the most tense periods of the Cold War, following Ronald Reagan's election in November 1980 and amid continuing East-West competition across multiple regions. Both Argentina and the United Kingdom maintained close relationships with Washington, albeit under different strategic circumstances.

The United Kingdom represented one of the United States' principal NATO allies, while Argentina had cooperated closely with the United States on anti-communist initiatives throughout Latin America. Consequently, any military confrontation carried implications extending beyond the South Atlantic, raising concerns regarding alliance politics, regional stability, and the credibility of international mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.⁵⁹

At the same time, the Security Council faced significant procedural and political limitations. Under Chapter VI of the Charter, the Council possessed several mechanisms designed to encourage peaceful dispute settlement. This included mediation, negotiation, conciliation, judicial settlement, and the appointment of representatives to facilitate dialogue.⁶⁰ However, these instruments depended largely upon the willingness of the parties to cooperate. Should hostilities begin, the Council would confront more difficult questions concerning ceasefires, compliance with international law, and the possible adoption of binding measures under Chapter VII. Any action would also need to account for the political interests of the Council's permanent members, particularly given the United Kingdom's position as one of the five states holding veto power.

As the crisis unfolded, the international community found itself observing a dispute in which information was often incomplete, political calculations remained highly fluid, and the intentions of the principal actors were far from transparent. Governments outside the immediate conflict monitored developments with increasing concern, not only because of the possibility of armed confrontation in the South Atlantic, but also because the choices made by Argentina and the United Kingdom could influence broader diplomatic relationships, regional stability, and the credibility of international institutions responsible for preserving peace.



Soldiers raising Argentine flag on Las Malvinas Islands on April 2, 1982

Credit: Gobierno de Argentina

Bloc Analysis

POINTS OF DIVISION

Every council member agrees that war should be avoided. On April 1, all members accepted a presidential statement calling on both governments to show restraint and refrain from the threat or use of force.⁶¹ Beyond that, they split three ways. The first split is legal: Resolution 1514 (XV) protects both self-determination, which the UK applies to the islands' residents, and "the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country," which Argentina says takes precedence.⁶² The second is about priorities. Some members want the Council to stop the use of force now, while others want it to address sovereignty, which they see as the root cause. The third is political, as evidenced by the 1976 vote on Resolution 31/49.⁶³ Each bloc below has at least one permanent member, so no bloc can act alone. Delegates will need to find room to compromise to achieve a satisfactory outcome.

NON-USE OF FORCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION

This bloc's priority is defending the UN Charter's ban on changing borders by force, set out in Article 2(4).⁶⁴ The UK and France staunchly believe that the residents of the Falklands should decide the islands' future. As established previously, this would almost certainly lead to continued British administration over the islands.

Japan, Guyana, and Jordan are notable potential members of this bloc because they may join for a different reason – each has a territorial dispute of its own and fears that force could become an accepted way to settle one. Their support for the UK is conditional. Jordan voted for Resolution 31/49, while Guyana abstained.⁶⁵ However, both Jordan and Guyana voted differently regarding the somewhat similar situation with the French island of Mayotte, claimed by Comoros. Both countries voted for resolution A/RES/31/4, which condemned France's referendum on independence, in which the inhabitants overwhelmingly voted to remain part of France.⁶⁶ Both countries may resist language that treats the residents' wishes as the sole and only factor.

The bloc may try to turn the April 1 statement into a resolution warning against any use of force. It could declare in advance that an armed landing would be a breach of the peace under Article 39 of the UN Charter, which could trigger Article 41 measures such as an arms embargo.⁶⁷ It can point to UNSC Resolution 497, adopted unanimously in December 1981, which reaffirmed that acquiring territory by force is inadmissible.⁶⁸ Its weakness is internal. If the UK pushes too hard for the islanders' wishes to be the decisive factor, it could lose its allies to other blocs.

DECOLONIZATION AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

This bloc, anchored by the communist powers and the non-aligned pact, sees the crisis as unfinished decolonization. The General Assembly has urged negotiations since Resolution 2065 in 1965. These members accept Argentina's argument that talks stalled because the UK refused to discuss sovereignty. The bloc accepted the April 1 call for restraint and does not endorse force. However, it opposes treating the crisis as simple aggression while ignoring its colonial roots.

All five members voted for Resolution 31/49. Spain will see parallels between the Falklands and Gibraltar. In 1967 the Assembly declared the UK's referendum there a violation of UN resolutions.⁶⁹ In 1972, China called Hong Kong and Macau "part of Chinese territory occupied by the British and Portuguese authorities." The Assembly then removed both from the decolonization list.⁷⁰ Panama won eventual control of the Canal under treaties ratified in 1978, and it also supported the resolution condemning France's referendum in Mayotte.⁷¹ After Argentina refused to join the 1980 US grain embargo, the Soviet Union became Argentina's top trading partner.⁷²

The bloc will push to keep any resolution under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. It would call for sovereignty negotiations based on Resolution

2065 and for both sides to withdraw their forces. It could also invoke Article 27(3), under which "a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting" on Chapter VI decisions.⁷³ This provision has only been used 12 times (last in 1960), and there is uncertainty about whether such an abstention could be enforced. All previous abstentions under Article 27(3) were voluntary. However, if successful, this step would remove the UK's vote and veto. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and China also hold veto power and are unlikely to support any resolution that overtly favors the UK.

MEDIATION AND DE-ESCALATION

This bloc, led by the United States, takes no position on sovereignty. Its priority is preventing war through restraint, a freeze on military moves, and the Secretary-General's good offices. The United States is torn between the UK, its closest NATO ally, and its effort to build a lasting partnership with Latin America.⁷⁴ African members may feel bound by the OAU Charter, which supports both decolonization and "peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration."⁷⁵ Togo and Uganda voted for Resolution 31/49, while Ireland, the United States, and Zaire abstained.⁷⁶ Although this bloc agrees on de-escalation, it does not agree on the question of sovereignty.

On April 1, President Reagan warned General Galtieri that an attack would wreck US-Argentine relations and offered to send an envoy immediately.⁷⁷ However, he then told Prime Minister Thatcher, "While we have a policy of neutrality on the sovereignty issue, we will not be neutral on the issue of Argentine use of military force."⁷⁸ Uganda has a unique perspective on this conflict, having watched Idi Amin's 1978 invasion of Tanzanian territory end with his overthrow in 1979.⁷⁹ Zaire holds the Council presidency, and its representative read the April 1 call for restraint.

As the swing vote, this bloc decides whether either of the others can reach nine votes. Its natural approach is a Chapter VI resolution that

builds on the April 1 statement. The resolution could call for restraint, a military pullback, no unilateral changes, and use of the peaceful means listed in Article 33.⁸⁰ It will likely give a central role to Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, an experienced mediator who took office in January 1982.⁸¹ Its challenge is staying united. If fighting begins, its members must choose between stopping an aggressor and keeping the Security Council neutral.

Committee Mission

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six main UN bodies created by the United Nations Charter in 1945. The Security Council's primary responsibility is to uphold global peace and security, allowing it to convene anytime peace is in jeopardy. Per the UN Charter, the UNSC has four key purposes: build world peace and security, foster goodwill among states, cooperate to solve global issues and advance respect for human rights, and serve as a hub for coordinating international policy.⁸²

The Council can set rules for agreements and initiate inquiries. In some cases, it can also mediate or send a mission. The UNSC can also appoint special envoys or request that the Secretary-General negotiate a peaceful solution to the dispute. In addition, the Council may decide to use enforcement actions, such as travel bans, financial penalties, and limitations, arms embargoes, economic sanctions, severance of diplomatic connections, blockades, or even collective military action.⁸³

The Council's effectiveness, however, depends not only on the legal authority granted by the Charter but also on the political willingness of member states – particularly the permanent members with veto power – to reach consensus during moments of international crisis.

Unlike many historical disputes examined by the Security Council, the situation in the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands presents delegates with a

crisis in which diplomacy has not yet failed but is rapidly approaching its limits.⁸⁴ The committee convenes as military preparations threaten to turn the dispute into armed conflict. At this moment, diplomacy has effectively ended as political tensions evolve into military hostility.⁸⁵ However, this conflict does not need to play out as it did historically. Delegates should evaluate the situation on April 3 and determine what options their country would see.

In addressing this dispute, the Council must navigate competing principles of international law without losing sight of the Council's primary responsibility to preserve international peace and security. The sovereignty claims advanced by Argentina, the administrative authority exercised by the United Kingdom, the interests of the Falkland Islanders, and the obligations established under the Charter of the United Nations all present legitimate considerations that must be carefully balanced.

TOPIC B

HSC | NHSMUN 2027

The Situation in Lebanon (1982)



Photo Credit: IDF Spokesperson's Unit photographer

Introduction

This committee convenes on **June 7, 1982**, one day after Israeli ground forces entered Lebanon.⁸⁶ This attack is also known as the First Lebanon War or Operation Peace for Galilee. Three main factors made this conflict happen: cross-border violence between Israeli and Palestinian groups, the Lebanese Civil War, and the attempted assassination of Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom.⁸⁷

A main event leading to the conflict was Black September in 1970. Black September was an armed conflict between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that forced the PLO out of Jordan into Lebanon.⁸⁸ The border with Lebanon used to be Israel's quietest border until the end of the 1960s. This changed, however, in the aftermath of Black September. From then on, the Palestinian groups began using Lebanon to target northern Israeli communities.⁸⁹

The Lebanese Civil War, active since 1975, left religious militias in control of ports, territory, and revenue instead of the government.⁹⁰ At the same time, Syria had a force of roughly 30,000 troops, challenging Israel's air control.⁹¹ Meanwhile, Israel's Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, made a secret deal with Bachir Gemayel's Christian militia. This left Israel the chance to help create a government that aligned with Western countries in Beirut.⁹² Israel hoped this would produce a Lebanese government friendly to Western countries like the United States, rather than aligned with Syria or Iran.⁹³ A broken state and a deep Syrian presence gave Palestinian groups room to build their own systems.⁹⁴

In 1978, UN Security Council Resolution 425 created the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).⁹⁵ UNIFIL was to confirm that Israeli forces had left, restore peace in the region, and help the Lebanese government restore its full control over the area.⁹⁶

A 1981 ceasefire briefly reduced fighting on the northern border, but Israeli leaders grew more willing to consider a larger war by early 1982.⁹⁷ The trigger came 3 days before. On June 3,

Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador to London, was shot by a gunman from the Abu Nidal Organization. Israel held the PLO responsible, regardless of that organization's opposition to the PLO.⁹⁸ On June 4 the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a heavy strike-back against the PLO in Beirut and southern Lebanon.⁹⁹ The next day, the PLO responded with massive artillery into northern Israeli towns. This exchange was used by Israel to justify the invasion launched the next morning.¹⁰⁰

On June 6, 1982, the IDF crossed the border, moving into Lebanon in three main combat sectors: the western, the central, and the eastern sector.¹⁰¹ Roughly 60,000 troops and more than 800 tanks crossed the border, heavily supported by aircraft, attack helicopters, artillery, and missile boats.¹⁰² Israel's stated goal was to push PLO forces back 40 kilometers to the north.¹⁰³

History and Description of the Issue

LEBANON'S POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

The story of modern Lebanon begins in the sixteenth century. During this time, the Emirate of Mount Lebanon was under Ottoman rule. As Mount Lebanon had very rugged terrain, the Ottoman Empire found it very difficult to impose direct military control over it. Thus, the emirate was given high levels of autonomy.¹⁰⁴

Social divisions in the Emirate mirrored the

Ottoman Empire's divisions. In the first division, subjects were divided based on religion using the millet system. Muslims were ranked higher in the system, while Christians and Jews were ranked lower. However, Christians and Jews under Islamic law are considered protected. Thus, they were free to worship provided they paid a protection tax.

In Mount Lebanon, these divisions also shaped the roles associated with different communities. The Druze, whose faith emerged from Shia Islam, were traditionally associated with tribal warfare. Christians and Jews were more often involved in commerce and were generally regarded as commoners.¹⁰⁵

The second division was between ranking orders (manasib) and commoners (ʿamma). The ranking order held titles and ruled over parts of the Ottoman Empire or held political / judicial power. The commoners included all untitled subjects. However, most were peasants. This also included rich farmers, merchants, artisans, and manufacturers. Divisions between these two groups frequently erupted in commoners' revolts.¹⁰⁶


Under the leadership of Fakhr al-Din, who

reigned from 1590 until 1635, many Christians (Maronites) were resettled to populate the south. This ultimately changed the demographic composition of Lebanon. Fakhr al-Din introduced silk production as a cash product. His intended aim was to export silk to Italian city-states. He encouraged Christians to leave the north of Mount Lebanon to work in the south. Politics to the south was controlled by the Druze at the time. Silk cultivation and other agricultural and artisanal occupations were considered unworthy by the majority of the Druze. Hence, the settlement of Christians was needed. In addition, Druze and warrior families began expelling local groups, settling Christians in their place. Over time, the south of Mount Lebanon would become a mixed Christian and Druze region and ultimately a region with a Christian majority.¹⁰⁷

In early 1843, the Emirate of Mount Lebanon was split into two administrative regions. This split ended the muqataʿji system and introduced peripheral capitalism. This also meant the end of Druze political superiority. After the split, the Druze emir Ahmad Arsan was appointed as the representative of the mixed southern district. In the north, the Christian emir Haydar Ahmad was appointed as representative. Each representative

Map of the Emirate of Mount Lebanon during the reign of Fakhr al-Din

Credit: Al Ameer son



was to be seconded by two wakils, a Druze and a Christian. They exercised their judicial and fiscal authority over the members of their respective communities.¹⁰⁸

Neither community welcomed this arrangement. The Maronite Church demanded that the Christians in the south be put under the jurisdiction of the Christian representative in the north. Additionally, 60 percent of the population of the south was Christian. However, the Druze insisted on their traditional right to rule over the whole of Mount Lebanon.

Maronites were taking public offices and buying lands from impoverished Muslims due to increased trade with European powers in Syria and Lebanon. Influenced by the French Revolution, the Maronites wanted independence from their Muslim rulers and to be a protectorate under France. In 1860, the Maronites launched raids on Druze villages.

The Druze community learned of the Maronite plans and were prepared. The Maronites faced ferocious opposition from the Druze. Tens of thousands of Christians were killed in Lebanon and Damascus. The French were sickened by this bloodbath. Thus, in 1860, French and Ottoman troops, with support from other European powers, imposed peace militarily.

The period between 1860 and the end of World War I was generally free of conflict, even if the cultural tensions remained. A governorate was created that combined Syria and Lebanon. Silk production increased, which further propped up the Christian merchant middle class. The

muqata`ji families essentially lost all power, with very few of them having political offices. Economic ties also increased. Most of the land in Lebanon was used for silk production, leading Lebanon to rely on Syrian farmers for cereal and livestock. A baby boom strained Lebanon's resources, forcing many Maronites to emigrate to the Americas and Europe.

In 1920, the League of Nations gave France administrative control over Lebanon and Syria.¹⁰⁹ The Ottoman Empire was dissolved a few years after the war.¹¹⁰ There was great disagreement on how Ottoman Syria was to be divided. The UK and France made deals with each other that gave the UK oil fields in Iraq and Palestine as a buffer zone. In exchange, France received Lebanon and Syria. Meanwhile, there was a growing Arab nationalist movement for a united Syria, combining both Lebanon and Syria.

The United States polled 36 cities in Ottoman Syria to garner the will of the people. They found that most inhabitants favored independence, and if that were not allowed, a British or American mandate would be preferable. Only 14 percent of the population wanted to be under a French mandate. Most people wanted a united Syria. 72 percent were opposed to taking Arab-inhabited lands for Jewish settlement. Going against the recommendation of the report, Lebanon was separated from Syria, lands were carved out for Jewish settlement, and Ottoman Syria was placed under French mandate. Maronites were unhappy because this new Lebanon incorporated more Islamic lands and made Muslims the majority. Syrians were dissatisfied because they were cut off from ports in Lebanon. Furthermore,

Most inhabitants favored independence, and if that were not allowed, a British or American mandate would be preferable

Muslims that were now a part of Lebanon were upset because Maronites, who ran the new government, took 80 percent of their revenue through taxation. The partition of Ottoman Syria left all parties displeased.

France ruled Lebanon under a constitutional system until 1943. In 1943, however, a religion-based system was created through the national pact.¹¹¹ This unwritten agreement divided political positions based on religion. This division was set based on a 1932 count of the population. By 1943, the count was already outdated.¹¹² This gave Christians an advantage in parliament. The president under this system would be a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, and the speaker a Shia.¹¹³

After independence, the political balance changed. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 caused a wave of 120,000 refugees from Palestine.¹¹⁴ This demographic shift was seismic for a state whose political system rested on a religious head count from 1932. The country's population had moved far from the Christian majority that the National Pact was built on.¹¹⁵

The Lebanese Civil War was a 15-year conflict driven by religious divisions and unequal political and economic power within Lebanon.¹¹⁶ Many Muslims felt powerless, while many Christians feared losing influence.¹¹⁷ Maronite, Shia, and Druze militias controlled large parts of the country, while states like Syria and Israel intervened and moved into parts of the country.¹¹⁸ About 150,000 people were killed, tens of thousands wounded, and hundreds of thousands lost their homes.¹¹⁹ The civil war began in 1975 and almost destroyed the country. The war began after a bus massacre in which Christian militias attacked a bus carrying Palestinian civilians in Beirut.¹²⁰ A witness stated the shooting lasted around 45 minutes. As a result, 22 people were killed.¹²¹

Because the militia leaders gained money from the war, it was hard to create a peace agreement.¹²² The militias operated as corporate

syndicates, turning the war into a business. Each sect controlled at least one port, which gave them control over money and trade.¹²³ The central government still existed but had lost all real power to the militia leaders. In the early 1970s, the situation worsened as the political leadership was further weakened.

EARLY ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICTS

Tensions between Israel and Lebanon have been growing since Israel's founding in 1948.¹²⁴ In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Israel changed its approach toward Lebanon. This was because of the ongoing attacks against Israel by Palestinians.¹²⁵

After Israel's founding in 1948, war quickly broke out between Israel and its Middle Eastern neighbors: Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan.¹²⁶ In November 1947, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that divided British Palestine into two states: one Jewish state and one Arab state. However, the Arab world rejected the plan. This ultimately led to a war between Palestinian Arab militias and Jewish forces in 1948.¹²⁷ The fighters from the surrounding Arab countries were small in numbers and under inconsistent leadership. In contrast, Jewish forces were well organized and focused on a shared goal of statehood.¹²⁸

The result was clear. Israel survived and grew. Palestinians were left stateless with 700,000 to 900,000 Palestinian refugees.¹²⁹ This led to the formation of refugee camps by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in late 1949.¹³⁰

The next turning point came in 1967. In the Six-Day War, Israel defeated Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in less than a week.¹³¹ After the destruction of much of the Egyptian army and the occupation of the Golan Heights, both sides accepted a cease-fire.¹³²

As a result, Israel took control of the entire Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank. This takeover



Mordechai Gur in a press conference about the Operation Litani

Credit: IDF Spokesperson's Unit

caused another wave of Palestinians to leave their homes. These occupied territories stayed at the center of future conflict.¹³³ A few years later, after Black September in 1970–71, the PLO leadership and thousands of fighters relocated to Lebanon, making it their primary headquarters.¹³⁴

The 1978 Litani Operation was Israel's first major invasion of Lebanon. It followed the Coastal Road Massacre three days earlier, in which PLO members attacked an Israeli bus.¹³⁵ The IDF then launched a large operation in southern Lebanon aimed at destroying PLO bases.¹³⁶ The fighting killed around 1,000 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, as well as 18 Israeli soldiers.¹³⁷ Israel withdrew its troops from most of the south in June in line with UN Security Council Resolution 425.¹³⁸ After the attack, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was created. They wanted to restore international peace and security.¹³⁹

These regional wars left Lebanon in a weak position. Each conflict pushed more Palestinians and armed groups into an already tense Lebanon. By 1982, Lebanon had become the place where the unfinished business of 1948, 1967, and 1970

finally collided.

DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF THE PLO

In 1970, Jordan formally expelled the PLO from its borders.¹⁴⁰ This was not a reflection of Jordan's policy on Palestinian independence. Rather, Jordan came to see Palestinian cross-border resistance as a threat to its survival.¹⁴¹ In the wake of this decision, Lebanon became the political and military center of the Palestinian movement. It provided shelter, a point of military activities, and a supply base.¹⁴²

The movement operated in Lebanon with little government control. Palestinian military presence grew quickly in Lebanon as the PLO moved resources from Jordan, and this sizeable force led to rising tensions with the Lebanese government. Factions of the Lebanese government seeking calm relations with Israel saw the PLO's growing fortifications as a beacon for Israeli reprisals. As time went on, the population of Lebanon came to feel that the PLO was using Lebanon for its own ends, without caring about the damage to Lebanon.¹⁴³

The PLO functioned increasingly as a state inside Lebanon, actually ruling over the camps, and thus directly weakening Lebanon's own authority.¹⁴⁴ Control of certain ports, border crossings, and smuggling routes in the south took money away from the Lebanese state. The separate system that the PLO built with weapons stores, training camps, and fighting positions turned the Lebanese territory into a target for Israeli retaliation, meaning ordinary Lebanese civilians paid the price of a conflict between two foreign parties.¹⁴⁵

In response to rising tensions, Lebanon and the PLO signed the Cairo Agreement in November 1969.¹⁴⁶ The PLO recognized Lebanon's sovereignty, forfeiting any territorial claims in Lebanon. In return, Lebanon formally approved the rights to employment, residence, and movement for Palestinians. The PLO was also allowed to form local committees in the camps and set up armed positions. This did little to calm Israeli accusations that the Lebanese government was supporting PLO violence. As PLO attacks continued, border friction between Israel and Lebanon increased quickly.¹⁴⁷

Still, tensions would continue to grow between the PLO and Lebanon. Rather than an actor inside the state, the PLO operated as a state outside the state.¹⁴⁸ But the fractured Lebanese government saw little alternative to tolerating the growing power of the PLO. In April 1973, Israeli special forces infiltrated Beirut and killed three leaders of the PLO as retaliation for the 1972 Munich Massacre. This dramatic incursion led to the resignation of Prime Minister Saeb Salam. However, the government was forced to admit that it could not protect the Palestinian refugee camps. Instead, it allowed the PLO even greater military control over the camps. Seeing that the Palestinian refugees had to protect themselves, other religiously affiliated militias would soon rise.¹⁴⁹

By the early 1980s, criticism of the PLO was openly voiced by Muslims and leftists. Their presence was viewed as an occupying force.

They felt like the PLO brought heavy strikes onto their villages while offering little in return.¹⁵⁰ The Amal Movement, a Shia Muslim militia, was particularly hostile to the PLO. The Amal Movement was created in 1974 to protect the rights of Shia Muslims from Israeli attacks.¹⁵¹ Eventually, however, members consider the PLO to be a threat as well, and it would fight PLO forces to restrict their movement to the Palestinian refugee camps. The most serious clashes happened between January and February 1982, shortly before the current invasion.¹⁵²

BORDER TENSIONS AND THE 1981 CEASEFIRE

Tension along the border in the late 1960s and early 1970s was high.¹⁵³ The defeat of the Arab states and the takeover by Israel of the West Bank and Gaza made the PLO switch to guerrilla warfare. Israel responded to these attacks with military patrols, operations against fighters, mass arrests, and the building of security walls along the Jordan River to prevent fighters from crossing.¹⁵⁴

The border tensions kept changing as Lebanon had an unstable situation. At first, the situation was seen as a result of the lack of sovereignty. Israel began using other strategies to deal with security problems.¹⁵⁵ Between 1968 and 1974, Israel crossed into Lebanon more than 3,000 times to pursue PLO targets. In the process, 880 civilians were killed and thousands were wounded. One-fifth of the 150,000 people in the border area had to flee north.¹⁵⁶ With the start of the civil war, the Palestinians backed the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) while Israel backed the Maronite-led militias by providing military and humanitarian assistance.¹⁵⁷ This was the start of the "Good Fence" policy. This meant that Israel's political and military leaders tried to guarantee Israel's and Lebanon's security.

The strong presence of the PLO made Israel act on Lebanon's weakening control over its land.

David Elazar, head of the IDF, stated that if the armed operations continued, it would result in danger for the state of Lebanon.¹⁵⁸

The ongoing violence on the border was due to two factors: the unclear policy towards Lebanon and the armed actions of Palestinian and Lebanese fighters in and from South Lebanon.¹⁵⁹ These circumstances, together with Israel's policies, continued to weaken Lebanon and left its government unable to restrain the PLO. The PLO received support from some members of Lebanon's Sunni community and from Arab states such as Egypt and Syria.¹⁶⁰ The decline of security in the Israeli-Lebanese border continued.

Operation Litani in 1978 deepened Israel's involvement in southern Lebanon, while UNIFIL formed a barrier between Palestinian forces and Israel.¹⁶¹ It also monitored Israel's withdrawal and worked to reduce violence.¹⁶²

However, this did not prevent further Palestinian attacks on Israel, and Israel's involvement in Lebanon intensified.¹⁶³ The border continued to be unstable as various PLO members stayed in the area controlled by UNIFIL and continued attacking Israel out of Lebanon.

Following the Litani Operation, Israel began a new form of confrontation. All the way up to 1981, they began launching a strategy of continuous wear and tear.¹⁶⁴ This largely consisted of artillery bombardments on the Nabatieh and Tire regions, air attacks against PLO positions and infrastructure, raids by commandos, and operations aimed at destroying PLO bases, ambushing convoys, and hindering Palestinian military organization.¹⁶⁵

Moreover, Israel stopped extending military and humanitarian support to the Christians in the South to instead create a military alliance against their common threat, the Palestinian factions and their supporters.¹⁶⁶ At the same time, the secret alliance between Israel and the Maronite Christian militias in the North of Lebanon was extensive and consisted of weapons supply, military training, and intelligence cooperation.¹⁶⁷

The goal of these operations was not only to eliminate the combatants but also to keep the PLO permanently on the defensive, forcing it to disperse its forces and dedicate a large part of its resources to surveillance and protecting its bases. At the same time, the bombings sought to exert pressure on the population of southern Lebanon and generate tensions between Lebanese and Palestinians, thus reducing local support for the PLO.¹⁶⁸

In July 1981, the situation reached one of its most dangerous moments since the 1973 war. On July 10, the PLO began a heavy attack on northern Israel using Katyusha rockets and heavy artillery. Israel responded with airstrikes, but these failed to stop the Palestinian fire. On July 17, the Israeli Air Force launched a major bombing raid on PLO buildings in downtown Beirut. This led to more Palestinian attacks against towns in northern Israel. Thousands of Israeli civilians had to hide in bunkers or temporarily abandon their homes.¹⁶⁹

Although Israel had a clear military advantage, it failed to force the PLO to cease its attacks. On the contrary, the PLO continued bombing northern Israel. Israel suffered a significant political cost due to international criticism of the Beirut bombings, and the damage inflicted on Israeli towns demonstrated that air power alone could not eliminate the Palestinian threat.¹⁷⁰

Faced with the risk of a larger-scale war, US Special Envoy Philip Habib initiated intensive diplomatic efforts between Israel, Lebanon, and the PLO. Thanks to his mediation, on July 24, 1981, both sides agreed to a ceasefire, ending direct hostilities across the border between Israel and Lebanon. US President Ronald Reagan hailed the agreement as a major step toward regional stability.¹⁷¹

Just days earlier, the United Nations Security Council had adopted Resolution 490 (1981), which demanded an immediate cessation of all armed attacks in Lebanon and reaffirmed the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹⁷² The ceasefire significantly reduced violence on



A Palestinian refugee camp near Tyre in Southern Lebanon, taken June 1982

Credit: Dan Hadani

the border. From July 1981 to June 1982, the front between Israel and southern Lebanon remained relatively quiet.¹⁷³

However, the agreement had significant limitations. The PLO interpreted the ceasefire as applying only to the border between Israel and Lebanon and therefore continued to organize operations in other theaters, especially in the occupied territories. Israel considered that the PLO was continuing to strengthen its military presence in Lebanon and that the agreement did not eliminate the underlying threat. The calm on the border did not resolve the strategic problem of the PLO's presence in southern Lebanon.¹⁷⁴

The escalating situation convinced much of the Israeli leadership that the measures implemented since 1967, reprisals, raids, bombings, and special operations, had failed in their primary objective. Expelling the PLO from Lebanon had not been possible. Consequently, planning began for a much larger military operation.¹⁷⁵

Current Status

THE ROAD TO INVASION

By the spring of 1982, the tensions between Israel, the PLO, and Lebanon were very high. The PLO was based in Lebanon, most notably in the south. They had strong military and political power that served as bases for attacks against Israel. However, the deeper causes were related to the strategic planning by Israeli leadership. This was true under Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. Israel had long viewed this presence as a direct threat to its security.

Israel decided to form a secret alliance with Bachir Gemayel, the leader of Lebanon's Christian Kataeb Party, Phalanges. The hope was that after Israel helped win the civil war, Israel and Lebanon would then sign a peace agreement.¹⁷⁶ The plan called for ending the PLO's presence in Lebanon, forcing Syrian troops to withdraw, and establishing a sovereign Lebanese government. Syria had been a major concern since its forces entered Lebanon in

1976. That concern intensified in April 1981, when Syria deployed Soviet-made surface-to-air missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley.¹⁷⁷

In May 1982, Sharon met with US Secretary of State Alexander Haig to discuss Lebanon. Haig said Israel should use force only if it were provoked and that its response should be limited.¹⁷⁸ Sharon reportedly took this as permission to act.¹⁷⁹

On the night of June 3, 1982, gunmen shot Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov.¹⁸⁰ The ambassador was severely wounded by a bullet that directly struck him in the head. He spent several months in a coma and remained paralyzed. The gunman was a member of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). This group had split from the PLO in 1974, as the PLO wanted to pursue diplomatic solutions.¹⁸¹ Still, Israel blamed the PLO for the attack, believing that the ANO and PLO were still closely coordinating.¹⁸² Prime Minister Begin reportedly said, "They are all PLO," and ordered attacks on PLO targets, starting the First Lebanon War.¹⁸³ On June 4 and 5, Israeli planes bombed targets in Beirut and southern Lebanon. PLO forces responded by firing toward northern Israel.

On June 5, 1982, the Israeli cabinet met and approved an invasion of Lebanon. Sharon described the operation as a 40-kilometer advance to protect northern Israel from PLO attacks. Sharon also had a broader plan to reach Beirut and work with Maronite Christian militias. The cabinet had not approved an advance that far.¹⁸⁴

In the early hours of June 6, 1982, Israeli ground forces crossed the Lebanese border on three fronts, supported by air and naval strikes.¹⁸⁵ The operation was named "Peace for Galilee."¹⁸⁶

In the west, Israeli forces moved along the coast. They advanced towards the cities of Tyre and Sidon, supported by an amphibious landing of naval commandos at the mouth of the Awali River. Meanwhile, in the center of the country, Israeli forces moved through the hills near Nabatieh and captured Beaufort Castle. In the east, General Avigdor Ben-Gal led troops directly through the Bekaa Valley towards the Beirut-Damascus highway, facing a clash with the Syrian 3rd Army Corps and its armored divisions.

UNIFIL camp in 1981

Credit: Marco K.





Bachir Gemayel, commander-in-chief of the Lebanese Christian Forces, shaking hands with Rafael Eitan, Israeli chief of staff, in front of Avner Azoulay, representative of the Mossad (center), on June 1, 1982

Credit: Bamahane/IDF

THE UNSC AND THE QUESTION OF PROPORTIONALITY

Following Operation Litani in 1978, the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 425 and 426 on 19 March 1978. Resolution 425 called for Israel to end its military action and withdraw its forces from Lebanon.¹⁸⁷ The resolutions also provided for the creation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm the withdrawal, help restore international peace and security, and assist the Lebanese government in reestablishing its authority in southern Lebanon.¹⁸⁸

UNIFIL faced difficulties the following year.¹⁸⁹ The PLO had bases all over Lebanon and continued to carry out the attacks. Israel kept responding to the military operations from the PLO. The Lebanese government still struggled to keep control, which caused more tensions between the PLO and Israel.¹⁹⁰ Repeatedly, the UNSC discussed the situation and called for respect for Lebanon's sovereignty, but it was unable to prevent further escalation.¹⁹¹

In early June 1982, with the escalation of the

conflict, the UNSC had various emergency meetings.¹⁹² This led to the passing of resolutions 508 and 509.¹⁹³ Both called for an immediate ceasefire and demanded that all parties respect Lebanon's sovereignty and withdraw their forces.¹⁹⁴ However, these demands were not immediately followed. The Security Council faced difficulties in enforcing its decisions because of disagreements among its permanent members and the complex involvement of regional and international powers.¹⁹⁵

Just war theory offers a useful lens for assessing the legitimacy of what is unfolding in this crisis. Aggression is defined as any violation of another state's territory or political sovereignty. Such violations are treated as serious because they threaten rights worth defending.¹⁹⁶ The victims of aggression have the right to fight back in self-defense, not merely as individuals but on behalf of their entire community.¹⁹⁷

The standard for victims of aggression to fight in self-defense has very specific criteria. States have a right to protect their territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Under the UN Charter, only aggression can justify war; injustice does not

justify war. Any threat or use of force by a state against the political sovereignty or the territorial integrity of another state is an act of aggression and a crime.¹⁹⁸ This framework is often called “the legalist paradigm,” though judging any specific war requires more nuance than the paradigm alone provides.

Applying this concept to the situation in Lebanon is not simple. Israel’s stated target is the PLO, a non-state armed organization, rather than the sovereign state of Lebanon itself. Complicating matters further, Lebanon’s own sovereignty and territorial control had already been significantly undermined by the presence of both PLO and Syrian forces on its soil.

Bloc Analysis

POINTS OF DIVISION

By the morning of June 7, the council had twice spoken with one voice. Resolution 508 called on all parties to stop military activity within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border, and Resolution 509 demanded that Israel withdraw all its forces forthwith and unconditionally.¹⁹⁹ That unanimity hides deep disagreement over what the resolutions mean and what comes next. The first split is over withdrawal. The United States reads Resolution 509 as requiring a ceasefire and an Israeli pullback to happen together, while most other members treat withdrawal as an obligation with no conditions attached.²⁰⁰ The second split is over enforcement. In January,

nine members supported a draft declaring Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights an act of aggression under Article 39 of the Charter. France, Ireland, Japan, Panama, and the United Kingdom abstained, and the United States vetoed it. The same lines are likely to reappear if anyone proposes condemnation or sanctions.²⁰¹ The third split is over the PLO’s standing. On June 5, eleven members voted to let the PLO participate with rights normally reserved for states. France, Japan, and the UK abstained, and the United States vetoed.²⁰² Finally, the blocs disagree about who should lead the search for peace: the UN’s own machinery, American mediation, or collective pressure from the Council. They also disagree about whether Lebanon can be settled at all without addressing the wider Palestinian question.

SECURITY GUARANTEES BEFORE WITHDRAWAL (UNITED STATES)

The United States wants the fighting to stop, but it sees the crisis differently from every other member of the Council. In the American view, the root problem is that Lebanon’s government does not control its own territory. Armed PLO units operate in the south, and Syrian troops occupy much of the north and the Bekaa Valley. An Israeli withdrawal with no arrangements attached would simply restore the conditions that produced attacks on northern Israel.²⁰³ Several factors shape this position. In November 1981, Washington signed a memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation with Israel, aimed at deterring threats to the region

In the American view, the root problem is that Lebanon’s government does not control its own territory

from the Soviet Union.²⁰⁴ The relationship is not frictionless, however. The State Department suspended the memorandum less than three weeks later, after Israel annexed the Golan Heights. The United States also has a direct stake in the diplomacy: Israel's own account to the Council credits American envoy Philip Habib with the laborious negotiations that produced the July 1981 cessation of hostilities on the Lebanese border.²⁰⁵ Finally, the United States does not accept that the PLO should be treated as though it were a state.

This position was visible in the Council's first two days of debate on the crisis. The United States voted for Resolution 509 on June 6. Immediately afterward, however, its representative explained that the ceasefire and the Israeli withdrawal were "inextricably linked and that their implementation must be simultaneous." One day earlier, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick objected to inviting the PLO to participate with the same rights as a member state. She argued that the PLO was a political movement rather than a state, asked for a recorded vote, and cast the only "no."²⁰⁶ The United States has also vetoed three Israel-related draft resolutions just in 1982: the Golan Heights draft on January 20, a draft on the dismissal of West Bank mayors on April 2, and a draft on the Fourth Geneva Convention and the holy places of Jerusalem on April 20.²⁰⁷ The pattern is consistent. The United States will support general calls for a ceasefire, but it opposes texts that single out Israel or threaten penalties.

In committee, the United States will likely insist that any text address "all parties" and tie Israeli withdrawal to a cessation of hostilities by the PLO. It may argue that the real goal should be the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces, including Syrian troops and armed Palestinian groups, and the restoration of the Lebanese government's authority over its whole territory. Constructive proposals could include deploying the Lebanese army or an expanded UNIFIL into areas that Israel leaves, condemning terrorism alongside the invasion, and endorsing continued American

mediation. The United States can veto any draft that condemns Israel or invokes Chapter VII, but a veto would leave it isolated. Its delegates will need to weigh that cost carefully and look for partners who might support softer language.

WESTERN MEDIATORS

This bloc treats Resolutions 508 and 509 as binding and agrees that Israel must withdraw immediately. It wants to get there through diplomacy, a stronger UN presence, and a political settlement rather than through punishment. Two members, in particular, have soldiers on the ground. After the Council enlarged the UNIFIL in February, the Secretary-General announced his intention to ask France to provide an infantry battalion.²⁰⁸ Lebanon's representative has also reminded the Council that UNIFIL has cost the lives of peacekeepers from Ireland and other contributing countries.²⁰⁹ The three European members also share the European Community's 1980 Venice Declaration. That declaration supported Palestinian self-determination and said the PLO would "have to be associated with the negotiations," while also affirming the right of all states in the region, including Israel, to existence and security.²¹⁰

Although the core of this bloc is likely to include the European powers, other countries may align with this bloc as well. For example, Zaire may collaborate closely with this bloc because of its increasing Western orientation and its recent diplomatic overtures toward Israel. President Mobutu said in late 1981 that he was ready to restore ties once Israel completed its withdrawal from the Sinai. In mid-May 1982, Zaire became the first African country to re-establish relations with Israel since the 1970s.²¹¹ Furthermore, Japan introduced the text that became Resolution 508 and urged the Council to speak with a unified voice.²¹²

At the same June 5 meeting, the United Kingdom condemned the attack on Ambassador Argov but said it did not justify massive Israeli attacks on Lebanese towns and villages. Ireland's

representative likewise condemned the assassination attempt but saw no connection between it and the large-scale raids on Beirut. France, speaking from the Council presidency, warned that “it is not possible to impose by force an equitable solution.” France argued that force would not secure Israel’s security, Palestinians’ right to their own land, or Lebanon’s right to peace. The next day, Ireland drafted and introduced Resolution 509.²¹³ Despite this common ground, there is also dissent within the bloc. On June 5, France, Japan, and the UK abstained on the PLO’s participation, while Ireland and Zaire voted in favor.²¹⁴

In committee, this bloc is best placed to act as a bridge between the United States and the rest of the Council. It may push for full compliance with 508 and 509 through close reporting by the Secretary-General, the deployment of UN observers, and protection for UNIFIL, whose mandate the Council must revisit within two weeks.²¹⁵ Humanitarian provisions are natural territory for this bloc. These could include access for the International Committee of the Red Cross, respect for the Geneva Conventions, and protection for civilians in Tyre, Sidon, and the refugee camps. The bloc may accept language

that deplores or censures Israel’s actions while resisting sanctions. It could also propose a longer-term framework built on the Venice principles and Resolution 242.

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND ARAB ACCOUNTABILITY

This bloc sees the invasion as aggression against a sovereign state and rejects Israel’s claim of self-defense. Its members argue that no lasting peace is possible without Palestinian rights. Jordan leads the bloc as the council’s only Arab member, and it has been the PLO’s sponsor inside the chamber.²¹⁶ Most members have no diplomatic ties with Israel. Spain has never recognized Israel. Uganda broke off relations in 1972, and Togo has also not restored the relations it cut in the early 1970s.²¹⁷ China also presents itself as a champion of Arab and Palestinian causes.

The bloc’s record shows a willingness to move beyond words. In January, Jordan introduced a Golan Heights draft that would have determined Israel’s actions to be “an act of aggression under the provisions of Article 39.”²¹⁸ China, Guyana, Jordan, Spain, Togo, and Uganda all voted for

A protest against Israel in Amsterdam, Netherlands

Credit: Rob Croes / Anefo



it, together with Poland, the USSR, and Zaire. When the United States vetoed it, the Council used Resolution 500 to send the question to an emergency special session of the General Assembly. Only the UK and the US abstained.²¹⁹ On June 5, every member of this bloc voted for Jordan's request to let the PLO participate.²²⁰ In the June 6 debate, Guyana called it absurd to link the invasion to the attack on Ambassador Argov. It warned that accepting such a justification would build international relations on vengeance and violence. China called for a resolution that explicitly condemned Israeli aggression and demanded a total and unconditional withdrawal, and it pledged continued support for Palestinian national rights. Panama is the exception on enforcement: it abstained on the January draft alongside the Western members.²²¹

In committee, this bloc will likely push for explicit condemnation of Israel's failure to comply with 508 and 509, short deadlines for withdrawal, and a commitment to reconvene and consider measures under the UN Charter if Israel refuses. Other natural priorities include protecting Palestinian refugees and the camps, providing humanitarian aid, and securing a role for the PLO in any settlement. If the United States blocks action, the bloc has a recent precedent in Resolution 500 for taking the issue to the General Assembly. Delegates should also be wary of the limits of internal unity among this bloc, as each country has a varying degree of enthusiasm for more punitive measures.

SOVIET BLOC

The Soviet Union and Poland see the invasion as aggression made possible by the United States, and they argue that the Council must use its enforcement powers. Their position is rooted in the Cold War. The US-Israeli strategic cooperation agreement signed in November 1981 was explicitly directed against Soviet influence in the Middle East.²²² Israel, in turn, accuses the Soviet Union of arming, training, and financing both the PLO and the Syrian army in

Lebanon.²²³ For Moscow and Warsaw, defending the Palestinians and Lebanon's sovereignty is inseparable from resisting American power in the region. They are also skeptical of peacekeeping arrangements that the West shapes and funds.

On June 5, the Soviet representative argued that Israel could not pursue its policy without the backing of its "strategic ally," the United States. He charged that Washington had shielded Israel from condemnation at the UN and urged the council to use all effective means available under the UN Charter.²²⁴ On June 6, the Soviet delegation said Resolution 509 fell short because it did not condemn Israel. It voted in favor only because the text demanded a full and unconditional withdrawal. Poland said something more forceful than protests would be needed to stop Israel and deter future aggression.²²⁵ In February, they were the only members to abstain on Resolution 501, which enlarged UNIFIL from about 6,000 to about 7,000 troops.²²⁶

In committee, this bloc will likely push for the strongest possible language. That could include explicit condemnation of Israel, a formal determination of aggression under Chapter VII, and sanctions such as a halt to military supplies until Israel withdraws. Its delegates may also press the Council to name the United States' role. They are likely to oppose any peacekeeping or security arrangement led by Western powers. Because this bloc is small, it will need to work with other members, likely from the Non-Aligned Movement, to reach the nine votes needed to pass a resolution. The upcoming UNIFIL renewal gives the bloc leverage. Its members could again abstain or tie their support to changes in the force's mandate.

Committee Mission

The UN Charter sets up the Security Council as the main organ. Its membership is set out in Chapter V. Article 23 says "The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members."²²⁷ While Article

24 sets the goal of “maintenance of international peace and security”, the fifteen countries aim to work together in the solutions and respect human rights.²²⁸

At the same time, Chapter VI discusses peaceful ways to settle disputes by setting out clear rules for how the Security Council can respond to conflicts in case of a dispute that could threaten international peace and security. Article 33 states to look for a solution by discussing the situation and trying to mediate. They can also resort to regional agencies, arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. If that doesn't work, the Security Council can apply Chapter VII. This consists of military action if a peaceful approach did not work, as well as authorizing enforcement measures.²²⁹

Lebanon already had peacekeeping missions before June 6, 1982. After Israel's Litani Operation in March 1978, the Council passed Resolutions 425 and 426.²³⁰ Both resolutions called for Israel to leave Lebanon and created the UNIFIL. This new peacekeeping mission called for a cessation of the IDF military action in Lebanon. It also decided on three main goals: checking the withdrawal of Israeli forces, bringing back peace and security, and helping the Government of Lebanon with real control in the area. The first UNIFIL troops arrived in the area on March 23, 1978.²³¹

Research and Preparation Questions

Your dais has prepared the following research and preparation questions as a means of providing guidance for your research process. These questions should be carefully considered, as they embody some of the main critical thought and learning objectives surrounding your topic.

TOPIC A

- 1 What are the main historical factors that contributed to the Falklands dispute?
- 2 Why did the Falklands dispute remain unresolved despite repeated attempts to address the issue?
- 3 How did political situations in Argentina and the United Kingdom worsen the Falklands conflict, and in what ways could those situations be rectified?
- 4 Why did the United Kingdom choose military action instead of relying solely on diplomatic negotiations after the Argentine invasion?
- 5 How did the Falklands War affect the relationship between Argentina and other Western powers?
- 6 How do the natural resources around the Falkland Islands contribute to the dispute?
- 7 What could happen to regional stability if tensions between Argentina and the United Kingdom increase?

TOPIC B

- 1 Under what terms does your government want to see the current hostilities end? Is a ceasefire enough, or are punitive steps required?
- 2 What measures could prevent further foreign military intervention in Lebanon?
- 3 To what extent does your country believe that Western powers influenced the events leading up to the Israeli invasion?
- 4 Is the Lebanese government in its current (June 1982) state capable of suppressing insurgent groups within its borders?
- 5 What is your country's relationship with the PLO? Does your country recognize it as a legitimate political entity or as a dangerous insurgent group?
- 6 With the veto power likely to loom heavily over the committee's debate, how can your country pursue solutions that will avoid a veto? To what extent does your country **want** to avoid a veto?

Important Documents

TOPIC A

Anthony Parsons, "The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations, 31 March–14 June 1982," *International Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1983): 169–178, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2619933>

United Nations General Assembly, Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Resolution 2065 (XX), A/RES/2065(XX), December 16, 1965, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/34458?ln=en&v=pdf>.

United Nations General Assembly, Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Resolution 31/49, A/RES/31/49, December 1, 1976, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/30781?ln=en>

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 502 (1982), S/RES/502(1982), April 3, 1982, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/34455?v=pdf>

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 505 (1982), S/RES/505(1982), May 26, 1982, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/34458?v=pdf>

TOPIC B

Barak, Oren. "Ambiguity and Conflict in Israeli-Lebanese Relations." *Israel Studies* 15, no. 3 (2010): 163–88. <https://doi.org/10.2979/isr.2010.15.3.163>.

Carole Collins, "Chronology of the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon June–August 1982," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 11–12, no. 4–1 (1982): 135–92.

Rami Siklawi, "The Palestinian Resistance Movement In Lebanon 1967–82: Survival, Challenges, and Opportunities." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (2017): 923–37. <https://doi.org/10.13169/arabstudquar.39.3.0923>.

Rex Brynen, "PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 2 (1989): 48–70. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2537633>.

Tom Russell, "A Lebanon Primer." *MERIP Reports*, no. 133 (1985): 17–19. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3010813>.

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 490 (1981). S/RES/490(1981), July 21, 1981. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/22228?v=pdf>

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 425 (1978). S/RES/425 (1978), March 19, 1978. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/71622>.

About the Authors

TOPIC A: ALEJANDRA LASSO PLACENCIA

Alejandra Lasso is an international relations and journalism student at Universidad San Francisco de Quito (USFQ), Ecuador. Her academic interests include international law, human rights, international security, and contemporary international affairs. She is also actively involved in debate and academic diplomacy, with experience in Model United Nations and international debate. Her work focuses on examining international issues through a critical and interdisciplinary perspective, particularly the intersection between international law, human rights, and global security. She has further developed her expertise in international humanitarian law through academic competitions and research, alongside professional experience in public-sector and international affairs-related environments.

TOPIC B: MARTINA RAMONEDA GÁZQUEZ

Martina Ramoneda Gázquez is a student at Leiden University, where she studies international relations and organizations. She was born in Spain, where she began participating in Model United Nations in 2022, competing as a delegate in numerous committees and earning several Best Delegate awards. Additionally, she has served as a dais for four different conferences inside and outside Europe. Outside of Model UN, Martina is a board member of IncLUision, which helps refugees have access to higher education. She is also the president of the Spanish-Speaking Student Association at her university.

Additional writing by Chris Talamo

Edited by Adam Allibhoy, Odera Arene, Armen Bagdassarian, Ana Margarita Gil, Aurora Lai, Sabeeh Mirza, Althea Turley, and Olivia Woodard

Endnotes

- 1 "UN / FALKLANDS ISLANDS [MALVINAS]", UNifeed, last modified June 26 2014, <https://media.un.org/unifeed/en/asset/d112/d1127334>.
- 2 "Falkland Islands (Malvinas)", United Nations Decolonization, accessed June 10 2026, <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/content/falkland-islands-malvinas>
- 3 Legal Information Institute, "Uti Possidetis Juris," Wex, Cornell Law School, last reviewed July 2024, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/uti_possidetis_juris. ; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto, "Antecedentes históricos," Cuestión Malvinas, Government of Argentina, accessed August 31, 2026, <https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/es/politica-exterior/cuestion-malvinas/antecedentes/antecedentes-historicos>.
- 4 William Hague, "Falkland Islanders Must Be Masters of Their Own Fate," GOV.UK, January 21, 2012, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/falkland-islanders-must-be-masters-of-their-own-fate>.
- 5 Scott Mainwaring and Emilia Simison, "Economic Crises, Military Rebellions, and Democratic Survival: Argentina, 1983–2021," *Democracy in Hard Places*, Oxford University Press, July 14, 2022, pp. 188–227, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197598757.003.0007>.
- 6 UK Parliament, "Falklands Campaign," Hansard, December 21, 1982, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1982/dec/21/falklands-campaign>.
- 7 U.S. Department of State, "Argentina-UK: Possible Conflict in South Atlantic," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*, March 26, 1982, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d19>.
- 8 "National sovereignty", United Nations Network on Migration, accessed June 18 2026, <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/taxonomy/term/742>.
- 9 Alonso Gurmendi, "The Malvinas/Falklands Dispute in Anti-Imperialist History" *Opinio Juris*, last modified April 30, 2026, <https://opiniojuris.org/2026/04/30/the-malvinas-falklands-dispute-in-anti-imperialist-history/>
- 10 Slobodan Pajovic & Goran Lalic, "Islas Malvinas: Entre Soberanía, Geopolítica y Geoconomía", *Historia actual online* 2 no.58 (2022) pp. 173-190, <https://doi.org/10.36132/ha0.v2i58.2195>
- 11 Pajovic & Lalic, "Islas Malvinas: Entre Soberanía, Geopolítica y Geoconomía", pp. 173-190; "AD 1493: The pope asserts rights to colonize, convert and enslave", National Library of Medicine, accessed June 15, 2026, <https://www.nlm.nih.gov/nativevoices/timeline/171.html>
- 12 Alejandra Raises, "Maritime Networks and Navigation Patterns in the Malvinas/Falkland Islands (1764–1845)", *Journal of Maritime Archaeology* 4 no.20. (2025) pp. 789-809, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/395211582_Maritime_Networks_and_Navigation_Patterns_in_the_MalvinasFalkland_Islands_1764-1845
- 13 Ko, Anna & Bodziany, Marek, "The Falklands Conflict - History and Predictions for The Future", *Historia i Polityka* 31 no. 24 (2018) pp. 9–32, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/HiP.2018.008>
- 14 Alonso Gurmendi, "The Malvinas/Falklands Dispute in Anti-Imperialist History"
- 15 Marcelo G. Kohen and Facundo D. Rodríguez, *The Malvinas/Falklands Between History and Law* (Scott Valley: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017), 47-48.
- 16 "A claim to British sovereignty", King's College of London
- 17 Mary Cawkell, *The Falkland Story, 1592-1982* (Virginia: Anthony Nelson Ltd, 1983), chap 2
- 18 Daniel Filmus, "Why are the Malvinas Argentine", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship, Argentine Republic last modified August 9, 2021 <https://cancilleria.gob.ar/en/why-are-malvinas-argentine>
- 19 Alonso Gurmendi, "The Malvinas/Falklands Dispute in Anti-Imperialist History," *OpinioJuris*, April 30, 2026, <https://opiniojuris.org/2026/04/30/the-malvinas-falklands-dispute-in-anti-imperialist-history/>.
- 20 Embassy of Argentina in Australia, "Question of the Malvinas Islands," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina, accessed September 21, 2026, <https://eaust.cancilleria.gob.ar/en/node/1248>.
- 21 Robert A. Philpott, David Barker, and Quita Mould, *Port Louis: An Archaeological and Historical Survey of the First Capital of the Falkland Islands*, Archaeopress, 2025, <https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.29126496>.
- 22 Organization of American States (OAS), Note from the Permanent Mission of Argentina Forwarding a Press Release Issued on June 10, 2026, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, and Worship of the Argentine Republic on the Occasion of the "Day of Affirmation of Argentina's Rights over the Malvinas, Islands, and Antarctic Sector" (Washington, DC: Organization of American States, 2026), OEA/Ser.G CP/INF.10972/26.
- 23 Pascoe, Graham, and Michael Pepper, *Getting It Right: The Real History of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas* (Victoria, Australia: The Falkland Islands Study Group, 2008).
- 24 Lawrence Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Vol. 1, The Origins of the Falklands War* (London: Routledge, 2005).
- 25 UK Parliament, "Falkland Islands," House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report, 2008, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfa/147/14717.htm>.
- 26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina, "Historical Background," Question of the Malvinas, accessed September 21, 2026, <https://cancilleria.gob.ar/es/politica-exterior/cuestion-malvinas/antecedentes/antecedentes-historicos>.
- 27 Andrés Cisneros and Carlos Escudé, eds., *General History of the Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic*, vol. 3, chap. 14, "History of the Falkland Islands from Discovery to the British Occupation of 1833" (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1999), https://cari.org.ar/uploads/articles/CARI_282_ESP.pdf?r=2
- 28 Falkland Islands National Archives, "Laws and Ordinances," Falkland Islands Government, accessed September 21, 2026, <https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/online-collections/government/laws-and-ordinances>
- 29 Carlos Escudé and Andrés Cisneros, *General History of the Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic*, volume 8 (Buenos Aires: Argentine Council for International Relations, 2000).
- 30 Andrew Graham-Yooll, *The Forgotten Colony: A History of the Falkland Islands*, (London: T. Smith, 1989)
- 31 Lowell S. Gustafson, *The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988)
- 32 Carlos Escudé and Andrés Cisneros, *General History of the Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic*.
- 33 Raymond F. Betts, *Decolonization*, 2nd ed (London: Routledge, 2004).
- 34 Andrew Graham-Yooll, *The Forgotten Colony: A History of the Falkland Islands*.
- 35 United Nations General Assembly, Transmission of Information under Article 73e of the Charter, A/RES/66(1), [https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/66\(1\)](https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/66(1))
- 36 William Hague, "Falkland Islanders Must Be Masters of Their Own Fate," GOV.UK, January 21, 2012, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/falkland-islanders-must-be-masters-of-their-own-fate>.
- 37 Marcelo G. Kohen and Facundo D. Rodríguez, "60th Anniversary of Resolution 2065 (XX) on the Question of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands," *Peace & Security – Paix et Sécurité Internationales*, no. 14 (2026), pp. 3–15, <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=10694822>
- 38 Carlos Escudé and Andrés Cisneros, "The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict," *Southern Hemisphere Journal of Diplomacy and International*

- Relations 1, no. 1 (1998), https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/shjdir/v1n1/shjdir_v1n1e.pdf
- 39 Jonathan Colman, "The Falklands War and the Dynamics of British Diplomacy," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* (2025), <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2025.2495451>
- 40 John E. Jessup, Jr., *The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1985), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA157369.pdf>
- 41 Lawrence Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign*.
- 42 David M. Hanlon, *The Falkland Islands and Their People* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 188–192.
- 43 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *The United Kingdom Defence Programme: The Way Forward* (Cmnd. 8288, London: HMSO, June 1981).
- 44 Katherine J. Worboys, "The Traumatic Journey from Dictatorship to Democracy: Peacekeeping Operations and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, 1989–1999," *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 2, (January 2007): 149–168, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48608763>.
- 45 Katherine J. Worboys, "The Traumatic Journey from Dictatorship to Democracy: Peacekeeping Operations and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, 1989–1999," 149–168.
- 46 Marcelo G. Kohen and Facundo D. Rodriguez, "60th Anniversary of Resolution 2065 (XX) on the Question of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands," *EuroMediterranean Journal of International Law and International Relations*, no. 14, December 26, 2025.
- 47 Gregory Fremont-Barnes, "The Falklands War: A Chronology of Events," *The History Press*, March 31, 2017, <https://thehistorypress.co.uk/article/the-falklands-war-a-chronology-of-events/>.
- 48 Matthieu Grandpierron, "The British Use of Domestic Political Situations During the Falklands War," *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies* 111, no. 2, March 15, 2022, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2022.2037234>.
- 49 Marshall Van Sant Hall, "Argentine Policy Motivations in the Falklands War and the Aftermath," *Naval War College Review* 36, no. 6, November 1983, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44636513?seq=2>.
- 50 Mikkel Bøgeskov Eriksen, "The Falklands War: An Intelligence Failure?" *Krigsvidenskab.dk*, February 10, 2017, <https://krigsvidenskab.dk/emne/falklands-war-intelligence-failure>.
- 51 Carla Sangrilli, "The Combative CGT during the Falklands War," *School of History Magazine* 11, no. 1, January 2012, https://www.scielo.org.ar/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1669-90412012000100006.
- 52 Gregory Fremont-Barnes, "The Falklands War: A Chronology of Events."
- 53 Marshall Van Sant Hall, "Argentine Policy Motivations in the Falklands War and the Aftermath."
- 54 Robert Headland, *Our Islands. Our History* (Stanley: Falklands Island Government, 2024), <https://falklands.gov.fk/our-history>.
- 55 Marcelo G. Kohen and Facundo D. Rodriguez, "60th Anniversary of Resolution 2065 (XX) on the Question of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands."
- 56 Marcelo G. Kohen and Facundo D. Rodriguez, "60th Anniversary of Resolution 2065 (XX) on the Question of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands."
- 57 Csilla Kiss, "The Falklands War," *Secret Atlas Handbook: Culture and History*, 2023, <https://www.secretatlas.com/handbook/culture-and-history/antarctic/the-falklands-war>
- 58 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina, "Falklands/Malvinas at the United Nations," *Cancillería Argentina*, accessed June 21, 2026, <https://cancilleria.gob.ar/es/politica-exterior/cuestion-malvinas/malvinas-en-naciones-unidas>
- 59 Csilla Kiss, "The Falklands War."
- 60 Csilla Kiss, "The Falklands War."
- 61 Robert E. Service and Richard W. Erdman, "Historical Documents - Office of the Historian," *Office of the Historian, US Department of State*, April 2, 1982, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d43>.
- 62 A/RES/15/1514 - Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries, A/RES/15/1514 (1960), <http://www.un-documents.net/a15r1514.htm>.
- 63 A/RES/31/49 - Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), A/RES/31/49 (1976), <https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/31/49>.
- 64 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations."
- 65 "Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas): Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly," *UN Digital Library*, December 1, 1976, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/649325>.
- 66 "Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte : Resolution / by the General Assembly," *UN Digital Library*, October 21, 1976, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/622478>.
- 67 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations."
- 68 Security Council Resolution 497 (1981), S/RES/497(1981) (1981), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/26751>.
- 69 Question of Gibraltar, A/RES/2353(XII) (1967), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/659868>.
- 70 HUANG Hua, "LETTER DATED 8 MARCH 1972 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE," March 9, 1972, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/nl3/570/39/pdf/nl357039.pdf>.
- 71 "Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian," *Office of the Historian, US Department of State*, accessed September 26, 2026, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/panama-canal>.
- 72 James Nelson Goodsell, "Grain Deal Helps Soviets Edge out US as Argentina's Top Trade Partner," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 20, 1981, <https://www.csmonitor.com/1981/1020/102021.html>.
- 73 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations."
- 74 "40. Talking Points Prepared for President Reagan," *Office of the Historian, US Department of State*, accessed September 26, 2026, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d40>.
- 75 "OAU Charter | African Union," May 24, 1963, <https://au.int/en/treaties/oau-charter-addis-ababa-25-may-1963>.
- 76 "Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas): Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly."
- 77 "40. Talking Points Prepared for President Reagan."
- 78 "42. Message From President Reagan to British Prime Minister Thatcher," *Office of the Historian, US Department of State*, accessed September 26, 2026, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d42>.
- 79 HISTORY com Editors, "Idi Amin - Death, Uganda & Facts," *HISTORY*, December 16, 2009, <https://www.history.com/articles/idi-amin>.
- 80 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations."
- 81 "Javier Perez de Cuellar," *Secretary-General*, August 4, 2016, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/formersg/javier.shtml>.
- 82 United Nations Security Council, "About the Security Council," *United Nations*, accessed July 18 2026, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/about_test1.
- 83 "Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression | Security Council," *United Nations*, accessed July 25 2026, <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/repertoire/actions>
- 84 United Nations General Assembly, Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Resolution 2065 (XX), A/RES/2065(XX), December 16, 1965, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/34458?ln=en&v=pdf>.
- 85 United Nations General Assembly, Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Resolution 31/49, A/RES/31/49, December 1, 1976, <https://>

digitallibrary.un.org/record/30781?ln=es

- 86 Sarah Beth Anderson, "The Lebanon War 1982," Anti-Defamation League, August 1, 2023, <https://www.adl.org/resources/background/lebanon-war-1982>.
- 87 "June 3, 1982: Iraq-Backed Palestinians Shoot Argov in UK, Triggering Lebanon War," The Jerusalem Post, June 3, 2026, <https://www.jpost.com/history/article-898258>.
- 88 "June 3, 1982: Iraq-Backed Palestinians Shoot Argov in UK, Triggering Lebanon War," The Jerusalem Post, June 3, 2026, <https://www.jpost.com/history/article-898258>; UNRWA. "Black September | UNRWA," n.d. <https://www.unrwa.org/content/black-september>.
- 89 Sarah Beth Anderson, "The Lebanon War 1982," <https://www.adl.org/resources/background/lebanon-war-1982>.
- 90 Martha Wenger and Julie Denney, "Lebanon's Fifteen-Year War 1975–1990," Middle East Report, no. 162 (1990): 23–25, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013281>.
- 91 Martha Wenger and Julie Denney, "Lebanon's Fifteen-Year War 1975–1990," <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013281>.
- 92 Kirsten E. Schulze, Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon
- 93 Arab Center Washington DC, "Without a National Consensus, Lebanon's Talks With Israel Are Doomed to Fail," Arab Center Washington DC, April 14, 2026, <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/without-a-national-consensus-lebanons-talks-with-israel-are-doomed-to-fail/>.
- 94 Rashid Khalidi, "The Palestinians in Lebanon: Social Repercussions of Israel's Invasion," Middle East Journal 38, no. 2 (1984): 255–66, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326798>.
- 95 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 425 (1978), S/RES/425 (1978), March 19, 1978, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/71622>.
- 96 UN Security Council, Resolution 425 (1978).
- 97 Avner Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative? The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," International Security 8, no. 2 (1983): 117–42.
- 98 "June 3, 1982: Iraq-Backed Palestinians Shoot Argov in UK, Triggering Lebanon War," <https://www.jpost.com/history/article-898258>.
- 99 Anti-Defamation League, "The Lebanon War 1982," August 1, 2023, <https://www.adl.org/resources/background/lebanon-war-1982>.
- 100 Jewish Virtual Library, "First Lebanon War: Background & Overview," accessed June 15, 2026, <https://jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-and-overview-of-first-lebanon-war>.
- 101 "The War in Lebanon," MERIP, July 29, 2025, <https://www.merip.org/1982/09/the-war-in-lebanon/>.
- 102 Yezid Sayigh, "Israel's Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982," Journal of Palestine Studies 13, no. 1 (1983): 24–65, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2536925>.
- 103 Yezid Sayigh, "Israel's Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982," <https://doi.org/10.2307/2536925>.
- 104 Dilek Dulkadir and Yaşar Özüçetin, "Ottoman Administration in Mount Lebanon and the Sectarian Policy of the Ottoman in the Region From Tanzimat to the First World War," International Journal of Social and Humanities Sciences 6, no. 2 (2022): 115–138, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378521531_Ottoman_Administration_in_Mount_Lebanon_and_the_Sectarian_Policy_of_the_Ottoman_in_the_Region_From_Tanzimat_to_the_First_World_War.
- 105 Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 3–4 accessed August 31, 2026, <https://www.opendata.uni-halle.de/bitstream/1981185920/110634/636/889942153.pdf>
- 106 Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 4.
- 107 Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 8.
- 108 Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 24–25.
- 109 "French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon." The American Journal of International Law 17, no. 3 (1923): 177–82. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2212963>.
- 110 Prince Kumar, "The Fall of an Empire: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire Post-World War I," Political Science Institute (blog), May 21, 2026, <https://polsci.institute/international-relations-world-history/fall-of-ottoman-empire-post-wwi/#the-treaty-of-sevres-formalising-the-collapse>.
- 111 Clyde Hess and Herbert Bodman. "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics." Middle East Journal 8, no. 1 (1954): 10–26. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4322562>.
- 112 Rania Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese?" British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 2 (1999): 219–41.
- 113 Tom Russel, "A Lebanon Primer," 17–19.
- 114 "Palestinian Refugees," EBSCO, 2021, <https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/political-science/palestinian-refugees>.
- 115 Tom Russel, "A Lebanon Primer." MERIP Reports, no. 133 (1985): 17–19, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3010813>.
- 116 Clyde Hess and Herbert Bodman, "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics," Middle East Journal 8, no. 1 (1954): 10–26. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4322562>.
- 117 Malley, Muadth. "The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Accord: Conflict and Compromise Engendered by Institutionalized Sectarianism." 121–59.
- 118 Wenger, Martha, and Julie Denney. "Lebanon's Fifteen-Year War 1975–1990." 23–25.
- 119 Wenger, Martha, and Julie Denney. "Lebanon's Fifteen-Year War 1975–1990." Middle East Report, no. 162 (1990): 23–25. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013281>.
- 120 Latif, Sara Abdel. "Background." In The Families of the Missing in Lebanon: On the Potentials of Participatory Art in Transitional Justice. Swisspeace, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep32862.5>.
- 121 Abby Sewell, "50 Years after Lebanon's Civil War Began, a Bullet-Riddled Bus Stands as a Reminder," AP News, April 13, 2025, <https://apnews.com/article/6f61e20392b75511aecba1afcf64ca2e>.
- 122 Malley, Muadth. "The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Accord: Conflict and Compromise Engendered by Institutionalized Sectarianism." 121–59.
- 123 Wenger, Martha, and Julie Denney. "Lebanon's Fifteen-Year War 1975–1990." 23–25.
- 124 "Timeline: Lebanon Civil War," Geopolitical Monitor, November 19, 2024, <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/timeline-lebanon-civil-war/>
- 125 Barak, Oren. "Ambiguity and Conflict in Israeli-Lebanese Relations." Israel Studies 15, no. 3 (2010): 163–88. <https://doi.org/10.2979/isr.2010.15.3.163>.
- 126 Benny Morris. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press, 2008. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1np9bm>.
- 127 United Nations. "About the Nakba." Question of Palestine. Modified May 21, 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/about-the-nakba/>.
- 128 Office of the Historian, United States Department of State. "The Arab-Israeli War of 1948." Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, 1945–1952. Accessed June 21, 2026. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war>.
- 129 EBSCO. "Israeli-Arab Wars." Research Starters. 2023. <https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/israeli-arab-wars>.
- 130 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). "Who We Are." Accessed June 21, 2026. <https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are>.

- 131 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). "Black September." Who We Are. Accessed June 19, 2026. <https://www.unrwa.org/content/black-september>.
- 132 EBSCO. "Israeli-Arab Wars." 2023.
- 133 EBSCO. "Israeli-Arab Wars." 2023.
- 134 MEE Correspondent. "A History of Israel's Invasions of Lebanon." Middle East Eye. April 21, 2026. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/explainers/history-israel-invasions-lebanon>.
- 135 Byron D. Cannon, "Israel Invades Southern Lebanon," Research Starters, EBSCO, 2021, <https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/israel-invades-southern-lebanon>.
- 136 IDF Editorial Team, "Operation Litani," Wars and Operations, Israel Defense Forces, October 30, 2017, <https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/wars-and-operations/operation-litani/>.
- 137 MEE Correspondent, "A History of Israel's Invasions of Lebanon," Middle East Eye, April 21, 2026, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/explainers/history-israel-invasions-lebanon>.
- 138 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 425 (1978). S/RES/425 (1978), March 19, 1978. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/71622>.
- 139 United Nations, "UNIFIL, Lebanon," Creative Community Outreach Initiative, accessed June 19, 2026, <https://www.un.org/en/ccoi/unifil-lebanon>.
- 140 Mehmood Hussain, "PLO-Jordan Relations." Economic and Political Weekly 21, no. 37 (1986): 1632–33. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4376119>.
- 141 Rami Siklawi, "The Palestinian Resistance Movement In Lebanon 1967–82: Survival, Challenges, and Opportunities." 923–37.
- 142 Rex Brynen, "PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons." Journal of Palestine Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 48–70. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2537633>.
- 143 Rashid Khalidi, "Lebanon in the Context of Regional Politics: Palestinian and Syrian Involvement in the Lebanese Crisis." 495–514.
- 144 Rex Brynen, "PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons," Journal of Palestine Studies 18, no. 2 (1989): 48–70, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2537633>.
- 145 Rex Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 67.
- 146 Julie Peteet, "From Refugees to Minorities: Palestinians in Post-War Lebanon". Middle East Report, No. 200, Minorities in the Middle East: Power and the Politics of Differences, July- September, 1996, 27–30, 28.
- 147 Rami Siklawi, "The Palestinian Resistance Movement In Lebanon 1967–82: Survival, Challenges, and Opportunities." 923–37.
- 148 Rex Brynen, "PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons." 48–70.
- 149 Dan Naor, "'Spring of Youth' in Beirut: The Effects of the Israeli Military Operation on Lebanon," Israel Affairs 20, no. 3 (June 16, 2014): 410–25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2014.922805>.
- 150 Rashid Khalidi, "Lebanon in the Context of Regional Politics: Palestinian and Syrian Involvement in the Lebanese Crisis." 495–514.
- 151 Justin Salhani, "What Is the Amal Movement, Lebanon's Other Shia Party?," Al Jazeera, June 12, 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/6/11/what-is-the-amal-movement-lebanons-other-shia-party>.
- 152 "First Lebanon War, 1982: A Turning Point for Israel," The Jerusalem Post, June 24, 2022, <https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/article-710188>.
- 153 Oren Barak, "Ambiguity and Conflict in Israeli-Lebanese Relations." Israel Studies 15, no. 3 (2010): 163–88. <https://doi.org/10.2979/isr.2010.15.3.163>.
- 154 Avner Yaniv and Robert J. Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative? The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," International Security 8, no. 2 (1983): 117–42.
- 155 Oren Barak, "Ambiguity and Conflict in Israeli-Lebanese Relations." 2010. <https://doi.org/10.2979/isr.2010.15.3.163>.
- 156 Al-Anwar (Lebanon), 1 July 1975; Adel Frieiha, *L'Armée et l'Etat au Liban* (Paris, 1980) 198; Rex Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival* (Boulder, CO, 1990) 67.
- 157 Kirsten E. Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998), 81–92; Oren Barak, "Ambiguity and Conflict in Israeli-Lebanese Relations." 2010. <https://doi.org/10.2979/isr.2010.15.3.163>.
- 158 Quoted in Hanoch Bartov, *Dado*. vol. 1 (Tel-Aviv, 1978) 161 [Hebrew].
- 159 Oren Barak, "Ambiguity and Conflict in Israeli-Lebanese Relations." 2010. <https://doi.org/10.2979/isr.2010.15.3.163>.
- 160 David Wurmser, "Egypto-Centrism in Israeli Strategic Planning: The 'Peace for Galilee' Operation," SAIS Review 4, no. 2 (1984): 65–76.
- 161 Alan James, "Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978–1982," International Journal 38, no. 4 (1983): 613–34.
- 162 Yezid Sayigh, "Israel's Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982." <https://doi.org/10.2307/2536925>.
- 163 Yaniv and Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?" 1983.
- 164 Yezid Sayigh, "Israel's Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982." <https://doi.org/10.2307/2536925>.
- 165 Yezid Sayigh, "Israel's Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982." <https://doi.org/10.2307/2536925>.
- 166 Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon*, 81–92.
- 167 Yezid Sayigh, "Israel's Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982." <https://doi.org/10.2307/2536925>.
- 168 Yaniv and Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?" 1983.
- 169 Carole Collins, "Chronology of the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon June–August 1982," Journal of Palestine Studies 11–12, no. 4–1 (1982): 135–92.
- 170 Yaniv and Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?" 1983.
- 171 Collins, "Chronology of the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," 1982.
- 172 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 490, S/RES/490 (21 July 1981).
- 173 Collins, "Chronology of the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," 1982.
- 174 Yaniv and Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?" 1983.
- 175 Yaniv and Lieber, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?" 1983.
- 176 Kirsten E. Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998), 81–92.
- 177 Michael Rubin, "Stew in Their Own Juice: Reagan, Syria, and Lebanon, 1981–1984," Diplomatic History 44, no. 4 (2020): 664–90, <https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/44/4/664/5865464>.
- 178 William Claiborne, "Sharon Said to Feel Haig Accepted Drive on Beirut," The Washington Post, December 27, 2023, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/07/22/sharon-said-to-feel-haig-accepted-drive-on-beirut/96eb4b1b-5916-45ff-aa6c-3ae19d086182/>.
- 179 Edward Walsh, "Envoy Says Sharon Outlined Invasion Plan to U.S. in 1981," The Washington Post, March 1, 2024, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/05/24/envoy-says-sharon-outlined-invasion-plan-to-us-in-1981/1a32f8f7-1e96-48ed-921a-6577fbaf810/>.
- 180 Council on Foreign Relations, "Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Aka Fatah Revolutionary Council, the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, or the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims," May 27, 2009. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/abu-nidal-organization-ano-aka-fatah-revolutionary-council-arab-revolutionary-brigades>.
- 181 Council on Foreign Relations., May 27, 2009, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/abu-nidal-organization-ano-aka-fatah-revolutionary-council-arab-revolutionary-brigades>.

- 182 Dan Naor and Eyal Lewin, 2023, "Was the 1982 Lebanon War a Deviation from Israeli Security Doctrine?" *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 14 (2): 219–44. doi:10.1080/21520844.2023.2171652.
- 183 Gershom Gorenberg. "This Is Your Brain on War: A Dispatch From Jerusalem." *The American Prospect*, July 23, 2014. <https://prospect.org/2014/07/23/brain-war-dispatch-jerusalem/>.
- 184 First Lebanon War, 1982: A Turning Point for Israel," *The Jerusalem Post*, June 24, 2022, <https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/article-710188>.
- 185 Barron, Kiegan. "Why Did Israel Invade Lebanon in 1982?" *WorldAtlas*, September 12, 2024. <https://www.worldatlas.com/history/why-did-israel-invade-lebanon-in-1982.html>.
- 186 IDF. "First Lebanon War," n.d. <https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/wars-and-operations/first-lebanon-war/>.
- 187 Oren Barak, "Ambiguity and Conflict in Israeli-Lebanese Relations." *Israel Studies* 15, no. 3 (2010): 163–88. <https://doi.org/10.2979/isr.2010.15.3.163>.
- 188 Oren Barak, "Ambiguity and Conflict in Israeli-Lebanese Relations." *Israel Studies* 15, no. 3 (2010): 163–88. <https://doi.org/10.2979/isr.2010.15.3.163>.
- 189 Alan James, "Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978–1982," (1983): 613–34.
- 190 Alan James, "Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978–1982," (1983): 613–34.
- 191 Tom Russell, "A Lebanon Primer - MERIP." *Middle East Research and Information Project*, July 29, 2025. <https://www.merip.org/1985/06/a-lebanon-primer/>.
- 192 Oren Barak, "Ambiguity and Conflict in Israeli-Lebanese Relations." 2010. <https://doi.org/10.2979/isr.2010.15.3.163>.
- 193 Carole Collins, "Chronology of the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon June–August 1982," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 11–12, no. 4–1 (1982): 135–92.
- 194 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 508, S/RES/508 (5 June 1982); Resolution 509, S/RES/509 (6 June 1982).
- 195 "United Nations: Documents Concerning the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon and the Israeli Incursion of Lebanon," *International Legal Materials* 21, no. 5 (1982): 1165–92.
- 196 James, "Painful Peacekeeping," 1983.
- 197 Urquhart, "United Nations Peace-Keeping in the Middle East," 1981.
- 198 Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 58.
- 199 Resolution 508 (1982) / Adopted by the Security Council at Its 2374th Meeting, on 5 June 1982., S/RES/508(1982) (1982), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/30305?v=pdf>; Resolution 509 (1982) / Adopted by the Security Council at Its 2375th Meeting, on 6 June 1982., S/RES/509(1982) (1982), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/30306?v=pdf>.
- 200 "S/PV.2375 – Security Council," UN Project, New York, June 6, 1982, <https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-2375/>.
- 201 Security Council Report, "The Security Council Veto," accessed September 26, 2026, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/working_methods_theveto-6.pdf.
- 202 "Security Council Official Records: Thirty-Seventh Year; 2374th Meeting: 5 June 1982," United Nations, June 5, 1982, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/nl8/200/54/pdf/nl820054.pdf>.
- 203 Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/kt5t1nc6tp>.
- 204 "Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel on Strategic Cooperation; November 30, 1981," United States Government Printing Office, November 30, 1981, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/pal03.asp.
- 205 C. I. E. Staff, "U.S., Israel Agree to Cooperate on Strategic Defense Initiative," *CIE*, May 6, 2026, <https://israeled.org/u-s-israel-cooperate-strategic-defense-initiative/>.
- 206 "S/PV.2375 – Security Council."
- 207 Security Council Report, "The Security Council Veto," accessed September 26, 2026, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/working_methods_theveto-6.pdf.
- 208 Javier PEREZ DE CUELLAR, "LETTER DATED 1 MARCH 1982 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL," March 1, 1982, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-190218/>.
- 209 "S/PV.2374 – Security Council."
- 210 "Venice Declaration," June 13, 1980, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf.
- 211 Najib J. Hakim and Richard P. Stevens, "Zaire and Israel: An American Connection," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 12, no. 3 (1983): 41–53, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2536150>.
- 212 "S/PV.2374 – Security Council."
- 213 "S/PV.2375 – Security Council."
- 214 "S/PV.2374 – Security Council."
- 215 "S/PV.2374 – Security Council."
- 216 "S/PV.2374 – Security Council."
- 217 *Palestine and International Law: Essays on Politics and Economics*. United Kingdom: McFarland, Incorporated, Publishers, 2009.
- 218 "Vetoed Draft Resolutions in the United Nations Security Council 1946–2012," UK Government, accessed September 26, 2026, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a75608ded915d6faf2b2830/vetoed-resolutions-un-security-council-aug-12.doc>.
- 219 Security Council Report, "The Security Council Veto."
- 220 "S/PV.2374 – Security Council."
- 221 "S/PV.2375 – Security Council."
- 222 "Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel on Strategic Cooperation."
- 223 "S/PV.2375 – Security Council."
- 224 "S/PV.2374 – Security Council."
- 225 "S/PV.2375 – Security Council."
- 226 Security Council Resolution 501 (1982) [on Strengthening of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon], S/RES/501(1982) (1982), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/278788>.
- 227 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," June 26, 1945, art. 23, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>.
- 228 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," art. 24.
- 229 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," Chapter VII.
- 230 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 425 (1978). S/RES/425 (1978), March 19, 1978. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/71622>.
- 231 UNIFIL, "UNIFIL Establishment," accessed July 23, 2026, <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-establishment>.

The National High School Model United Nations Conference (NHSMUN) is a project of IMUNA, a non-profit organization formally associated with the United Nations Department of Global Communications (UNDGC). IMUNA is dedicated to promoting global issues education through simulation.

© 2026 IMUNA. All Rights Reserved.

