

A full-page background image of a rainy New York City street. Tall brick buildings line the street, and the wet pavement reflects the red taillights of cars and the white headlights of a bus. Pedestrians with umbrellas are crossing the street. A blue semi-transparent banner is overlaid across the middle of the image, containing the event title.

NHSMUN

National High School Model United Nations

Table of Contents

A Note on the NHSMUN Difference.....	3
Position Paper Requirements.....	4
Committee History.....	5

Topic A: Election Monitoring in Post-Conflict Areas.....

Introduction	7
History and Description of the Issue	8
Current Status.....	14
Bloc Analysis	19
Committee Mission.....	21

Topic B: Political Instability in Peru.....

Introduction	24
History and Description of the Issue	24
Current Status.....	31
Bloc Analysis	36
Committee Mission.....	39

Research and Preparation Questions.....	41
Important Documents	42

A Note on the NHSMUN Difference

Esteemed Faculty and Delegates,

Welcome to NHSMUN 2027! We are Armen Bagdassarian and Sabeeh Mirza, and we are elated to serve as this year's Secretaries-General. Thank you for choosing to attend NHSMUN, the world's largest and most diverse high school Model United Nations conference. As a space for collaboration, consensus, and compromise, NHSMUN strives to transform today's brightest thinkers, speakers, and collaborators into tomorrow's leaders. We believe that an emphasis on education through simulation is paramount to the Model UN experience.

Realism and Accuracy: Although a perfect simulation of the UN is never possible, we believe that one of the core educational responsibilities of MUN conferences is to educate students about how the UN System works. We strive to invite real UN, NGO, and field experts into each committee through our committee speakers program. Moreover, we arrange meetings between students and the actual UN Permanent Mission of the country they are representing. These exclusive resources are only available due to IMUNA's formal association with the United Nations Department of Global Communications and consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. No other conference goes so far to deeply immerse students into the UN System.

Educational Emphasis: At the heart of NHSMUN lies education and compromise. Part of what makes NHSMUN special is its diverse delegate base. As such, when NHSMUN distributes awards, we strongly de-emphasize their importance in comparison to the educational value of Model UN. In particular, our daises look for and promote constructive leadership and diplomacy that strive toward consensus, as real ambassadors do in the United Nations.

Research and a Dedicated Staff: Our staffers care deeply about delegates' experiences and what they take away from their time at NHSMUN. Our Directors spend over six months preparing Background Guides, in addition to Update Briefs written to reflect the rapidly changing nature of the topics to be discussed. Our staffers are trained rigorously to provide the best conference experience possible. Our daises provide thoughtful comments on submitted position papers. Our staff aims to tailor the committee experience to delegates' reflections and research, but also to facilitate an environment where all delegates' thoughts can be heard.

Empowering Participation: The UN relies on the voices of all of its member states to create resolutions. This is our philosophy at NHSMUN too. Our Rules of Procedure and our staff focus on making every voice in the committee heard, regardless of country assignment or skill level. Additionally, unlike many other conferences, we also emphasize delegate participation after the conference. Delegates spend countless hours researching topics critical to the UN and broader international sphere.

Delegates, it is our sincerest hope that your time at NHSMUN will be thought-provoking and stimulating. NHSMUN is an incredible time to learn, grow, and embrace new opportunities. We look forward to seeing you work both as students and global citizens at the conference.

Best,

Armen Bagdassarian
Secretary-General

Sabeeh Mirza
Secretary-General

Position Paper Requirements

Delegate research and preparation is a critical element of attending NHSMUN and enjoying the debate experience. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in your committee. We encourage and expect each of you to critically explore the selected topics and be able to identify and analyze their intricacies upon arrival to the conference.

The task of preparing for the conference can be challenging. To assist delegates, we have updated our [Beginner Delegate Guide](#) and [Advanced Delegate Guide](#). These guides contain more detailed instructions on how to prepare a position paper and excellent sources that delegates can use for research. Use these resources to your advantage. They can help transform a sometimes overwhelming task into what it should be: an engaging, interesting, and rewarding experience.

To accurately represent a country, delegates must be able to articulate its policies. Accordingly, NHSMUN requires each delegation (the one or two delegates representing a country in a committee) to write a position paper for each topic on the committee's agenda. More information about how to write and format position papers can be found in the [Research Guide](#). To summarize, position papers should be structured into three sections.

I: Topic Background – This section should describe the history of the topic as it would be described by the delegate's country. Delegates do not need to give an exhaustive account of the topic, but rather focus on the details that are most important to the delegation's policy and proposed solutions.

II: Country Policy – This section should discuss the delegation's policy regarding the topic. Each paper should state the policy in plain terms and include the relevant statements, statistics, and research that support the effectiveness of the policy. Comparisons with other global issues are also appropriate here.

III. Proposed Solutions – This section should detail the delegation's proposed solutions to address the topic. Descriptions of each solution should be thorough. Each idea should clearly connect to the specific problem it aims to solve and identify potential obstacles to implementation and how they can be avoided. The solution should be a natural extension of the country's policy.

Each topic's position paper should be **no more than 10 pages long** double-spaced with standard margins and 12 point font size. This is a maximum; **3–5 pages per topic is often a suitable length**. The paper must be written from the perspective of your assigned country and should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference.

Each delegation is responsible for submitting position papers on or before **February 26, 2027**. If a delegate wishes to receive detailed feedback from the committee's dais, their position paper must be submitted on or before **February 5, 2027**. The papers received by this earlier deadline will be reviewed by the committee dais and returned before February 26. Instructions on how to submit position papers will be shared directly with faculty advisors.

Submission instructions for position papers will be sent to faculty advisers via email. If delegations are unable to submit their position papers on time, please contact us at nhsmun@imuna.org.

Delegations that do not submit position papers will be ineligible for awards.

Committee History

SPECPOL (Special Political and Decolonization Committee) is commonly known as the Fourth Committee of the United Nations. The committee operates under the United Nations General Assembly, which means that it is a deliberative body within the UN system.¹ When initially founded, SPECPOL's main and only goal was to address issues related to the decolonization process of regions still under colonial rule. However, SPECPOL's mission expanded to broader and more politically influenced issues in 1993, when Resolution 47/233 merged the Special Political Committee with the Decolonization Committee.²

SPECPOL has addressed issues across the world, more specifically in regions with many decolonization issues. Historically, the committee has done most of its work in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Pacific. Now, with greater efforts in decolonization, SPECPOL aims to resolve the issues in territories that are not self-governed. It also aims to resolve issues such as the effects of atomic radiation, peacekeeping operations, and human rights for marginalized groups.³

Throughout its history, SPECPOL has contributed to international efforts involving peacekeeping and political stability. The committee has contributed to the process of decolonization, with more than 80 former colonies eventually gaining independence.⁴ SPECPOL has also addressed major political issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the status of Palestinian refugees. Additionally, the committee has remained involved in the Western Sahara conflict, including through the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), while continuing to address peacekeeping and political challenges in conflict-affected regions.

SPECPOL consists of all 193 UN member states and considers specific agenda items through discussion, negotiation, and voting. Its work is guided by Articles 10–22 of the UN Charter, which give the General Assembly authority to discuss international issues and make recommendations.⁵ This role is particularly relevant to post-conflict areas, where rebuilding political institutions and establishing legitimate governments are essential for lasting peace.

1 "General Assembly of the United Nations - Fourth Committee" United Nations. Accessed August 27, 2026. <https://www.un.org/en/ga/fourth/>.

2 "A/RES/47/233 : UN Documents : Security Council Report." n.d. Security Council Report. Accessed August 27, 2026. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/ares47233.php>.

3 "Fourth Committee | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." 2025. Un.Org. June 4, 2025. <https://press.un.org/en/fourth-committee>.

4 "General Assembly of the United Nations." WwW.Un.Org. Accessed August 27, 2026. <https://www.un.org/en/ga/fourth/>.

5 United Nations. 2015. "Functions and Powers of the General Assembly." United Nations. <https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml>.

TOPIC A

SPECPOL | NHSMUN 2027

Election Monitoring in Post-Conflict Areas



Introduction

When the guns fall silent, the real test of peace begins at the ballot box. Years of violence within a country can leave behind unstable political institutions with weak public trust. In these situations, elections can provide a peaceful way for citizens to participate in choosing their leaders and help countries legitimize their new governments. However, holding an election does not guarantee that a country will become more stable. Citizens must also believe that they can participate freely and that election results are credible. This makes election monitoring and electoral assistance an important part of the post-conflict process. The UN describes elections as an important part of political transitions and the implementation of peace agreements.¹ It also provides assistance that can help countries develop more credible and inclusive electoral processes. Election monitoring is the process of observing an election to determine whether it is conducted fairly, freely, and according to established laws and standards.²

The international community has become increasingly involved in supporting elections in countries recovering from conflict. Since 1991, the UN has provided electoral assistance to more than 118 countries, including Liberia, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Timor-Leste.³ Electoral assistance can take many forms depending on the needs of each country. In some cases, international organizations help improve election laws or strengthen election bodies. In others, they provide logistical support or help create safer conditions for citizens to participate. Election observers, however, generally do not intervene in the electoral process. Instead, election observers monitor voting, document potential problems, and provide an individual assessment of whether an election was conducted fairly. Their presence can help increase public confidence in election results. However, their limited role can also create challenges for post-conflict peacebuilding. Observers can identify and report electoral problems. They cannot force political leaders to accept election results.

Post-conflict elections continue to face new challenges. New technology has created new concerns for election integrity. False information

can spread quickly and influence how citizens understand candidates or election results. These challenges raise questions about how the international community should respond. While international organizations can provide assistance, their involvement must also be balanced with a respect for national sovereignty. This can create tension when governments restrict international observers or view outside oversight as interference in domestic affairs, as Belarus did when it declined to invite an election observation mission from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).⁴ The central issue is therefore not simply whether elections should be monitored. Rather it is how international election monitoring can support peaceful political transitions while helping countries build strong institutions of their own. The decisions made by the international community play an important role in determining whether elections become a foundation for lasting peace or another source of political instability.

History and Description of the Issue

FOUNDATIONS OF ELECTION MONITORING

In 1966, the UN General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 25 of the ICCPR gave citizens the right to vote and run for office in regular elections.⁵ It also requires that these elections be open to all citizens equally and held by secret ballot. This would allow voters to express their choice freely and without pressure. As of November 2025, the ICCPR has been ratified by 175 countries, with exceptions including Singapore, China, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia.⁶

Even before the ICCPR, the UN already played a role in helping elections. In 1948, a UN commission supervised elections in South Korea to help set up a legitimate government.⁷ Over the next two decades, dozens of colonies around the world gained independence. Many of these new countries had recently survived major civil wars and conflict. The UN often helped oversee their first elections as these places gained their statehood.⁸

The supervision of elections grew even more in the 1970s. Political scientist Samuel Huntington called this period the “Third Wave of Democracy.” During this time, over 30 countries moved from authoritarian rule to democratic government, often after civil wars.⁹ These countries were spread across Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Many countries invited international observers to make sure the elections were fair. In this sense, election monitoring went from a rare practice to a common one. From the 1960s to the 2000s, monitoring expanded from less than 10 percent of all elections to almost 80 percent.¹⁰ This increase was led by observers seeking to provide accurate and unbiased information on the quality of elections worldwide. This effort strengthened standards for elections around the

world.

Today, election monitoring uses several methods. Observers review voter lists and visit polling stations to check security. They also monitor media coverage to detect bias toward specific candidates. To verify the results, some missions use parallel vote tabulation. In this method, observers count votes from a sample of polling stations and compare them with the official count. Some missions send small teams that arrive only on election day. Others monitor the entire election process. They arrive months in advance to observe the entire process, from voter registration to the polls.¹¹

As election monitoring became more common, international organizations created formal standards to guide the process. In 2005, the UN and dozens of other election-monitoring organizations endorsed the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.¹² This set out specific rules for how observers must operate. Observers are required to stay neutral and avoid bias toward a country’s government or candidates. They must respect the host country’s laws and the authority of its election officials. No interference is allowed in any way. The declaration also requires observers to look at the whole election, not just voting day. This means examining candidate registration and the campaign trail from the start. It also includes the period after, such as how disputes over results are solved. Observer missions are expected to publish their findings publicly. They are meant to issue an initial statement soon after the election and a full final report afterward. Observer missions cannot receive funding or support from the government whose election they are observing. This is meant to prevent any bias and preserve their independence. In return, host countries are expected to guarantee observers can move freely, access all stages of the election without government interference. This includes speaking with anyone involved, including election officials, political parties, and the media. Since 2005, the declaration has been signed by dozens of organizations around

the world. It remains the most widely accepted framework for election observation today.¹³

This standard was reinforced in 2023, when the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 78/208. This resolution reaffirmed that UN electoral assistance must remain objective, impartial, neutral, and independent.¹⁴ It also mentioned that this assistance must only be provided when a country specifically requests it. The resolution raised concern about the spread of misinformation around elections. It also addressed threats to journalists and independent media during election periods. Lastly, it recognized the importance of election observation for building public confidence and easing election-related tensions. It specifically welcomed the 2005 Declaration of Principles as a way to guide many organizations that observe elections.¹⁵ In this way, Resolution 78/208 built on the 2005 Declaration. It placed new responsibility on both the UN and member states to protect the integrity of elections.

These standards opened the door for organizations to strengthen elections around the world. Two organizations have played an especially large role. The first is the OSCE which works through the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Between 2000 and 2020, ODIHR observed more national elections than any other international organization.¹⁶ In 1996, ODIHR published an Election Observation Handbook. This handbook set out clear standards for how its observers should work, making its operations transparent.¹⁷ The second major organization is the European Union. The EU carries out its election work

through Election Observation Missions (EOMs). Since the 2000s, the EU has sent EOMs to countries across Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.¹⁸ Both the EU and OSCE use similar methods. They send teams that visit many polling stations. These teams observe the whole election cycle and use parallel vote tabulation to check the official results.¹⁹ As more organizations adopted these standards, election monitoring spread to more countries. It has become a widely accepted practice around the world.

THE EVOLVING SCOPE OF ELECTION MONITORING IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-CONFLICT STATES

In post-conflict societies, elections can help shift competition away from violence and toward politics. This can allow former rival groups to pursue their interests through politics rather than armed conflict.²⁰ However, elections alone do not create lasting peace. Research on post-conflict regions has shown that the group with positions in government often holds the practical advantage.²¹ This is because control of state institutions can be a powerful tool. Additionally, elections held before institutions and security conditions are properly established can increase tensions. Meanwhile, well-planned elections can support stability and reconciliation.²² Therefore, election success is usually one of the hardest steps to achieve a peaceful transition to democracy in post-conflict societies.

The success of an election often depends on whether different political, ethnic, and

UN electoral assistance must remain objective, impartial, neutral, and independent.

social groups are able to participate fairly in the process.²³ The timing of elections is also important. Holding an election too soon after a conflict may leave people feeling unsafe or unprepared to vote. However, waiting too long can slow the country's return to democratic rule.

Moreover, it is essential for citizens to believe that the rules are applied equally. They should be able to trust that their votes will be counted accurately, and that all candidates have a genuine opportunity to compete.²⁴ When people trust the electoral process, they are more likely to accept the outcome. This often holds true even if their preferred candidate loses. Conversely, if large segments of the population view an election as unfair, political polarization can deepen. This can make compromise more difficult and increase the risk of democratic backsliding.²⁵

In this sense, post-conflict states need more than the standard election monitoring toolkit. Most elections take place in countries with established capacity to hold elections, as well as a track record of peaceful transfers of power.²⁶ Post-conflict states rarely have either. As one assessment of post-conflict elections put it, "most war-torn societies lack the political climate, social and economic stability, institutional infrastructure, and even political will to mount successful elections."²⁷ In these states, public trust in government is often low. The losing side may have little reason to accept defeat quietly.

These conditions also change what kinds of problems are likely to occur. In a stable democracy, election fraud on voting day is usually the main risk for observers to watch.²⁸ In a post-conflict state, bigger risks might come earlier and less visibly. Governments in these countries often slow down voter registration in areas where opposition groups have strong support.²⁹ This kind of delay is much harder to detect than fraud committed in front of observers on election day. Ongoing violence and insecurity in parts of a country can make campaigning dangerous for candidates and observers. This can also discourage voters from participating.³⁰ For these

reasons, post-conflict elections are a useful test case for determining whether election monitoring has kept up with the current necessities. Election monitoring has vast potential to evolve and improve beyond election day. If it is to yield results, they will likely be the most visible in post-conflict states.

Election monitoring did expand well beyond their original focus on voting day. Organizations like the OSCE and the EU now follow elections all the way through the final count. However, this wider oversight has not stopped all types of election manipulation. Modern authoritarian governments have adapted. Political scientist Andreas Schedler describes this as "electoral authoritarianism."³¹ These are regimes that hold regular elections and allow opposition parties to run. However, they are able to manipulate conditions to sway things in their favor. These tools can include media censorship, voter intimidation, and the banning of candidates.³²

This creates a problem for monitoring that goes beyond scope. Even when monitors are present and watching the full cycle, not all monitors operate similarly. Some international observer groups are what researchers call "low-quality" or "zombie" monitors. These are groups that show up, observe an election, and issue a positive report regardless of the actual election process. A 2024 study found that by 2020, low-quality monitors were present at 39 percent of monitored elections, for the first time roughly matching the number of high-quality monitors.³³ This means a government facing criticism from one credible group can often find a second, more sympathetic group willing to call the same election fair. As a result, election monitoring itself has become politicized, with governments facing criticism often dismissing monitors outright and framing their findings as foreign interference rather than honest assessment.

Azerbaijan's 2013 presidential election is an example of unsuccessful election monitoring. The OSCE's election observation office found that the vote count was "bad or very bad" in

58 percent of the polling stations its observers watched. This was a record in its 20-year history of monitoring in the region.³⁴ Yet delegations from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament monitored the same election. They issued a joint statement calling the process “free, fair and transparent.”³⁵ Both delegations were credentialed, elected European officials, but they reached opposite conclusions about the same election on the same day.

Sometimes, even a strong monitor is not enough to stop backsliding. In Cambodia, the country’s first post-conflict election was held in 1993. It was organized by the United Nations, and international observers were present.³⁶ For years afterward, Cambodia held elections that were flawed but genuinely contested. Opposition parties began to win seats in the Parliament. This changed in 2013, when an opposition coalition won 45 percent of the vote. This was the first time that someone came close to defeating the incumbent government.³⁷ In response, the government arrested and exiled opposition leaders, dissolving their coalition. By 2018, the main opposition had been banned outright. That year, the ruling party won every seat in parliament. In 2023, the next major opposition party faced a minor paperwork dispute. They were again disqualified before the election even took place.³⁸ Cambodia’s example is a prominent example of a specific mechanism. When an opposition performs unexpectedly well but still loses, the ruling government may be “spooked” by how close it came to losing power. They may respond by cracking down on the opposition harder than before. In this view, a strong but unsuccessful opposition showing does not always produce democratic progress. It can instead convince the government that competitive elections are too dangerous to keep holding.

These cases point to a deeper limitation. Even the most thorough monitoring mission is built to detect and report problems. It does not try to fix the conditions that cause them. An

observer can document that a government delayed voter registration in opposition areas, or that state media gave the ruling party ten times more coverage than its rivals. But on its own, documenting these problems does not fix them. Change is still needed to avoid the same problems next time, such as an independent election commission, trained officials, and fair information for voters.

This is why a growing number of experts argue in favor of election assistance. This would go beyond checking whether one election met international standards. It would mean helping build the capacity to produce fair elections. This can involve institutional aid, such as training election officials and supporting independent electoral commissions. It can also help the people, such as running civic education campaigns to help voters understand their rights and the voting process itself. For example, this process has been used in Mozambique. The Mozambican National Resistance or RENAMO used to be a rebel movement in the country. However, international donors created a trust fund to help RENAMO make the transition into a functioning political party. They described this investment as critical to keeping the group engaged in the peace process.³⁹ The OSCE helped to do this in Kosovo as well. They funded “political party service centres” to help new parties develop real policy platforms to appeal more to voters.⁴⁰

HISTORICAL CASES OF POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS

Although internal conflicts can be damaging to the democracy of a country, post-conflict elections can successfully help states transition from war to peace. One of the strongest examples of a successful post-conflict election can be seen within Liberia. Between 1989 and 2003, Liberia experienced two successive civil wars, separated by a brief period of civilian rule under Charles Taylor. On August 18, 2003, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was



2013 "Ballots not Bullets"
billboard in Liberia

Credit: blk24ga

signed, ending 14 years of conflict that killed an estimated 250,000 people and displaced many more.⁴¹

After the peace agreement, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in October 2003. UNMIL helped create a safe environment for elections by deploying peacekeepers. Rather than focusing only on election day, the mission spent nearly two years rebuilding the conditions necessary for a credible election. Peacekeepers secured major roads and polling locations so election materials could be delivered safely, while disarmament programs reduced the number of armed combatants capable of disrupting the vote. At the same time, UNMIL worked with Liberia's National Elections Commission to strengthen election administration by supporting voter registration, planning polling locations, and training election officials.⁴² These efforts allowed millions of Liberians to participate in an electoral process that was viewed as both secure and well organized. International observers monitored polling stations to make elections more transparent, fair, and trustworthy. Their independent assessments also helped increase public confidence in the

election process.⁴³ As a result, more than 1.35 million Liberians registered to vote, and over 74 percent of registered voters participated in the presidential runoff election, reflecting widespread public engagement after years of conflict.⁴⁴

In 2005, Liberians voted peacefully, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected president.⁴⁵ Since the election was secure, transparent, and accepted by political leaders, it marked an important turning point in Liberia's recovery. It demonstrated how carefully organized elections can help transform conflict into lasting peace. The election's success was measured by more than a peaceful transfer of power. It also reflected years of investment in Liberia's institutions, allowing responsibility to shift gradually from international peacekeepers to Liberian authorities instead of creating a sudden power vacuum. As Liberian security forces became better trained and government institutions gained public trust, UNMIL gradually reduced its responsibilities before transferring security duties back to Liberian authorities under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2239 in 2015.⁴⁶ By emphasizing long-term institution building alongside election monitoring, Liberia

demonstrated that international assistance can strengthen a country's ability to govern independently long after an observer mission has ended.⁴⁷

Elections do not always strengthen peace, especially when political divisions remain unresolved. The 1992 election in Angola demonstrates how post-conflict elections can fail when peace has not yet taken root. Following Angola's independence from Portugal in 1975, the country became divided between the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the rebel movement UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). These two groups fought for control of the government for nearly two decades. This civil war left the country deeply divided and weakened public trust in political institutions.⁴⁸ The Bicesse Accords, signed in 1991, sought to end the fighting by establishing a ceasefire. It required the disarmament of armed groups and called for Angola's first multiparty democratic elections.⁴⁹

Although international observers generally concluded that Angola's 1992 elections were broadly free and fair, the credibility of the voting process was not enough to preserve peace.⁵⁰ When the MPLA won the first round of voting, UNITA rejected the results, claimed election fraud, and returned to armed conflict. The violence that followed caused thousands of deaths and prolonged Angola's civil war for another ten years.⁵¹ Election monitoring improved the transparency of the electoral process, but it could not overcome years of mistrust or ensure that the peace agreement would survive a contested result.

A comparison of Liberia and Angola shows that election monitoring is most effective when it is combined with peacebuilding and security efforts. In Liberia, peacekeepers helped reduce violence and resolve disputes, allowing elections to take place peacefully. In Angola, however, political distrust and continued violence made it difficult for observers to prevent conflict after

the election.⁵² These cases show that election monitoring can improve transparency and trust, but it cannot create peace on its own.⁵³

CHALLENGES TO ELECTION MONITORING IN POST-CONFLICT STATES

One challenge for election monitoring is balancing respect for sovereignty with the need for oversight.⁵⁴ National governments are responsible for running elections. As such, some states argue that the presence of foreign observers interferes with their domestic affairs.⁵⁵ This can create tension, and governments may attempt to limit the ability of observers to do their job. They may restrict where monitors can travel or delay invitations until election day, preventing them from watching the entire process.⁵⁶ This can damage efforts because election monitoring depends on cooperation from everyone involved. In some cases, governments only invite observer groups they believe will issue favorable reports. This can create the appearance of oversight without providing a complete or impartial view of the election. This can reduce public confidence in both the election and the observer mission itself.

Security and logistical challenges can also make election monitoring difficult in post-conflict states. Armed groups may still control large territories in some countries, making it dangerous for people to vote, while transportation networks damaged by war can leave remote communities difficult to reach.⁵⁷ The areas most vulnerable to electoral fraud or violence are often the same places that are hardest to monitor.⁵⁸ This was seen in Cambodia's 1993 election, discussed above, where ongoing conflict in remote regions made it difficult for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to monitor polling stations.⁵⁹

These challenges are not just limited to election day. Governments may misuse their resources and power to limit the opposition long before the polls open. Conflict can also cause governments to become disorganized. This can include problems such as inaccurate voter registration

lists. However, these problems may only be seen in the months leading up to the election. If observer missions only arrive when voting begins, they may observe an orderly process. This means they would miss many aspects of the broader process.⁶⁰ For this reason, many organizations support long-term observation missions for every stage of the election, especially in post-conflict states.⁶¹

A major limitation of election monitoring is that observers can identify problems but cannot force governments to fix them. Election observers look at whether elections are fair, document problems, and make recommendations for improvement.⁶² This was clear during Zimbabwe's 2008 presidential election. International observer missions reported widespread voter intimidation, political violence, and other issues. Despite publicly condemning these abuses, they had no legal authority to stop the violence, overturn the election results, or force the government to follow their recommendations.⁶³ Instead, observer missions depend on public reporting and international pressure to encourage governments to make changes. Their influence depends on whether political leaders are willing to act on the recommendations they might receive.⁶⁴ Zimbabwe demonstrated that election monitoring can expose problems and increase international scrutiny, but it cannot guarantee accountability when governments refuse to cooperate. For this reason, election monitoring should be combined with broader efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and protect fair elections.

Current Status

ELECTION MONITORING IN NEWLY POST-CONFLICT REGIONS

Even though election monitoring has expanded throughout the years, many elections are still held while violence, political divisions, and humanitarian challenges continue. Elections today may take place while violence remains unresolved.⁶⁵ This does not mean that elections should automatically be postponed until all conflict has ended. In countries with long-lasting conflicts, waiting for complete peace may not be realistic. Elections are still necessary to maintain political legitimacy and allow citizens to participate in government. The challenge is determining whether citizens can participate safely and whether the election can remain credible despite ongoing instability.⁶⁶

International election observers play an essential role in helping evaluate whether elections remain credible despite ongoing challenges or conflict.⁶⁷ This includes examining whether voters can register, whether candidates can campaign safely, and whether election officials can operate effectively. Observers may now have to evaluate elections while conflict and political tensions are still present. This shift reflects one of the defining characteristics of election monitoring today: supporting democratic processes in countries that are still working toward lasting peace rather than waiting until peace has already been achieved.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

A major limitation of election monitoring is that observers can identify problems but cannot force governments to fix them.

demonstrates how difficult election monitoring can become when conflict continues during the electoral process. The DRC has endured over a century of conflict, including the first and second wars lasting from 1996 to 2003.⁶⁸ Today, armed conflict and a humanitarian crisis continue. This is especially because of fighting involving the M23 rebel group. The conflict has been most serious in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. In Goma, the key regional hub, M23 forces continue to control much of the city, disrupting government authority, and limiting humanitarian access.⁶⁹ These conditions create significant obstacles for election monitoring. Ongoing fighting has displaced millions of people, damaged transportation networks, and made some communities too dangerous for election officials and international observers to safely access.⁷⁰ As a result, observer missions may be unable to monitor every polling station or verify whether voting procedures are being followed consistently across the country.

In the 2023 election, the Carter Center reported that the vote counting process lacked transparency. Election observers were not even allowed to witness this process.⁷¹ When election monitors are faced with barriers like this in something as basic as vote counting, it becomes difficult to fully judge the fairness of an election. While one of the primary things monitored in elections is vote counting, election observers in the DRC must also assess whether ongoing conflict has prevented citizens from voting as a whole. This includes registering to vote, reaching polling stations, participating in campaigns, and safely exercising their right to vote. Election monitors also face trouble in evaluating these things due to the impact of conflict. For example, the Carter Center reported that the voter registration audit for the 2023 election was not up to standard.⁷² Therefore, monitors were unable to get a full picture for such an integral aspect of election fairness.

The DRC shows how modern post-conflict elections differ from earlier examples.⁷³ In many earlier cases, a peace agreement

created a clearer transition from war to political reconstruction. Today, that transition may be less defined. A country can hold national elections while armed groups remain active in certain regions. Some communities may face violence while others experience relatively normal political conditions. Political violence is one of the clearest signs of this uneven security landscape. In 2023 in the DRC, 32 political figures across ten parties were targets of political violence.⁷⁴ The DRC even saw violence against election monitors leading up to the 2023 election. This was most present in the province of North Kivu, which was also the province identified as the most vulnerable to issues in the election.⁷⁵

Colombia is also a valuable case study, showing how election monitoring remains important even after major peace agreements have been signed. In 2016, the peace agreement between Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was heralded as the end of a decades-long conflict. The agreement did significantly reduce violence, but security remained a challenge. Splinter groups continue to operate in rural regions, operating similar to the FARC on a smaller scale.⁷⁶ These ongoing security concerns remained evident during Colombia's 2026 presidential election, particularly in conflict-affected regions where armed groups continue to threaten local communities and restrict political activity.⁷⁷ Rather than focusing solely on election day, observer missions monitored whether candidates were able to campaign safely, voters could participate without intimidation, and election officials could operate freely across the country.⁷⁸ They also had to consider whether political participation was equally accessible in regions facing different levels of security risk. Although the election was successfully conducted nationwide, conditions varied considerably between regions, demonstrating that a national election can still face localized threats to democratic participation even after a major peace agreement. Colombia shows that a peace agreement can reduce large-scale conflict without immediately removing every threat to

political participation.

TECHNOLOGY, DISINFORMATION, AND ELECTION INTEGRITY

As elections become increasingly connected to digital technology, disinformation has become a major challenge to election monitoring efforts. Traditional forms of election interference often involve ballot fraud or voter intimidation at polling stations. In contrast, modern disinformation campaigns attempt to influence elections by spreading false or misleading information about candidates or parties online.⁷⁹ Online disinformation can influence how voters understand candidates, election procedures, and results. It can also weaken trust in democratic institutions. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) defines disinformation as false information that is intentionally created and spread to influence public opinion or cause harm.⁸⁰ In post-conflict countries, citizens may already have low trust in government institutions due to years of violence or instability. False information can be especially damaging because it can increase political divisions and make citizens less likely to accept election outcomes.

As a result, election monitoring organizations today must evaluate whether ballots are counted correctly and whether voters are receiving accurate information. Organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union's Election Observation Missions (EOMs), the OSCE, and the NDI have expanded their observation methods. These include media monitoring, analysis of online platforms, and tracking of disinformation campaigns alongside traditional election observation. These efforts do not simply try to remove false information. Observers also track where false claims appear, who is spreading them, and whether the claims could affect political participation. For example, the OSCE includes social media and online campaigning in its election observations. The NDI also provides guidance for civil society groups on how to monitor social media during elections. This monitoring has helped observers identify patterns of manipulation, but it has not eliminated the problem. In Iraq's 2021 parliamentary election, the EU Election Observation Mission reported widespread disinformation and manipulative online campaigns.⁸¹ The UN later supported Iraq's election commission in developing strategies to identify and respond to both misinformation and disinformation. This suggests that digital



Real-time election results outside the Election Commission of India's office in New Delhi

Credit: Election Commission of India

monitoring can help election officials recognize threats earlier, but it cannot guarantee that false information will stop spreading.

The growth of artificial intelligence (AI) has made these challenges more complex. AI allows false information to be created quickly and at a much larger scale. AI tools can now produce realistic images, videos, and audio recordings, often called “deepfakes,” that falsely show political candidates saying or doing things that never happened.⁸² These technologies create new difficulties for election observers because determining whether digital content is authentic requires advanced technical skills and resources. Observers must also work quickly. A false video can reach thousands of people before fact-checkers or election officials have time to verify it. In 2024 and 2025, several technology companies made voluntary commitments to reduce the impact of AI-generated disinformation during elections, including improving detection systems, labeling AI-generated content, and increasing cooperation with researchers and election officials.⁸³ However, assessments by the Brennan Center for Justice found that these commitments varied in effectiveness, with some companies failing to provide enough transparency about how they enforce their policies.⁸⁴ The problem is therefore not only whether AI-generated content can be detected. It is also whether platforms act quickly enough once it is identified. Election observers must increasingly evaluate both the content itself and the systems that determine how widely that content spreads. This demonstrates that while technology companies play an important role in protecting elections, relying only on private companies may not be enough to guarantee electoral integrity.


The impact of AI-generated disinformation has become a major concern for countries preparing for elections, including countries with recent histories of political instability. Brazil’s 2026 election has been described as its first major “AI election.”⁸⁵ Brazilian election authorities have introduced new rules requiring greater

transparency around AI-generated political material and have expanded efforts to identify misleading digital content before it spreads widely.⁸⁶ Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court requires political advertisements using AI-generated or altered content to clearly disclose that the material was created or manipulated with AI.⁸⁷ The debate is no longer theoretical. In July 2026, an AI-generated avatar of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro – then under house arrest – appeared in a campaign video supporting his son Flavio Bolsonaro. The video was transparent about its use of AI, but political opponents argued that the content could still violate electoral restrictions. Even when AI-generated content is labeled, observers must determine whether its use is still misleading or violates election rules. Observers must increasingly examine online spaces in addition to traditional campaign events, polling stations, and vote counting procedures.⁸⁸

International organizations and governments are trying to reduce election-related misinformation online. For example, the EU’s Digital Services Act requires large online platforms to address risks such as illegal content and disinformation during elections. However, enforcing these rules can be difficult because online platforms operate across different countries.⁸⁹ Election observers are also expanding their work to monitor social media and misinformation, since false claims about elections can reduce public trust even when an election is fair.⁹⁰

CASE STUDY: 2026 ARMENIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION

In September 2023, Azerbaijan mounted an offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh that put an end to a decades-long conflict. The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was established by the Soviet Union in 1923. In 1988, the oblast intended to join the Republic of Armenia. This ultimately led to conflict as the oblast’s official location lay within Azerbaijani borders.⁹¹ Azerbaijan’s September 19, 2023, attack was



Joint declaration signed during a meeting between the presidents of Azerbaijan and the United States and the prime minister of Armenia in 2025.

Credit: Press Service of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

massive. Leadership in Nagorno-Karabakh surrendered within 24 hours, ceding the de facto independence they had held for 30 years.⁹² While there are still remnants of this conflict being dealt with, the Republic of Armenia has completed its first election since the official end of the conflict.

Armenia's June 7, 2026, parliamentary elections are the state's first national elections since 2017. This election decided the make-up of the National Assembly and the next Prime Minister and their cabinet.⁹³ The incumbent, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, kept control of the country. His party, Civil Contract, was able to do this with 49.8 percent of the vote.⁹⁴ Pashinyan's campaign focused on finalizing a peace deal with Azerbaijan, after reaching a preliminary agreement in 2025. Russian-backed opposition parties claimed that these peace discussions betrayed the Armenian people and the country should instead look to Moscow for allyship. The most notable opposition party was Strong Armenia, led by Samvel Karapetyan. This pro-Russia bloc followed Civil Contract with 23.3 percent of the vote. Although Karapetyan led the bloc, he holds Russian and Cypriot citizenship and is thus unable to represent it in parliament.

Instead, his nephew, Narek, was the official candidate.⁹⁵

Before the election, Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted concerns about intense polarization, campaign financing, possible vote-buying, and a lack of strong accountability systems.⁹⁶ Polarization is a major concern in Armenia. As faith in the reformist strategies of Civil Contract dwindles, young Armenians struggle to find new parties to identify with. Civil Contract heightens this polarization by framing this election under the question of war vs. peace.⁹⁷ HRW also mentions that Armenia has made recent strides to improve human rights surrounding elections.⁹⁸ However, the HRW still documents their observations as a record of Armenians' right to political expression. These pre-election reports are useful to flag issues that monitors should pay attention to on election day. In some cases, they also identify problems that can be prevented.

On election day, multiple groups deployed observers. The OSCE sent around 100 observers from its Parliamentary Assembly (PA) election monitoring team. They were stationed at polling locations across the country to review vote

counting, procedures, and the general voting environment. The ODIHR and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) also deployed election monitors in collaboration with the OSCE PA.⁹⁹ The day after the election, the OSCE PA published their initial report on the election. Many of the identified problems matched the concerns noted by HRW before the election.¹⁰⁰

A unique observation by the OSCE PA was the use of AI-generated content to spread disinformation about political opponents.¹⁰¹ For example, a video was made of a Euronews report stating that Pashinyan had “aggressive cancer.” This was done by recreating the voice of a real Euronews anchor using AI software.¹⁰² The stated purpose of these fake videos was to support the opposition candidate, Karapetyan. However, the majority simply attacked Pashinyan.¹⁰³

As election monitoring reports have continued to come in, there have been accusations of interference on both sides. During the election, law enforcement carried out arrests against opposition figures on the basis of financial crimes and vote bribery. Karapetyan was under house arrest for most of his campaign for financial crimes and threats to overthrow the government. Opposition parties have criticized Pashinyan, arguing that he abused his power over the Armenian authorities to stifle dissent.¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, European Parliament observers also noted Russian interference in the election. In the lead up to the election, Russia used trade measures and threats in an attempt to impact the results. This level of foreign interference was condemned by the European Parliament on the grounds of sovereignty.¹⁰⁵

Election reports show that different groups took actions that made the election less fair. While election monitoring could not prevent these problems, it helped identify what needs to improve in future elections. This is especially important in post-conflict countries like Armenia, where elections can be affected by the lasting effects of conflict. In Armenia, peace talks with

Azerbaijan were a major and divisive issue, contributing to political polarization. Election monitoring can help identify how these tensions affect elections and what can be done to make future elections fairer.¹⁰⁶

Bloc Analysis

POINTS OF DIVISION

Countries disagree about how involved international organizations should be in elections after conflict. Some believe organizations should stay heavily involved to protect fair elections and prevent new conflict. Others believe countries should eventually manage their own elections independently. A third view centers on national sovereignty, arguing that international organizations should only get involved when the host government agrees. These different views lead to different solutions in committee. Countries such as Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Sweden tend to prioritize international peacebuilding and democratic accountability, favoring continued election observation and international cooperation to protect electoral legitimacy. Countries such as Liberia, Ghana, Kenya, and Sierra Leone tend to emphasize strengthening domestic election commissions and building the capacity to manage future elections independently. Countries such as Belarus, Russia, China, and Venezuela place greater importance on sovereignty and non-interference, supporting international election monitoring only when it has been approved by the national government.¹⁰⁷

STATES PRIORITIZING INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

This bloc believes international organizations should stay involved in elections after conflict to help protect peace and democracy. They argue that elections alone cannot create a

stable democracy since people must also trust the process and its results. Because post-conflict countries often have weak institutions, political divisions, and limited resources, these states support continued involvement from organizations such as the UN, OSCE, and EU until local institutions are strong enough to manage fair elections on their own.¹⁰⁸ They believe international organizations can provide expertise and resources that newly rebuilt governments may not have, and that international involvement can offer an outside source of credibility when political parties or citizens do not trust domestic institutions.

Rather than limiting involvement to election day, they believe observer missions should monitor every stage of the electoral process while helping governments strengthen democratic institutions over time, including voter registration, election administration, political participation, media monitoring, and the development of stronger electoral institutions. The goal is not just to observe whether an election is conducted properly, but to help create conditions where future elections can be managed independently.

Canada reflects these priorities through its continued support for election observation and democratic assistance abroad. In 2026, the Canadian government announced plans to send election observers to Armenia as the country prepared for parliamentary elections while continuing democratic reforms after years of political instability.¹⁰⁹ Canadian officials argued that independent observers could strengthen confidence in the electoral process and help discourage disputes over the election results.

STATES PRIORITIZING NATIONAL CAPACITY-BUILDING AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Countries in this bloc believe that strong national institutions are the foundation of both successful elections and lasting democracy. They support international election monitoring and assistance, including training, funding, and technical support,

but believe its main purpose should be to help countries build their own independent election commissions, trained election officials, and strong legal systems. As these institutions become stronger, they favor gradually reducing international involvement, arguing in committee that international organizations should build local capacity rather than replace national governments.

Liberia demonstrates this approach. As discussed above, UNMIL's institution-building work with Liberia's National Elections Commission gradually shifted international involvement away from direct election administration and toward strengthening the country's own capacity. By the time Liberia conducted its 2023 general elections, national authorities were able to administer them without a UN peacekeeping mission for the first time since UNMIL ended in 2018.¹¹⁰ Rather than relying on permanent international oversight, Liberia's experience demonstrated how institution-building can allow countries to manage credible elections on their own.

STATES PRIORITIZING SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERFERENCE

Countries in this bloc believe that elections should remain under national control. While they may accept international observers or technical support, they believe this should only happen with the government's permission, arguing that each country should have the final say over how its elections are run and monitored, in line with the UN principle of non-interference in domestic affairs.¹¹¹ Their main concern is protecting national sovereignty and preventing outside organizations from interfering in domestic affairs, which sets their position apart from blocs that support a stronger international role in monitoring elections and protecting electoral legitimacy.

Belarus demonstrates how this perspective can shape a country's approach to election monitoring. Before the 2025 presidential election, the OSCE announced that it would not

*US Ambassador to Ghana
observing Ghana's 2024 general
election*

Credit: U.S. Embassy Ghana



deploy an election observation mission because Belarus did not issue an invitation within the required timeframe. While the OSCE argues that this prevented it from conducting a credible assessment of the election, Belarus maintained that decisions regarding international observation remained a matter of national authority.¹¹² This example shows the main concern of this bloc. Scholars have noted that debates over election monitoring often reflect competing interpretations of sovereignty, with some governments viewing external observations as democratic cooperation and others seeing it as a challenge to national independence.¹¹³

These countries are likely to support proposals that protect government control over election monitoring and limit international involvement to assistance requested by the host country, while opposing proposals that would allow international organizations to enter or monitor elections without government approval. Instead, they favor voluntary technical assistance and observer missions invited by national governments, arguing in committee that international organizations should support governments when asked rather than control how elections are run.

Committee Mission

The mission of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL) is to address political and international issues that affect peace, stability, and self-determination.¹¹⁴ This makes SPECPOL well suited to discuss elections in post-conflict countries. Elections can help countries rebuild legitimate governments after conflict, but weak political institutions can make this process difficult. SPECPOL can examine how the international community can support credible elections while respecting the right of each country to manage its own political system.

In the context of SPECPOL, international election monitoring raises questions of authority and timing: how much authority observers should have, when monitoring should begin, and how assistance can protect election integrity without interfering in national sovereignty. These questions are especially important in post-conflict countries, where international support may be needed but long-term outside control can weaken domestic institutions.

SPECPOL cannot run elections or permanently take over a country's election system.¹¹⁵ Instead, it can recommend international frameworks, encourage cooperation between observers and host governments, support election-monitoring standards, and promote capacity-building programs that help national institutions manage elections themselves. The goal is not for international organizations to replace domestic governments, but to help post-conflict countries build the institutions and skills to hold credible elections independently, so that international assistance becomes a foundation for long-term democratic stability rather than a source of lasting dependence.

TOPIC B

SPECPOL | NHSMUN 2027

Political Instability in Peru



Introduction

Over the past two decades, Peru has experienced one of the longest periods of political instability in Latin America. Since the early 2000s, the country has seen repeated presidential impeachments, resignations, corruption investigations, constitutional disputes, and frequent confrontations between the executive and legislative branches.

While Peru has maintained regular democratic elections, the country's political institutions have struggled to provide stable and effective governance. As public trust in government has declined, political polarization has increased, making it more difficult for elected leaders to build consensus or respond to the country's most pressing challenges.¹¹⁶

Peru's political crisis extends beyond disagreements between individual presidents and Congress. Many experts and organizations argue that the country's instability is driven by several problems. These issues include constitutional weaknesses, widespread corruption, weak political parties, regional inequality, and declining confidence in democratic institutions.¹¹⁷ These challenges have contributed to repeated changes in national leadership while limiting the government's ability to implement long-term policies. At the same time, public frustration has fueled protests, increased support for non-democratic candidates, and intensified debates over reform and democratic governance.¹¹⁸

The effects of Peru's political instability extend far beyond politics. Years of uncertainty have reduced investment, weakened public institutions, made it harder to fight organized crime, and limited the government's ability to provide reliable public services. Frequent changes in leadership have also made it difficult to carry out long-term reforms. New governments often replace or delay the policies of their predecessors before they can produce lasting results. As public trust has fallen, many Peruvians have become increasingly frustrated with both the government and the political system. International organizations have warned that without meaningful reforms, Peru could continue to experience repeated political crises and growing instability. Although countries may disagree on which reforms should

come first, many share the goal of strengthening institutions, improving government accountability, and rebuilding public confidence. These common goals shape the discussion, even as different countries support different approaches for achieving them.¹¹⁹

History and Description of the Issue

PERU'S 1993 CONSTITUTION AND THE FUJIMORI LEGACY

Alberto Fujimori was an unlikely presidential candidate when he entered Peru's 1990 election. He was an agronomist, a plant and soil scientist, and also worked as a university administrator. Fujimori was born in Lima in 1938 to Japanese immigrant parents.¹²⁰ Before entering politics, Fujimori had never held elected office. He founded the political movement Cambio 90 only months before the 1990 election. His victory reflected Peru's deep political crisis rather than the strength of an established political party.

Peru faced political chaos in the years leading up to this election. Throughout the 1980s, Peru faced hyperinflation, severe economic decline, and a brutal internal armed conflict driven primarily by the Shining Path insurgency. The Shining Path is a Maoist guerrilla movement



A man waving the Peruvian flag at a protest.

Credit: Giancarlo Granza

seeking to violently overthrow the Peruvian government.¹²¹ From 1980 to 1992, the conflict between Shining Path and the Peruvian state left over 70,000 people dead, with human rights investigations later documenting abuses on both sides.¹²² The bombings, assassinations, and terrorist attacks left much of the country insecure.¹²³

This chaos fueled Fujimori's campaign. As an outsider to politics, Fujimori stood out from his opponents and appealed to audiences who distrusted the government. Additionally, his promises to reduce unemployment and suffering through conservative policies, combined with his aggressive anti-guerrilla message, made voters believe in him.

Shortly after taking office, Fujimori introduced emergency economic reforms known as the "Fujishock." This sharply reduced government spending, removed many price controls, and stabilized inflation. However, these changes also caused a sudden rise in the cost of living for many Peruvians.¹²⁴ At the same time, Fujimori increasingly clashed with Peru's bicameral Congress. He argued that lawmakers were

blocking the emergency economic and security measures needed to restore stability.¹²⁵

On April 5, 1992, Fujimori carried out what became known as the *autogolpe*, or "self-coup." Backed by the military, he dissolved Congress, suspended parts of the Constitution, intervened in the judiciary, and ruled by decree. He claimed these extraordinary measures were necessary to defeat terrorism and corruption.¹²⁶ In the aftermath, a Fujimori-aligned Constituent Congress drafted an entirely new constitution, ratified by a narrow referendum margin in October 1993.

The new Constitution fundamentally changed how Peru's government operated, particularly the relationship between Congress and the presidency. Under the previous system, legislation had to pass through two chambers: Chamber of Deputies and the Senate before becoming law. In the past, a bicameral congress allowed both chambers to review and amend legislation approved by the other. The new Constitution eliminated the Senate, meaning legislation only needed approval from a single chamber.¹²⁷ The president can issue emergency

decrees that suspend core civil rights and can manage almost all foreign and defense policy alone.¹²⁸ As a result, many of the institutional checks that limit both Congress and the presidency have become significantly weaker.

Coalitions within Peru's unicameral Congress have repeatedly disagreed over whether the 1993 Constitution should be reformed or replaced. Some political parties have proposed restoring the Senate to recreate a bicameral legislature. Others have advocated for drafting an entirely new constitution through a constituent assembly.¹²⁹ Despite growing public debate as political disagreements became more common during the 2000s and 2010s, these efforts have repeatedly stalled. No political coalition has secured the supermajority required to amend the Constitution, leaving many of the institutional features established in 1993 unchanged.¹³⁰

Although the 1993 Constitution has remained in force for more than three decades, debate over its legacy continues today. Supporters argue that it helped stabilize Peru after years of economic crisis and political violence. They say it strengthened the executive branch and spurred economic growth through market-oriented reforms. Critics, however, contend that the Constitution concentrated too much power in the presidency while weakening many of the safeguards that protect democratic governance.¹³¹ They argue that these structural changes made it easier for conflicts between Congress and the president to escalate into constitutional crises, rather than being resolved through negotiation and compromise. This political structure has been identified as one

of the main reasons for the many corruption scandals in almost every Peruvian administration since the 1990s.¹³² Weak oversight mechanisms and concentrated power allowed corrupt acts to go unchecked for years before being exposed. Peru's democratic institutions are fragile in the face of repeated political confrontation.¹³³

PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY, CONGRESSIONAL DISSOLUTION, AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN PERU

Constitutional Articles 113 and 134 are key to understanding the presidential crises Peru has experienced since 2018. Article 113, known as *Vacancia Presidencial* (Presidential Vacancy), lists the reasons why the presidency may be declared vacant: death, physical incapacity, permanent moral incapacity, resignation, unauthorized departure from national territory, or impeachment.¹³⁴

The “moral incapacity” clause in Article 113 is the vaguest of these grounds. It requires no criminal conviction and no judicial process, only a congressional declaration.¹³⁵ Article 117 works differently. It covers impeachment, the criminal prosecution of a sitting president. Article 117 allows prosecuting a president only for a short, specific list of offenses: treason, obstructing elections, or unlawfully dissolving Congress.¹³⁶ Because Article 113's path is so much easier to use, Congress has increasingly relied on “moral incapacity” to remove presidents it opposes, even when no crime has been charged.¹³⁷

Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, president from 2016 to

The “moral incapacity” clause in Article 113 is the vaguest of these grounds. It requires no criminal conviction and no judicial process, only a congressional declaration.

2018, resigned in March 2018 before a near-certain vacancy vote. This happened amid allegations concerning his relationship with the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht.¹³⁸ Martín Vizcarra, president from 2018 to 2020, was removed in November 2020 after Congress declared him unable to govern based on corruption allegations. These were allegedly tied to contracts awarded while he served as governor of the Moquegua region.¹³⁹ Although he denied the accusations and had not been convicted of a crime, Congress voted to remove him. This triggered Peru's largest street protests in nearly two decades.¹⁴⁰ Pedro Castillo, president from 2021 to 2022, was removed in December 2022 after attempting a self-coup. The military, police, and much of his cabinet refused to support the announcement. Congress immediately voted to remove him for moral incapacity, and he was arrested later that day while attempting to leave Lima.¹⁴¹ After Castillo's removal, Vice President Dina Boluarte assumed the position of president. However, she too was removed under the moral incapacity clause in 2025.¹⁴²

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has held that a government may only restrict the right to hold elected office through clear legal procedures that involve review by a competent court. In *Lopez Mendoza v. Venezuela*, the Court found that stripping an elected official of his political rights without judicial review violated the American Convention on Human Rights.¹⁴³ Peruvian legal scholars have invoked this same standard when criticizing the vague "moral incapacity" clause.

Constitutional scholars, judges, and members of Congress have disagreed for years over what "moral incapacity" actually means.¹⁴⁴ Some say it should apply only when a president is truly unable to govern due to a physical or mental condition. Others believe Congress can interpret it more broadly. In this view, Congress can remove a president on political grounds, as long as enough legislators agree.

Peru's unicameral Congress makes this process even faster. There is no Senate, or second chamber, to review or slow down a motion. A congressional majority can move from initiating proceedings against a president to voting for removal.¹⁴⁵

Article 134 works very differently, and it is much harder to use than Article 113. Under Article 134, called "Congressional Dissolution," the president can dissolve Congress, but only if two separate Cabinets have already lost Congress's confidence.¹⁴⁶ This can happen in two ways. Congress can vote to censure a Cabinet on its own, or the government can ask Congress for a formal vote of confidence, which Congress can then reject. Either one counts as a loss of confidence. If this happens to two different Cabinets, the president can dissolve Congress and call new elections. Those elections must happen within four months of the dissolution.

There are limits on this power. Congress cannot be dissolved during the final year of its term. Even after a dissolution, a small standing body called the Permanent Commission keeps functioning, and it cannot be dissolved along with the rest of Congress.¹⁴⁷

Peru's Constitution lets a president attach a policy proposal to a "vote of confidence" in the Cabinet, using the path described. In September 2019, President Martín Vizcarra used exactly this tool. He tied a package of anti-corruption reforms to a vote of confidence in his Cabinet.¹⁴⁸ This was not the first loss of confidence his government had faced: an earlier one had already happened in 2017. Legal scholars point to both episodes together as the constitutional basis for what followed.¹⁴⁹

Congress never directly voted on Vizcarra's 2019 reforms. Instead, it moved ahead with appointing new judges to the Constitutional Tribunal without addressing his request.¹⁵⁰ Vizcarra treated this inaction as a second denial of confidence and invoked Article 134 to dissolve Congress. This action was described as controversial. Congress

had never formally voted against the Cabinet, and Vizcarra himself decided that ignoring the vote counted as a denial. Whether that interpretation was constitutionally legitimate is still disputed.¹⁵¹

Opposing lawmakers immediately said Vizcarra's decision broke the Constitution. They tried to remove him from office by naming Vice President Mercedes Araoz as a temporary president instead.¹⁵² But the armed forces continued to recognize Vizcarra as the legitimate president, and Araoz resigned the next day. Peru's Constitutional Tribunal later ruled that the dissolution had been constitutional.¹⁵³ Even so, the ruling did not protect Vizcarra for long. About a year later, Congress removed him from office anyway, this time under the much easier moral incapacity standard.¹⁵⁴

Articles 113 and 134 show a major asymmetry in Peru's Constitution. The permanent moral incapacity clause needs only a supermajority vote, and it does not define what counts as a "moral" failing. Because the standard is so vague, it is easy to overuse. Congress has repeatedly used it to remove presidents, making it the most common tool for ending a presidency early.¹⁵⁵

Article 134 works the opposite way. It requires two formal cabinet confidence denials before a president can use it, so it has only worked once. And even when a president uses it successfully, as Vizcarra did, dissolution does not prevent Congress from later pursuing other constitutional or legal measures against the president. But a president cannot dissolve Congress nearly as easily. Thus, this asymmetry has become a central issue in debates over constitutional

reform, including proposals to restore a bicameral legislature and make the grounds for presidential vacancy more specific.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FAULT LINES: THE LIMA-PROVINCES DIVIDE

From 2006 to 2025, Peru's economy grew to nearly four times its former size.¹⁵⁶ Nonetheless, this growth has not benefited everyone equally. Lima, the country's capital, is the center of Peru's government, economy, and many public services. Most government offices, businesses, universities, and major investments are located there. In contrast, many rural provinces, especially in the southern Andes and Amazon regions, continue to face higher poverty rates, weaker roads and transportation, lower-quality schools and hospitals, and fewer job opportunities.¹⁵⁷ Because of these differences, many Peruvians living outside Lima believe that the national government focuses too much on the capital, while ignoring the needs of the rest of the country. Over time, this has created frustration with both the government and Peru's political system.

These differences are especially important because many rural provinces are home to large Indigenous communities, such as the Quechua and Aymara populations.¹⁵⁸ For many years, local leaders have argued that these communities have not received the same level of public investment as Lima and other coastal cities. Reports from the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank show that many rural regions still have lower incomes, poorer

Many rural regions still have lower incomes, poorer infrastructure, and less access to healthcare, education, and other public services.

infrastructure, and less access to healthcare, education, and other public services.¹⁵⁹ Because of this, many people believe that politicians in Lima are disconnected from the problems facing the rest of the country. This has influenced elections, as voters in Lima and voters in the provinces often support very different candidates and political parties.¹⁶⁰

The divide between Lima and the provinces can also be seen in Peru's mining industry. Peru is one of the world's largest producers of copper, gold, and several other minerals. As a result, mining is one of the country's most important industries.¹⁶¹ Many of the largest mines are located in rural regions, where Indigenous communities have lived for generations. While mining has brought billions of dollars to Peru's economy, many local communities argue that they have received very little in return. Instead, they see pollution, damage to farmland, pressure on local water supplies, and a lack of investment in nearby towns.¹⁶² As a result, many communities have demanded that more mining revenue be invested locally instead of being controlled by the national government.¹⁶³

These concerns have led to protests, strikes, and demonstrations across southern Peru for many years, as regional organizations and strike committees have developed a deep distrust of the government in Lima.¹⁶⁴ Many residents believe that national leaders make important decisions without listening to the communities most affected by them. Long-term economic and regional inequalities have weakened public trust in government while contributing to greater political division.¹⁶⁵ As a result, some voters have become more willing to support anti-establishment leaders who promise major changes, even if those changes challenge democratic systems.

The connection between regional inequality and political instability has become more important in recent years, especially in rural areas, where many people feel that governments in Lima have ignored their needs for years.¹⁶⁶ This growing gap between citizens and the government has


weakened trust in democracy, made it harder for political leaders to work together, and increased support for candidates who present themselves as outsiders to the political system. Although Peru continues to hold regular democratic elections, many voters remain frustrated. They feel their communities face the same economic and social problems, no matter which party is in power.¹⁶⁷

FUJIMORISMO, POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION, AND THE ROAD TO PEDRO CASTILLO (2011–2021)

Following Alberto Fujimori's resignation in 2000, Peru returned to democratic rule. However, many of the political divisions created during his presidency remained.¹⁶⁸ One of the most influential forces in Peruvian politics became Fujimorismo, a political movement based on the ideas and legacy of Alberto Fujimori.¹⁶⁹ Supporters of Fujimorismo argue that his government restored economic stability and defeated the Shining Path insurgency. However, critics believe his presidency weakened democratic institutions and concentrated too much power in the executive.¹⁷⁰

Alberto Fujimori's daughter, Keiko Fujimori, became the leader of the movement and ran for president three times between 2011 and 2021.¹⁷¹ Although she never won the presidency in those elections, Fujimorista parties remained highly influential in Congress and often controlled one of its largest voting blocs. According to political analysts, the continued rivalry between Fujimorista parties and their opponents contributed to increasing political polarization, weakened cooperation between the executive and legislative branches, and reinforced many of the institutional divisions created during the 1990s.¹⁷²

At the same time, Peru's party system became increasingly fragmented. New political parties frequently appeared during elections, while many older parties struggled to maintain public support.¹⁷³ As trust in political institutions



A poster that reads "4 presidents in 5 years and none was Keiko, and she will never be."

Credit: correliebre

declined, voters became more willing to support outsider candidates who promised to challenge the political establishment. According to Transparency International, confidence in political parties fell to some of the lowest levels in Latin America during the 2011-2021 period.¹⁷⁴

Public frustration also increased because of a series of corruption scandals involving government officials. Consider the Odebrecht investigation, which was part of the large corruption scandal that spread across Latin America. It revealed that several former Peruvian presidents and political leaders had allegedly accepted illegal campaign donations or bribes in exchange for public contracts.¹⁷⁵ Former President Alejandro Toledo was later convicted of accepting millions of dollars in bribes connected to Odebrecht, making him one of several former Peruvian presidents implicated in corruption investigations over the past two decades.¹⁷⁶ The Odebrecht scandal originated in Brazil, as the large construction company admitted to paying bribes across Latin America to secure contracts in different regions, including in Peru.¹⁷⁷ As investigations expanded, corruption charges affected leaders from multiple political parties.

This reinforced the belief among many Peruvians that corruption was a systemic problem rather than the actions of a single government.

The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) has argued that repeated conflicts between Congress, political elites, and anti-corruption prosecutors weakened Peru's democratic institutions.¹⁷⁸ Additionally, concerns about political interference in the judiciary made it more difficult for citizens to trust public institutions. More recently, human rights organizations have warned that continued efforts to weaken judicial independence risk further reducing public confidence in Peru's legal system and democratic institutions.¹⁷⁹

This political environment created the conditions for the closely contested 2021 presidential election. Pedro Castillo, a rural schoolteacher and union leader with little national political experience, campaigned as an anti-establishment candidate. He promised to represent Peru's rural provinces and reduce the influence of Lima's political elite. His message appealed to many voters who believed that the country's political system no longer represented ordinary Peruvians,

particularly those living outside the capital.¹⁸⁰ Castillo narrowly defeated Keiko Fujimori in the runoff election. However, he entered office facing an opposition-controlled Congress, political divisions, and historically low levels of public trust in government institutions. These challenges, combined with Peru's fragmented party system and continuing tensions between the executive and legislative branches, contributed to further democratic backsliding after the 2021 election.¹⁸¹ By the time Castillo assumed office, Peru's constitutional weaknesses, regional inequalities, and fragmented political landscape had combined to create one of the most unstable political environments in South America. This ultimately set the stage for the constitutional crisis.

International organizations have observed that repeated conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, combined with declining confidence in representative institutions, have made effective governing more challenging. By 2021, many Peruvians believed that meaningful political change required more than replacing individual leaders.¹⁸² Broader institutional reforms, they argued, were necessary to restore public confidence and strengthen the relationship between citizens and the state.¹⁸³ These conditions ultimately shaped the political environment that Pedro Castillo inherited upon taking office and helped explain why Peru's constitutional crisis continued to deepen after his election.¹⁸⁴

Current Status

THE RISE OF DINA BOLUARTE AND THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENTS OF 2025–2026

Peru's constitutional crisis entered a new phase on December 7, 2022, when President Pedro Castillo attempted to dissolve Congress before lawmakers could vote on his impeachment. In a televised address, Castillo announced that he

would temporarily close Congress, establish an emergency government, and rule by decree until new legislative elections could be organized.¹⁸⁵ He also proposed reorganizing the judiciary and imposing a nationwide curfew.¹⁸⁶ Many Peruvians compared these actions to Alberto Fujimori's 1992 self-coup because both presidents attempted to bypass Congress and concentrate power in the executive branch.¹⁸⁷ Unlike Fujimori, however, Castillo received little support from Peru's military, cabinet, or other state institutions. Within hours, several ministers resigned, the Constitutional Court declared his actions unconstitutional, and Congress voted to remove him from office for "permanent moral incapacity." Castillo was arrested shortly afterward while attempting to leave Lima.¹⁸⁸

Following Castillo's removal, Vice President Dina Boluarte was sworn in as Peru's first female president. Under the 1993 Constitution, the vice president automatically assumes the presidency if the office becomes vacant.¹⁸⁹ During her first address to the nation, Boluarte called for political unity and asked Congress to work with her government to restore stability. However, many Peruvians questioned her legitimacy because she had campaigned alongside Castillo in 2021 but remained in office after supporting his removal.¹⁹⁰ Public dissatisfaction was especially strong in Peru's southern Andean provinces, where Castillo had received much of his electoral support. Protesters demanded Boluarte's resignation, the closure of Congress, and early general elections.¹⁹¹

Although Boluarte entered office promising stability, her administration soon faced many of the same institutional problems that affected previous presidents. Congress remained divided among dozens of political parties and independent blocs, making it difficult to pass major legislation or build lasting governing coalitions.¹⁹² Several proposals to hold early elections or begin constitutional reform failed because lawmakers could not reach the level of agreement required under Peru's Constitution.¹⁹³ Political scientists argued that these repeated

deadlocks reflected long-standing structural institutional weaknesses rather than the actions of a single president.¹⁹⁴ The constitutional system created in 1993 continued to encourage confrontation between the executive and legislative branches instead of compromise.

Boluarte also faced growing criticism over allegations of corruption and misconduct. Investigations involving undeclared luxury watches, questions about government transparency, and other political controversies damaged her public image throughout 2024 and 2025.¹⁹⁵ At the same time, her approval ratings fell to some of the lowest recorded for a Peruvian president since the country's return to democracy.¹⁹⁶ Her declining popularity made it increasingly difficult for the government to negotiate with Congress or respond effectively to Peru's economic and political challenges.

Political tensions reached another turning point in late 2025, when Boluarte was removed from office following renewed congressional action and continuing political scandals.¹⁹⁷ Her successor, Jose Jeri, assumed the presidency on an interim basis but struggled to restore confidence in Peru's political institutions. Continuing disagreements within Congress,

combined with low public trust and ongoing political uncertainty, prevented his administration from establishing long-term stability.¹⁹⁸ After Jeri's term ended, Jose Maria Balcasar became head of a caretaker government responsible for overseeing the country until the 2026 general elections. Rather than introducing major reforms, the caretaker administration focused on maintaining the operation of Peru's democratic institutions and preparing for a peaceful transfer of power.¹⁹⁹

Despite these leadership changes, many of the problems discussed remain unresolved. Peru continues to experience weak political parties, repeated confrontations between the executive and Congress, and low levels of public trust in government institutions.²⁰⁰ Lasting stability will likely require broader constitutional reforms, stronger democratic institutions, and greater public confidence in the political system. These ongoing challenges form the backdrop for Peru's 2026 general elections and continue to shape the country's political future.



Peruvians protesting political corruption look up at a poster of Pedro Castillo during the 2021 elections

Credit: Gatodemichi

Protestors holding a sign that says “Dina Boluarte, Otarola murderers, resign now”

Credit: Ovruni



CIVIL UNREST, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND STATE RESPONSE

Pedro Castillo's removal from office on December 7, 2022, triggered some of the largest protests Peru had experienced in decades. Demonstrations began almost immediately in Lima but were strongest in the southern Andean regions where Castillo received the most votes.²⁰¹ Many protesters believed that Castillo's removal ignored the voices of rural and Indigenous voters who had strongly supported him during the 2021 election. Others demanded President Dina Boluarte's resignation, the dissolution of Congress, immediate elections, and the drafting of a new constitution to replace the 1993 Constitution.²⁰² While many demonstrations remained peaceful, some roads, airports, and government buildings were occupied or blocked, disrupting transportation and economic activity across the country.²⁰³

In response, the Peruvian government declared multiple states of emergency and deployed both the National Police and the Armed Forces to restore public order.²⁰⁴ During a state of emergency, certain constitutional rights,

including freedom of movement and freedom of assembly, may be temporarily restricted.²⁰⁵ Government officials argued that these measures were necessary to protect public safety and prevent further violence. However, many human rights organizations questioned whether the government's response was proportional to the threat posed by the demonstrations.²⁰⁶

Some of the most serious violence occurred in Ayacucho and Juliaca. There, security forces used lethal force during confrontations with protesters. According to reports from the United Nations, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the US Department of State, dozens of civilians were killed, and hundreds more were injured during the protests between late 2022 and early 2023.²⁰⁷ Many of those killed suffered gunshot wounds, while others died during confrontations between protesters and security forces. International observers also noted that many of the victims came from Indigenous and rural communities that had already experienced long histories of political and economic marginalization.²⁰⁸

Several international organizations concluded

that there were credible allegations of excessive use of force by Peruvian security forces. Human Rights Watch documented cases in which police and military personnel appeared to use lethal force against protesters who did not pose an immediate threat to life.²⁰⁹ Amnesty International similarly argued that authorities relied on unnecessary or excessive force in several locations and called for criminal investigations into senior government officials responsible for directing security operations.²¹⁰ The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights also expressed concern about reports of arbitrary detentions, excessive force, and restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly.²¹¹ Although Peruvian officials defended their actions as necessary to restore public order, the government's response received widespread international criticism.

The protests also exposed long-standing regional divisions. Many demonstrations were concentrated in southern provinces where support for Pedro Castillo had been strongest and where many communities have historically argued that Lima-based governments fail to represent their interests.²¹² The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights observed that these protests reflected not only immediate political disagreements but also decades of economic inequality, social exclusion, and limited government presence in many rural regions.²¹³ As a result, many analysts argued that the demonstrations represented broader frustrations with Peru's political system rather than support for any single political leader.²¹⁴

Questions of accountability have remained a major issue since the protests ended. Human rights organizations continue to call for independent investigations into deaths, injuries, and alleged abuses committed during security operations. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and EarthRights International have argued that accountability is essential for rebuilding public confidence in Peru's democratic institutions and preventing similar violations in the future.²¹⁵ The Office of the United Nations

High Commissioner for Human Rights has likewise encouraged Peru to strengthen judicial investigations, protect victims and witnesses, and ensure that security forces operate in accordance with international human rights standards.²¹⁶ While some investigations remain ongoing, many victims' families and civil society organizations argue that justice has progressed slowly, contributing to continued distrust of the government and the judicial system.²¹⁷

The government's response to the 2022–2023 protests has become one of the defining issues of Peru's current political crisis. As Peru continues to address the consequences of these events, the debate over security, accountability, and human rights stays closely connected to broader discussions about constitutional reform, democratic governance, and the future of Peru's political system.

THE 2026 GENERAL ELECTIONS AND POST-ELECTION INSTABILITY

Peru held the first round of its 2026 general elections in April during one of the most politically divided periods in the country's modern history. The election followed years of presidential removals, corruption investigations, nationwide protests, and declining public trust in government institutions.²¹⁸ Many Peruvians viewed the election as an opportunity to restore political stability. Others remained skeptical, arguing that changing presidents alone would not solve the constitutional and institutional problems that had contributed to repeated political crises since the 1990s.²¹⁹ As a result, the election took place in an atmosphere of uncertainty, with many voters expressing frustration toward both the executive branch and Congress.²²⁰

Political fragmentation remained one of the defining features of the election. Peru's electoral system continued to allow a large number of political parties to compete, many of which were organized around individual candidates instead of long-term political platforms.²²¹ This produced a crowded field of presidential candidates, making

it difficult for any one party to build broad national support. Analysts argued that Peru's party system had become so fragmented that forming stable governing coalitions after the election would be almost as challenging as winning the election itself.²²² International IDEA similarly noted that weak political parties and unstable governing alliances have become persistent obstacles to effective democratic governance in Peru.²²³

The campaign also reflected many of the same political divisions discussed throughout this background guide. Candidates disagreed over constitutional reform, the balance of power between the president and Congress, economic policy, and the government's response to the 2022–2023 protests.²²⁴ Some supported replacing the 1993 Constitution through a constituent assembly, while others argued that targeted reforms would provide greater stability without completely rewriting Peru's political system.²²⁵ Debates over corruption, judicial independence, public security, and regional inequality also remained central campaign issues, demonstrating that many of the problems that contributed to previous political crises had not been resolved.²²⁶

Following the first round of voting, the presidential race narrowed to a runoff between Keiko Fujimori and Roberto Sanchez.²²⁷ The outcome immediately renewed many of Peru's long-standing political divisions. Fujimori's supporters argued that her experience and political organization offered the best opportunity to restore stability after years of institutional crisis. Critics, however, remained concerned about the legacy of Fujimorismo and its association with executive power, constitutional centralization, and political polarization.²²⁸ Sanchez, meanwhile, campaigned on promises of institutional reform and democratic renewal. This attracted voters who believed Peru required significant political change rather than a return to established political movements.²²⁹

Fujimori won the June 7 runoff by fewer than 50,000 votes, one of the closest margins in Peru's recent electoral history. She was declared president-elect in early July following the official vote count. She was sworn in on July 28, 2026, becoming Peru's ninth president in a decade, as the country's restored bicameral Congress, its first since 1992, was seated the same day. Many observers view the return of the Senate as one of the most significant institutional reforms of

Keiko Fujimori gives a speech during the 2026 election

Credit: NotimexTV



the past three decades, restoring a structural check that the 1993 Constitution eliminated.²³⁰ However, analysts caution that these changes alone will not resolve the structural problems that have contributed to Peru's political instability for more than thirty years. Building effective cooperation between the executive branch and both chambers of Congress will remain essential if future political crises are to be avoided.²³¹

Beyond the institutions of government, President Fujimori also faces significant public expectations. Many Peruvians continue to demand stronger anti-corruption measures, greater accountability for the government's response to the 2022–2023 protests, improved public services, and meaningful economic opportunities outside Lima. If these concerns remain unresolved, demonstrations and political unrest could continue despite the new administration taking office.²³² For this reason, many international organizations argue that Peru's long-term stability will depend not only on institutional reforms such as the return to a bicameral legislature, but also on whether the new government can rebuild public trust and address the structural causes of political instability examined throughout this guide.²³³

Bloc Analysis

POINTS OF DIVISION

Although most nations agree that Peru must restore stability and strengthen its democratic institutions, they often disagree on how to achieve those goals. Some argue that Peru's political crisis is mainly the result of weaknesses in the country's constitutional framework, particularly the relationship between the president and Congress. Others believe that corruption, weak judicial independence, and limited government accountability are the greatest obstacles to democratic governance.²³⁴ A third perspective argues that lasting stability

cannot be achieved unless the government addresses long-standing regional inequalities, expands political participation, and rebuilds public trust among communities that have historically felt excluded from national decision-making.²³⁵

These different perspectives have shaped Peru's political debate over the past several years. For example, some political leaders have proposed constitutional reforms that would redefine the powers of the executive and legislative branches or modify the procedures for the removal of the president. Others have focused on strengthening anti-corruption institutions, protecting judicial independence, and improving government transparency in response to repeated corruption scandals involving senior public officials. At the same time, many civil society organizations have argued that institutional reforms alone will not restore stability unless they are accompanied by policies that improve public services, reduce regional inequalities, and strengthen communication between the government and local communities.²³⁶

These disagreements are not mutually exclusive. This means that countries may find that elements of multiple approaches are compatible with their foreign policy. However, because committee time is limited, delegates should identify which underlying cause of Peru's instability they believe deserves the greatest attention. Some delegations may think that stronger democratic institutions should come first, while others may prioritize accountability and the rule of law or emphasize rebuilding public confidence through more inclusive governance. Understanding these different priorities will help delegates identify potential partners during negotiations and develop solutions that address both the immediate political crisis and the long-term challenges facing Peru.²³⁷

CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Countries in this bloc believe that Peru's political instability is mainly the result of structural weaknesses within the country's constitutional system rather than the actions of any single political leader. Throughout Peru's recent history, repeated confrontations between presidents and Congress have often resulted in political turmoil. This has seen impeachment proceedings, presidential resignations, dissolutions of Congress, and periods of prolonged political deadlock. Members of this bloc argue that while corruption and social inequality remain important issues, these problems are worsened by constitutional rules that fail to clearly define the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. As a result, they believe that strengthening Peru's democratic institutions is the most effective way to create long-term political stability.²³⁸

Countries with strong constitutional systems, stable democratic institutions, and checks and balances on the government are likely to find common ground within this bloc. Many of these states place significant importance on an independent judiciary, clearly defined constitutional procedures, peaceful transfers of power, and institutions capable of resolving political disputes without creating constitutional crises.²³⁹ Countries that consistently score highly on international measures of democratic governance or the rule of law may also identify with this approach, as they often view strong institutions as the foundation for political stability and economic development.²⁴⁰

Rather than focusing primarily on replacing political leaders, this bloc emphasizes reforming the institutions that shape how governments operate. Delegates may support proposals to clarify the constitutional grounds for presidential impeachment, establish more effective mechanisms for resolving disputes between Congress and the executive, strengthen judicial review of constitutional conflicts, or reconsider

aspects of the 1993 Constitution that have contributed to repeated political crises.²⁴¹ Some delegates may also support reforms that improve legislative effectiveness, encourage greater cooperation between political parties, or restore institutional safeguards that increase accountability within the government. These proposals seek to reduce future political crises by improving the constitutional framework itself rather than addressing only the immediate consequences of instability.²⁴²

At the same time, delegates in this bloc generally recognize that constitutional reform must preserve democratic legitimacy. Major constitutional changes should respect the rule of law, protect civil liberties, and avoid concentrating excessive authority in any one branch of government. Members are therefore likely to support transparent reform processes that involve public participation, judicial oversight, and broad political consensus whenever possible. By strengthening Peru's constitutional institutions and strengthening the relationship between the executive and legislative branches, this bloc believes the country can reduce recurring political crises while creating a more stable and effective democratic system for the future.²⁴³

ANTI-CORRUPTION AND RULE OF LAW

Delegates who align with this bloc believe that corruption and weak rule of law are the main causes of Peru's political instability. They argue that many of the country's constitutional crises have become worse because public officials have not always been held accountable for corruption or abuse of power. The investigations involving several former Peruvian presidents, including those connected to the Odebrecht scandal, have reduced public confidence in government and strengthened the belief that stronger oversight is needed.²⁴⁴ As a result, this bloc views transparency, accountability, and an independent judiciary as the foundation for a stable democracy.²⁴⁵

Countries that consistently perform well on international corruption and rule of law rankings are most likely to support this approach. Many of these states have independent courts, professional anti-corruption agencies, transparent public procurement systems, and strong protections for judges and prosecutors. Delegates representing countries that have invested significant resources into reducing corruption may argue that stable institutions cannot exist unless public officials are subject to the same laws as every other citizen. Likewise, countries that have successfully improved government transparency or strengthened judicial independence may view these policies as examples that Peru could adapt to its own political system.²⁴⁶

Members of this bloc generally support reforms that make the government more transparent and easier to monitor. Delegates may propose giving greater independence to judges, prosecutors, and anti-corruption investigators so they can investigate public officials without political pressure. They may also support stronger financial disclosure requirements, improved auditing of government spending, open contracting procedures, and expanded public access to government information. Many delegates may argue that preventing corruption is more effective than responding to it after public funds have already been misused.²⁴⁷

This bloc also believes that protecting the rule of law means strengthening the institutions responsible for enforcing it. International organizations have recommended improving ethics standards for public officials, protecting

those who report corruption, increasing cooperation between oversight agencies, and ensuring that anti-corruption laws are enforced consistently regardless of a person's political position. Delegates may also encourage greater cooperation with international organizations that provide technical assistance, training, or monitoring related to corruption and judicial reform.²⁴⁸

While members of this bloc recognize that Peru also faces constitutional disputes and regional inequalities, they believe these problems cannot be solved unless citizens trust their public institutions. When courts are independent, investigations are fair, and government decisions are transparent, public confidence is more likely to increase. For this reason, delegates in this bloc argue that reducing corruption and strengthening the rule of law should be the priority in any long-term effort to restore Peru's political stability.²⁴⁹

INCLUSIVE GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC TRUST

Delegates who align with this bloc believe that Peru's political instability cannot be solved through constitutional reform or anti-corruption efforts alone. Instead, they argue that lasting stability depends on rebuilding public trust by ensuring that all Peruvians feel represented by their government. Throughout Peru's recent history, many rural provinces, Indigenous communities, and historically underserved regions have argued that national leaders in Lima have not responded to their needs.²⁵⁰ As a result, members of this bloc believe that strengthening

Delegates may also encourage greater cooperation with international organizations that provide technical assistance, training, or monitoring.

the relationship between citizens and the state should be a top priority.²⁵¹

This bloc is most likely to appeal to delegates representing countries that have invested in inclusive public services, citizen participation, and regional development. Many of these states have worked to reduce inequalities between urban and rural areas, improve access to healthcare and education, or increase opportunities for local governments to participate in national decision-making. Delegates from countries that emphasize social inclusion, equal political representation, or community engagement may find that their national policies closely align with the goals of this bloc.²⁵²

Members of this bloc support policies that make the government more responsive to the people it serves. Delegates may propose expanding opportunities for citizens to participate in public decision-making, improving communication between national and regional governments, and increasing investment in communities that have historically received fewer public resources. They may also encourage reforms that improve access to healthcare, education, transportation, and other essential public services, particularly in rural and Indigenous regions. Supporters argue that when citizens see tangible improvements in their daily lives, they are more likely to trust democratic institutions and participate peacefully in the political process.²⁵³

This bloc also recognizes that local and regional governments play an important role in rebuilding public confidence. International organizations have recommended strengthening cooperation between Peru's national, regional, and municipal governments so that public services are delivered more effectively across the country. Delegates may therefore support increasing the capacity of local governments, improving coordination between different levels of government, and giving regional authorities greater opportunities to contribute to national policymaking. These measures aim to ensure that government decisions better reflect the needs of communities

throughout Peru rather than focusing primarily on the capital.²⁵⁴

Although members of this bloc acknowledge the importance of constitutional reform and anti-corruption measures, they argue that democratic institutions cannot succeed without public confidence. Citizens are more likely to respect government decisions when they believe they are represented fairly and have equal access to public services and political participation.²⁵⁵ For this reason, delegates in this bloc believe that reducing regional inequalities, expanding citizen engagement, and strengthening trust between the government and the public are essential steps toward achieving long-term political stability in Peru.²⁵⁶

Committee Mission

The Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, also known as the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL), is responsible for addressing political issues that affect international peace, security, and cooperation when they fall outside the responsibilities of other principal UN bodies. Over time, the committee has discussed issues related to political stability, decolonization, human rights, peacekeeping, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Although SPECPOL cannot intervene directly in Peru's domestic political affairs or require constitutional reforms, it can recommend policies and frameworks, encourage international cooperation, and promote dialogue that supports democratic governance and long-term stability.²⁵⁷

Peru's political crisis presents challenges that extend beyond its national borders. Continued political instability has affected regional cooperation, economic development, public confidence in democratic institutions, and the protection of human rights. International organizations have also warned that repeated political crises may increase social unrest and create conditions that weaken the rule of

law.²⁵⁸ These broader regional and international consequences provide a basis for SPECPOL to consider how international cooperation can support Peru's path toward stability.

Within its mandate, the committee may consider recommendations that strengthen democratic institutions, encourage constitutional dialogue, support good governance, promote respect for human rights, and expand cooperation between Peru and the international community. Members may also explore ways the United Nations can assist through technical expertise, capacity-building, election support, or cooperation with regional organizations, while fully respecting Peru's sovereignty and the principles of the UN Charter.²⁵⁹ Although countries may disagree on which reforms should receive the highest priority, they share a common interest in promoting peaceful political dialogue and preventing future instability. Through constructive debate and international cooperation, the committee has an opportunity to develop recommendations that support a more stable, representative, and democratic future for Peru.

Research and Preparation Questions

Your dais has prepared the following research and preparation questions as a means of providing guidance for your research process. These questions should be carefully considered, as they embody some of the main critical thought and learning objectives surrounding your topic.

TOPIC A

- 1 How can the international community help rebuild public trust in elections when citizens no longer trust their own government or electoral institutions after a conflict?
- 2 How should the United Nations respond when a post-conflict government does not want international election observers?
- 3 What should an election monitoring mission look like in a country where conflict has not completely ended?
- 4 As election interference increasingly moves online, how should election monitoring adapt to address disinformation and AI-generated content aimed at undermining public trust?
- 5 How can the international community prevent an election from becoming a trigger for renewed violence?
- 6 Some governments hold elections and invite observers, only to have a second, less credible observer group contradict the findings of a more rigorous one. How should the international community respond when election monitoring itself becomes politicized?

TOPIC B

- 1 How has Peru's 1993 Constitution shaped the balance of power between the president and Congress, and what constitutional reforms could reduce future political conflict?
- 2 What lessons can Peru learn from other countries that have experienced repeated political instability, and which of those approaches could realistically be applied to Peru?
- 3 How has political instability affected Peru's Indigenous and rural communities differently from communities in Lima, and what policies could help reduce this divide?
- 4 What role should international and regional organizations, such as the United Nations and Organization of American States, play in protecting democracy and human rights in Peru while respecting the country's sovereignty?
- 5 How can Peru strengthen its anti-corruption and judicial systems without allowing anti-corruption efforts to become tools for political retaliation against opponents?
- 6 Following the 2026 elections and the return to a bicameral Congress, what factors will determine whether Peru enters a period of greater political stability or continues its cycle of political crises?

Important Documents

TOPIC A

Andre Nicola, “Brazil’s Ambitious AI Electoral Framework Confronts a Test,” ORF America, May 18, 2026, <https://orfamerica.org/orf-america-comments/brazils-ambitious-ai-electoral-framework-confronts-a-test>.

Annette M. Fath-Lihic and Dawn Brancati, Elections and Peacebuilding: Why the Timing and Sequencing of Transitional Elections Matter, Policy Brief No. 4 (Geneva: Kofi Annan Foundation, 2017), <https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Elections-and-Peacebuilding.pdf>.

Chloe Bordewich et al., “International Election Observation,” in ACE Project: The Electoral Knowledge Network, accessed August 29, 2026, <https://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/international-election-observation/onePage>.

Judith Kelley, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Rethinking Election Monitoring” (International IDEA, 2012), <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-rethinking-election-monitoring.pdf>.

Sarah Sunn Bush, Christina Cottiero, and Lauren Prather, “Zombies Ahead: Explaining the Rise of Low-quality Election Monitoring,” The Review of International Organizations, no. 2 (July 26, 2024): 261–91, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09554-3>.

United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, “The Role of the United Nations in Ensuring Free and Fair Elections,” United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, May 29, 2024, accessed August 29, 2026, <https://unric.org/en/the-role-of-the-united-nations-in-ensuring-free-and-fair-elections/>.

TOPIC B

César Landa, “Back to Bicameralism: The Illiberal Goals of Peru’s Constitutional Reforms,” ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, March 26, 2024, <https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/back-bicameralism-illiberal-goals-peru>.

International Crisis Group, “Unrest on Repeat: Plotting a Route to Stability in Peru,” Latin America & Caribbean Report No. 104, February 13, 2024, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/latin-america-caribbean/peru/104-unrest-repeat-plotting-route-stability-peru>.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Observations on the Human Rights Situation in the Context of the Protests in Peru” (unofficial translation), October 19, 2023, <https://reliefweb.int/report/peru/observations-human-rights-situation-context-protests-peru-unofficial-translation>.

“Peru 2026 Presidential Election Explained,” Encyclopedia Britannica, July 28, 2026, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Perus-2026-Presidential-Election-Explained>.

“Towards a National Integrity and Transparency System in Peru,” OECD, 2025, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/towards-a-national-integrity-and-transparency-system-in-peru_4207602e-en.html.

“World Report 2026: Rights Trends in Peru,” Human Rights Watch, January 2026, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/peru>.

About the Authors

TOPIC A: SADIE JUN

Sadie Jun is an undergraduate at the University of California, Santa Barbara studying Political Science. Born in the South Bay of Los Angeles, Sadie has spent her entire childhood on the beach. Being interested in public speaking and debate, Sadie entered the Model United Nations program at her high school starting her freshman year and participated all the way until her senior year. She has participated in dozens of conferences from within California, to all over the state and even other countries! Within the Model UN class, Sadie held the position of Under-Secretary-General her senior year of high school. Outside MUN, Sadie works with local charities through her sorority, Alpha Chi Omega, runs a sports photography business, works for the UCSB Recreation Center as a photographer, and is on the intramural volleyball team.

TOPIC B: ALAN KOSZELAK

Alan Koszelak is an undergraduate at Binghamton University studying both Politics, Philosophy and Law (PPL) and Human Development. Born and raised on Long Island, New York, he has been involved in Model UN since 2022 in High School. He has taken part in numerous conferences around the Long Island/New York City area (including NHSMUN), and has won Best Delegate in a wide variety of committees. He was also the Secretary-General of his high school's Model UN club, and currently attends Binghamton University's MUN club as well. Outside MUN, Alan works with local Slavic community organizations, and helps in charity auctions, fundraisers, and other diversity events.

Additional writing by Manuel Enríquez and Paxton Hemingway

Edited by Adam Allibhoy, Armen Bagdassarian, Ana Margarita Gil, Sabeeh Mirza, Kailena Song, Althea Turley, and Olivia Woodard

Endnotes

- 1 United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, "Elections," UN DPPA, accessed August 29, 2026, <https://dppa.un.org/en/elections>.
- 2 United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, "Elections."
- 3 United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, "The Role of the United Nations in Ensuring Free and Fair Elections," United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, May 29, 2024, accessed August 29, 2026, <https://unric.org/en/the-role-of-the-united-nations-in-ensuring-free-and-fair-elections/>.
- 4 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, "No Election Observation Mission in Belarus Due to Lack of Invitation, in Breach of OSCE Commitments," Press release, OSCE, January 9, 2025, accessed August 29, 2026, <https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/584445>.
- 5 United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Resolution 2200A (XXI), A/RES/2200(XXI), Art. 25 (Dec. 16, 1966), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>.
- 6 "Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard," Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), accessed July 19, 2026, <https://indicators.ohchr.org/>.
- 7 Chloe Bordewich et al., "International Election Observation," in ACE Project: The Electoral Knowledge Network, accessed August 29, 2026, <https://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/international-election-observation/onePage>.
- 8 Bordewich et al., "International Election Observation."
- 9 Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (March 1, 1991): 12–34, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1991.0016>.
- 10 Sarah Sunn Bush, Christina Cottiero, and Lauren Prather, "Zombies Ahead: Explaining the Rise of Low-quality Election Monitoring," *The Review of International Organizations*, no. 2 (July 26, 2024): 261–91, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-024-09554-3>.
- 11 Bush, Cottiero, and Prather, "Zombies Ahead: Explaining the Rise of Low-Quality Election Monitoring."
- 12 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers (Stockholm: International IDEA, Oct. 27, 2005), <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/declaration-of-principles-for-international-election-observation.pdf>.
- 13 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.
- 14 United Nations General Assembly, Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in the Promotion of Democratization and Enhancing Periodic and Genuine Elections, Resolution 78/208, A/RES/78/208 (Dec. 19, 2023), <https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/78/208>.
- 15 A/RES/78/208
- 16 Bush, Cottiero, and Prather, "Zombies Ahead: Explaining the Rise of Low-Quality Election Monitoring."
- 17 Susan D. Hyde, *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma*, Cornell University Press eBooks, 2011, <https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9780801449666.001.0001>.
- 18 "EU and Election Observation," European External Action Service (EEAS), Dec. 17, 2018, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-and-election-observation-0_en.
- 19 EEAS, "EU and Election Observation."
- 20 Benjamin Reilly, "Electoral Assistance and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding – What Lessons Have Been Learned?" ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 2004, <https://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/elections-security/Reilly-2505.pdf>.
- 21 Aila M. Matanock, "How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals," *Annual Review of Political Science* 23, no. 1 (May 11, 2020): 357–83, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-033504>.
- 22 Annette M. Fath-Lihic and Dawn Brancati, *Elections and Peacebuilding: Why the Timing and Sequencing of Transitional Elections Matter*, Policy Brief No. 4 (Geneva: Kofi Annan Foundation, 2017), <https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Elections-and-Peacebuilding.pdf>.
- 23 Carrie Manning, Ian O. Smith, and Ozlem Tuncel Gurlek, *Parties, Politics, Peace*, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003311980>.
- 24 Sead Alihodžić and Nicholas Matatu, with Oliver Joseph and Katrin Lewis, *Timing and Sequencing of Transitional Elections*, International IDEA Policy Paper No. 18 (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2019), <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/2024-01/timing-and-sequencing-of-transitional-elections.pdf>.
- 25 Michael Neblo, Jason Brennan, and Whitney Quesenbery, "The Impact of Voter Turnout on Polarization," *Georgetown Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics (GISME)*, Aug. 22, 2022, <https://gisme.georgetown.edu/news/the-impact-of-voter-turnout-on-polarization/>.
- 26 Reilly, "Electoral Assistance and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding - What Lessons Have Been Learned?"
- 27 Reilly, "Electoral Assistance and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding - What Lessons Have Been Learned?"
- 28 Judith Kelley, "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Rethinking Election Monitoring" (International IDEA, 2012), <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-rethinking-election-monitoring.pdf>.
- 29 Matanock, "How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals."
- 30 Yana Gorokhovskaia and Cathryn Grothe, *Freedom in the World 2024: The Mounting Damage of Flawed Elections and Armed Conflict* (Washington, DC: Freedom House, February 2024), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/FIW_2024_DigitalBooklet.pdf.
- 31 Andreas Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (L. Rienner Publishers, 2006).
- 32 Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*.
- 33 Bush, Cottiero, and Prather, "Zombies Ahead: Explaining the Rise of Low-Quality Election Monitoring."
- 34 "Election in Azerbaijan Undermined by Limitations on Fundamental Freedoms, Lack of Level Playing Field and Significant Problems on Election Day, International Observers Say," news release, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, October 10, 2013, <https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/106908>.
- 35 "Presidential Election in Azerbaijan: Joint Statement by PACE and EP Delegations," news release, Council of Europe, October 10, 2013, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/news-2013/-/asset_publisher/TEHTOeUO1Ozc/content/presidential-election-in-azerbaijan-joint-statement-by-pace-and-ep-delegations.
- 36 Reilly, "Electoral Assistance and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding - What Lessons Have Been Learned?"
- 37 Oren Samet, "When You Come at the King: Opposition Coalitions and Nearly Stunning Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 69, no. 4 (October 9, 2024): 1469–85, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12920>.
- 38 Reuters, "Cambodia's Main Opposition Party Barred From July Election," *Al Jazeera*, May 17, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/17/cambodias-main-opposition-party-barred-from-july-election>.
- 39 Reilly, "Electoral Assistance and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding - What Lessons Have Been Learned?"
- 40 Daan Everts, "Review of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo's Activities 1999–2001," *ReliefWeb*, May 22, 2001, <https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/review-osce-mission-kosovos-activities-1999-2001>.

- 41 "Liberia," Center for Justice and Accountability, accessed August 3, 2026, <https://cja.org/where-we-work/liberia/>.
- 42 David Harris, "Liberia 2005: An Unusual African Post-Conflict Election," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 44, no. 3 (2006): 375–395, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3876300>.
- 43 Michael Scharff, "A Path to Peace: Liberia's First Post-War Elections, 2004–2005," *Innovations for Successful Societies*, Princeton University, October 2011, <https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/path-peace-liberias-first-post-war-elections-2004-2005>.
- 44 Richard Lappin, "Bridging the Capabilities–Expectations Gap: Lessons Learned from Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance to Liberia," *Democracy and Security* 15, no. 3 (2019): 248–270, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2018.1519801>.
- 45 Tamasin Ford, "Ellen Johnson Sirleaf: The Legacy of Africa's First Elected Female President," *BBC News*, January 22, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42748769>.
- 46 "UNMIL Fact Sheet," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed August 3, 2026, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/factsheet/unmil>.
- 47 Michelle Gavin, "History Casts a Long Shadow Over Liberia's Democracy," *Council on Foreign Relations*, November 13, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/articles/history-casts-long-shadow-over-liberias-democracy>.
- 48 Filomeno Vieira Lopes, "The Challenge of Democratisation," in *Accord Issue 15: Angola*, Conciliation Resources, October 2004, <https://www.c-r.org/accord/angola/challenge-democratisation>.
- 49 Laurence Simms, *The Challenges for Free and Fair Elections in Angola: Conference Report*, British-Angola Forum, 4–5 July 2005 (London: Chatham House, 2005), <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bafelections.pdf>.
- 50 "Angola: Effects of 1992 Elections," Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), accessed August 3, 2026, <https://www.cmi.no/projects/1191-effects-of-1992-elections>.
- 51 US Department of State, "Angola," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 4, 2002, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/af/8217.htm>.
- 52 CMI, "Angola: Effects of 1992 Elections."
- 53 "Liberia's Landmark Elections and the Drive for Inclusivity and Security," United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, April 2024, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/liberia-success-story>.
- 54 Judith Kelley, "Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring," *International Organization* 62, no. 2 (April 2008): 221–255, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080089>.
- 55 Patrick Merloe, "Lessons Learned and Challenges Facing International Election Monitoring" (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute, April 1999), https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/3_elect_lessons99.html.
- 56 Kelley, "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly."
- 57 Barış Arı, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Wakako Maekawa, "How United Nations Peace Operations Can Help Overcome Perils to Post-Conflict Elections," *Journal of Peace Research* 62, no. 7 (December 2025): 2257–2272, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433251322287>.
- 58 Fernanda Buril, "Preparing for Transitional Elections – Challenges and Opportunities for Building Democratic Resilience During Conflict and Other Crises," *IFES*, November 7, 2023, <https://www.ifes.org/publications/preparing-transitional-elections-challenges-and-opportunities-building-democratic>.
- 59 Kevin Ponniah, "In 1993, the UN Tried to Bring Democracy to Cambodia. Is That Dream Dead?" *BBC News*, July 28, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44966916>.
- 60 Anzhelika Ivanishcheva, "How Observation Works," *OSCE Parliamentary Assembly*, accessed August 3, 2026, <https://www.oscepa.org/en/activities/election-observation/how-observation-works>.
- 61 Kelley, "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly."
- 62 ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, s.v. "Electoral Integrity," 3rd ed. (2012), accessed August 29, 2026, <https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ei/default>.
- 63 Kenneth Ingham, "2008 Elections and Aftermath," in "Zimbabwe," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, last updated August 24, 2026, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Zimbabwe/2008-elections-and-aftermath>.
- 64 Larry Garber and Krishna Kumar, "What Have We Learned about Postconflict Elections?" *New England Journal of Public Policy* 14, no. 1 (1998): article 3, <https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol14/iss1/3>.
- 65 "Global Election Monitor," *International IDEA*, accessed August 29, 2026, <https://www.idea.int/global-election-monitor>.
- 66 Toby S. James and Holly Ann Garnett, "Electoral Integrity Resilience: Protecting Elections during Global Risks, Crises, and Emergencies," *Democratization* (September 2025): 1–28, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2551075>.
- 67 "What Is an Election Observation Mission?" *Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF)*, accessed August 29, 2026, <https://www.zif-berlin.org/en/what-election-observation-mission>.
- 68 "History of Instability and Conflict," *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*, accessed August 29, 2026, <https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/instability-and-conflict>.
- 69 "Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *Global Conflict Tracker*, Council on Foreign Relations, last updated August 3, 2026, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo>.
- 70 International Rescue Committee. 2025. "Conflict in the DRC: What You Need to Know about the Crisis." *The IRC*. February 6, 2025. <https://www.rescue.org/article/conflict-drc-what-you-need-know-about-crisis>.
- 71 "Carter Center Issues Final Report on 2023 Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," news release, The Carter Center, July 24, 2024, <https://www.cartercenter.org/news/drc-072424/>.
- 72 The Carter Center, "Carter Center Issues Final Report on 2023 Elections."
- 73 Ithiel Batumike, Fred Bauma, and Jason Stearns, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Competitive Electoral Oligarchy," *Brookings*, August 22, 2025, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-a-competitive-electoral-oligarchy/>.
- 74 Ladd Serwat, "Disorder and Distrust Ahead of the 2023 Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *ACLED*, December 13, 2023, <https://acleddata.com/report/disorder-and-distrust-ahead-2023-elections-democratic-republic-congo>.
- 75 Serwat, "Disorder and Distrust Ahead of the 2023 Elections."
- 76 "Colombian Armed Conflict," *Justice for Colombia*, accessed August 29, 2026, <https://justiceforcolombia.org/about-colombia/colombian-armed-conflict/>.
- 77 Tiziano Breda, "Total Peace Paradox in Colombia: Petro's Policy Reduced Violence, but Armed Groups Grew Stronger," *ACLED*, November 28, 2024, <https://acleddata.com/report/total-peace-paradox-colombia-petros-policy-reduced-violence-armed-groups-grew-stronger>.
- 78 Catherine Ellis, "Conflict-Hit Regions Face Security Concerns Ahead of Colombia Presidential Election," *Latin America Reports*, May 29, 2026, <https://latinamericareports.com/conflict-hit-regions-face-security-concerns-ahead-of-colombia-presidential-election/14567/>.
- 79 Ian Vandewalker, "Digital Disinformation and Vote Suppression," *Brennan Center for Justice*, September 2, 2020, <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/digital-disinformation-and-vote-suppression>.
- 80 Disinformation and Electoral Integrity: A Guidance Document for NDI Elections Programs (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute), https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Updated%20format%20-%20Disinformation%20and%20Electoral%20Integrity_NDI_External.pdf.

- 81 "EU Election Observation Mission Iraq Presents Final Report with Recommendations," EU Election Observation Mission to Iraq 2021, European External Action Service (EEAS), February 27, 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eom-iraq-2021/eu-election-observation-mission-iraq-presents-final-report-recommendations_en.
- 82 Huo Jingnan, "It's Quick and Easy to Clone Famous Politicians' Voices, despite Safeguards," NPR, May 31, 2024, <https://www.npr.org/2024/05/30/nx-s1-4986088/deepfake-audio-elections-politics-ai>.
- 83 Mekela Panditharatne, "The Election Year Risks of AI," Brennan Center for Justice, May 9, 2024, <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/election-year-risks-ai>.
- 84 Daniel I. Weiner and Lawrence Norden, "Regulating AI Deepfakes and Synthetic Media in the Political Arena," Brennan Center for Justice, December 5, 2023, <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/regulating-ai-deepfakes-and-synthetic-media-political-arena>.
- 85 Andressa Michelotti and Tatiana Dourado, "Brazil Is Preparing for Its First Real AI Election, But Is It Ready?" Tech Policy Press, March 20, 2026, <https://www.techpolicy.press/brazil-is-preparing-for-its-first-real-ai-election-but-is-it-ready/>.
- 86 Beatriz Farrugia, "Regulating the Use of AI for Brazilian Elections: What's at Stake," Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), May 29, 2024, <https://dfrlab.org/2024/05/29/regulating-the-use-of-ai-for-brazilian-elections-whats-at-stake/>.
- 87 Nicola, "Brazil's Ambitious AI Electoral Framework Confronts a Test."
- 88 Giulia Colombo and Tiago Angelo, "Bolsonaro Denies Authorizing AI Video Shown at Flávio Convention," Valor International, July 30, 2026, <https://valorinternational.globo.com/politics/news/2026/07/30/bolsonaro-denies-authorizing-ai-video-shown-at-flavio-convention.ghtml>.
- 89 "The Digital Services Act," European Commission, Shaping Europe's Digital Future, last updated August 10, 2026, <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act>.
- 90 "Election Misinformation," Brennan Center for Justice, July 28, 2022, <https://www.brennancenter.org/election-misinformation>.
- 91 "Tensions Between Armenia and Azerbaijan," Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, last updated July 29, 2026, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict>.
- 92 Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian, "A 'Frozen Conflict' Boils Over: Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and Future Implications," Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 18, 2024, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/01/a-frozen-conflict-boils-over-nagorno-karabakh-in-2023-and-future-implications/>.
- 93 "Statement of Findings and Recommendations: IRI Pre-Election Assessment Mission to Armenia's 2026 Parliamentary Elections," International Republican Institute, April 29, 2026, <https://www.iri.org/resources/statement-of-findings-and-recommendations-iri-pre-election-assessment-mission-to-armenias-2026-parliamentary-elections/>.
- 94 Paul Sonne, "Armenia's Prime Minister Declares Victory in Race Shadowed by Russia," New York Times, last updated June 9, 2026, <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/08/world/europe/armenia-election-results.html>.
- 95 Sonne, "Armenia's Prime Minister Declares Victory."
- 96 Giorgi Gogia and Anahit Chilingaryan, "What Rights Observers Are Watching in Armenia's Elections," Human Rights Watch, May 27, 2026, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/05/28/what-rights-observers-are-watching-in-armenias-elections>.
- 97 "Outcomes of the Armenian Parliamentary Elections: Implications for Armenia-EU Relations," German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), June 10, 2026, <https://dgap.org/en/events/outcomes-armenian-parliamentary-elections>.
- 98 Gogia and Chilingaryan, "What Rights Observers Are Watching in Armenia's Elections."
- 99 "Some 100 OSCE PA Observers to Deploy for Parliamentary Elections in Armenia," news release, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, June 2, 2026, <https://www.oscepa.org/en/news-a-media/press-releases/2026/some-100-osce-pa-observers-to-deploy-for-parliamentary-elections-in-armenia>.
- 100 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Armenia, Parliamentary Elections, 7 June 2026: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, June 8, 2026), <https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/664831>.
- 101 OSCE/ODIHR, Armenia, Parliamentary Elections, 7 June 2026.
- 102 Bela Shikaryan, "Armenia: Anatomy of Manipulation: The 2026 Election in Light of the Facts," International Society for Human Rights, June 15, 2026, <https://ishr.org/armenia-anatomy-of-manipulation/>.
- 103 Shikaryan, "Armenia: Anatomy of Manipulation."
- 104 Sonne, "Armenia's Prime Minister Declares Victory."
- 105 Lucy Papachristou, "Armenia's Pashinyan Wins Election, Observers Allege Russian Interference," Reuters, June 8, 2026, <https://www.reuters.com/world/armenias-ruling-party-leads-parliamentary-vote-with-57-early-results-2026-06-07/>.
- 106 "Pluralism, Governance and Post-Election Challenges," Armenian Weekly, June 23, 2026, <https://armenianweekly.com/2026/06/23/political-pluralism-democratic-governance-and-the-challenges-of-the-post-election-period/>.
- 107 "Election Observation," Elections, Global Democracy Support, European Parliament, accessed August 29, 2026, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/globaldemocracysupport/en/elections/election-observation>.
- 108 "EU-UN Strategic Partnership on Peace and Security," European External Action Service (EEAS), October 21, 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-un-strategic-partnership-peace-and-security_en.
- 109 Raffy Boudjikianian, "As Canada Plans to Send Election Observers to Armenia, Advocates Warn of a Democratic Backslide," CBC News, May 14, 2026, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cbc-ca-politics-armenia-elections-canada-9.7198559>.
- 110 UN Peacebuilding Commission, "Liberia's Landmark Elections."
- 111 Arturo Santa-Cruz, "Constitutional Structures, Sovereignty, and the Emergence of Norms: The Case of International Election Monitoring," International Organization 59, no. 3 (July 2005): 663–693, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s002081830505023x>.
- 112 "No Election Observation Mission in Belarus Due to Lack of Invitation, in Breach of OSCE Commitments," news release, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, January 9, 2025, <https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/584445>.
- 113 Ancața (Anna) Hansen, "Are U.S. and Russian Election Observation Tactics Converging?" The Fulcrum, July 19, 2026, <https://thefulcrum.us/elections/the-new-fight-over-election-observation>.
- 114 "Special Political and Decolonization (Fourth Committee)," United Nations General Assembly, accessed August 30, 2026, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/fourth/>.
- 115 United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Policy Principles and Types of UN Electoral Assistance, Electoral Assistance Division, rev. March 1, 2021, https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/ead_pd_un_ea_principles_types_20210303_e.pdf.
- 116 Julio Carrión and Patricia Zárate, "Peru: Deep Political Dissatisfaction Weakens Support for Democracy," Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública 12, no. 2 (2023): 25–54, <https://doi.org/10.14201/rlap.31378>.
- 117 International Crisis Group, "Unrest on Repeat: Plotting a Route to Stability in Peru," Latin America & Caribbean Report No. 104, February 13, 2024, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/latin-america-caribbean/peru/104-unrest-repeat-plotting-route-stability-peru>.
- 118 "Peru Political Update: Navigating Instability and Institutional Reform," FTI Consulting, April 16, 2025, <https://www.fticonsulting.com/insights/articles/peru-political-update-navigating-instability-institutional-reform>.
- 119 Martin Cassinelli, "Peru at a Breaking Point: How Ten Years of Political Chaos Opened the Door to Organized Crime," Atlantic Council, October

27, 2025, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/peru-at-a-breaking-point-how-ten-years-of-political-chaos-opened-the-door-to-organized-crime/>.

120 Adrian Armas Rivas and Zenon Quispe Misaico, "Economic Stabilization Experiences: The Case of Peru 1990–1991," *Ensayos Económicos* 1, no. 84 (November 2024): 93–129, <https://ideas.repec.org/a/bcr/ensayo/v1y2024i84p93-129.html>.

121 Britannica Editors, "Shining Path," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, last updated August 13, 2026, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shining-Path>.

122 Charles Walker, "Peru: The Shining Path and the Emergence of the Human Rights Community in Peru," *Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies*, Spring–Fall 2020, <https://clacs.berkeley.edu/peru-shining-path-and-emergence-human-rights-community-peru>.

123 Britannica Editors, "Shining Path."

124 BBC News, "Alberto Fujimori Profile: Deeply Divisive Peruvian Leader," February 20, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-16097439>.

125 "Alberto Fujimori," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed August 30, 2026, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alberto-Fujimori>.

126 Sebastián Calderón Bentin, "The Politics of Illusion: The Collapse of the Fujimori Regime in Peru," *Theatre Survey* 59, no. 1 (January 2018): 84–107, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0040557417000503>.

127 Political Constitution of Peru (1993, rev. 2021), Art. 90, *Constitute Project*, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2021.

128 Political Constitution of Peru (1993, rev. 2021), Art. 118, 137.

129 Alicia Del Aguila, "The Roots of Political Conflict in Peru," *The Loop* (ECPR), January 20, 2023, <https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-roots-of-perus-political-conflict-in-peru/>.

130 Del Aguila, "The Roots of Political Conflict in Peru."

131 Del Aguila, "The Roots of Political Conflict in Peru."

132 Del Aguila, "The Roots of Political Conflict in Peru."

133 Freedom House, "Peru: Freedom in the World 2025," *Country Archive*, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2025>.

134 Political Constitution of Peru (1993, rev. 2021), Art. 113.

135 Political Constitution of Peru (1993, rev. 2021), Art. 113.

136 Political Constitution of Peru (1993, rev. 2021), Art. 117.

137 Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg, "Peru 'Coup': Public Fury Forces Resignation of Interim President Leaving Dangerous Power Vacuum," *The Conversation*, November 16, 2020, <https://theconversation.com/peru-coup-public-fury-forces-resignation-of-interim-president-leaving-dangerous-power-vacuum-150200>.

138 Ray Sanchez, Mayra Cuevas, and Flora Charner, "Peruvian President Kuczynski Resigns amid Corruption Scandal," *CNN*, March 21, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/21/americas/peru-president-pedro-pablo-kuczynski-resigns/>.

139 "Peruvian Ex-President Martin Vizcarra Sentenced to 14 Years in Prison," *Al Jazeera*, November 26, 2025, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/26/peruvian-ex-president-martin-vizcarra-sentenced-to-14-years-in-prison>.

140 "I'm So Tired of This': Peru Youth Vow to Remain on the Streets," *Al Jazeera*, November 15, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/14/im-so-tired-of-this-peru-youth-vow-to-remain-on-the-streets>.

141 "Why Was Peru's President Impeached?" *Council on Foreign Relations*, December 19, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/articles/why-was-perus-president-impeached>.

142 Jessica Rawnsley, "Peru's President Removed from Office amid Soaring Crime," *BBC News*, October 10, 2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1edw3x6vl2o>.

143 "López Mendoza v. Venezuela, Case Summary," *Inter-American Court of Human Rights Project*, Loyola Law School, https://iachr.ils.edu/sites/default/files/iachr/Cases/Lopez_Mendoza_v_Venezuela/yeung_lopez_mendoza_v_venezuela.pdf.

144 "Constitutional Tribunal Fails to Pin Down 'Permanent Moral Incapacity,'" *Peru Support Group*, November 21, 2020, <https://perusupportgroup.org.uk/2020/11/constitutional-tribunal-fails-to-pin-down-permanent-moral-incapacity/>.

145 Political Constitution of Peru (1993, rev. 2021), Art. 134.

146 Political Constitution of Peru (1993, rev. 2021), Art. 134.

147 Political Constitution of Peru (1993, rev. 2021), Art. 134.

148 Franklin Briceño and Christine Armario, "Peru President Dissolves Congress amid Anti-Corruption Push," *Associated Press*, September 30, 2019, <https://www.wate.com/news/national/peru-president-dissolves-congress-amid-anti-corruption-push/>.

149 Briceño and Armario, "Peru President Dissolves Congress."

150 Briceño and Armario, "Peru President Dissolves Congress."

151 Briceño and Armario, "Peru President Dissolves Congress."

152 Briceño and Armario, "Peru President Dissolves Congress."

153 "Constitutional Tribunal Ratifies Dissolution," *Peru Support Group*, January 17, 2020, <https://perusupportgroup.org.uk/2020/01/constitutional-tribunal-ratifies-dissolution/>.

154 Briceño and Armario, "Peru President Dissolves Congress;" "Constitutional Tribunal Ratifies Dissolution," *Peru Support Group*, January 17, 2020, <https://perusupportgroup.org.uk/2020/01/constitutional-tribunal-ratifies-dissolution/>.

155 *Al Jazeera*, "I'm So Tired of This': Peru Youth Vow to Remain on the Streets."

156 "Peru," *World Bank Group*, accessed August 30, 2026, <https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/peru>.

157 "The Equality Challenge," *UNDP Peru*, November 12, 2019, <https://www.undp.org/es/peru/noticias/equality-challenge>.

158 Antonella Bancalari and Juan Pablo Rud, "How Peru Transformed Natural Resource Wealth into Local Economic Development," *Institute for Fiscal Studies*, February 4, 2025, <https://ifs.org.uk/articles/how-peru-transformed-natural-resource-wealth-local-economic-development>.

159 "Five Pieces of Data about Poverty and Economic Growth in Peru," *World Bank Blogs*, March 2024, <https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/latinamerica/datos-pobreza-crecimiento-economico-en-peru>.

160 "The Peruvian Presidential Election of 2026: Strong Rightwing Support in Metropolitan Lima," *GeoCurrents*, July 9, 2026, <https://www.geocurrents.info/blog/2026/07/09/the-peruvian-presidential-election-of-2026-strong-rightwing-support-in-metropolitan-lima/>.

161 Christopher Sabatini and Bruno Binetti, "State Capacity, Mining and Community Relations in Peru," *Chatham House*, December 2, 2024, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/state-capacity-mining-and-community-relations-peru/introduction>.

162 Anna Heikkinen, Anja Nygren, and Maria Custodio, "The Slow Violence of Mining and Environmental Suffering in the Andean Waterscapes," *The Extractive Industries and Society* 14 (June 2023): 101254, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2023.101254>.

163 Bancalari and Rud, "How Peru Transformed Natural Resource Wealth into Local Economic Development."

164 *Inter-American Commission on Human Rights*, "Peru," Chapter V, 2024 Annual Report, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2024/chapters/IA2024_5_PER_EN.pdf.

165 Vincenzo S. Cassinelli, "The Price of Instability: How Democratic Backsliding Is Fracturing Peru's Economic Stability," *Medium*, May 11, 2026, <https://medium.com/@vincenzomarquez1/the-price-of-instability-how-democratic-backsliding-is-fracturing-perus-economic-stability-b5cc12dc4318>.

166 Jet Li Jorkaef Jaramillo Lizana, "Regional Inequality in Peru: Causes, Effects, and Strategies for Equitable Development," SocArXiv preprint, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/j2mns>.

167 Raquel Alvarez-Siguayro, Fermin Francisco Chaiña-Chura, Eutropia Medina-Ortiz, Wenceslao Quispe-Borda, and Edgar Quispe-Mamani, "Neoliberal Intergovernmentality in Peru: Centralized Power and Territorial Inequality in Local Arenas," *Journal of Cultural Analysis and Social Change* 10, no. 2 (November 25, 2025): 161–175, <https://doi.org/10.64753/jcasc.v10i2.1583>.

168 Julio F. Carrión, ed., *The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), <https://doi.org/10.5325/j.ctt7v107>.

169 Carrión, ed., *The Fujimori Legacy*.

170 Del Aguila, "The Roots of Political Conflict in Peru."

171 "How Has Keiko Fujimori Performed in Presidential Elections?" *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed August 30, 2026, <https://www.britannica.com/question/How-has-Keiko-Fujimori-performed-in-presidential-elections>.

172 Del Aguila, "The Roots of Political Conflict in Peru."

173 "Peru," *Global State of Democracy Democracy Tracker*, International IDEA, accessed August 30, 2026, <https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/peru>.

174 "Peru," *Transparency International*, accessed August 30, 2026, <https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/peru>.

175 "Peru Ex-President Toledo Sentenced to More Than 20 Years for Corruption," *France 24*, October 22, 2024, <https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20241022-peru-s-former-president-gets-more-than-20-years-in-prison-in-corruption-case>.

176 "Peru's Former Leader Alejandro Toledo Convicted in Odebrecht Scandal," *Devdiscourse News Desk*, October 22, 2024, <https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/law-order/3130319-perus-former-leader-alejandro-toledo-convicted-in-odebrecht-scandal>.

177 Laura Bunt-MacRury, "Peru's House of Cards: Odebrecht Scandal Has Engulfed the Country's Political Class," *The Conversation*, June 27, 2019, <https://theconversation.com/perus-house-of-cards-odebrecht-scandal-has-engulfed-the-countrys-political-class-118793>.

178 Washington Office on Latin America, *Deconstructing Democracy: Peru Under Alberto Fujimori*, WOLA, https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Andes/Peru/past/peru_deconstructing_democracy_fujimori_eng.pdf.

179 "Human Rights Watch Decries the Undermining of Judicial Independence in Peru," *Peru Support Group*, July 12, 2025, <https://perusupportgroup.org.uk/2025/07/human-rights-watch-decries-the-undermining-of-judicial-independence-in-peru/>.

180 "Peru's Enduring Drama: Eight Presidents, Endless Judicial Battles," *LatinAmerican Post*, April 19, 2025, <https://latinamericanpost.com/americas/perus-enduring-drama-eight-presidents-endless-judicial-battles/>.

181 "Peru: Freedom in the World 2025," *Freedom House*, accessed August 30, 2026, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2025>.

182 "What Can Be Done to Make Peru More Politically Stable?" *Inter-American Dialogue*, <https://thediologue.org/analysis/what-can-be-done-to-make-peru-more-politically-stable>.

183 Ricardo Monzón Kcomt, "In Peru, Under Every Stone Lies a Political Party," *Latinoamérica 21*, May 6, 2025, <https://latinoamerica21.com/en/in-peru-under-every-stone-lies-a-political-party/>.

184 Carlo A. Chávez Linares, "A Case for Disastrous Party Politics in Peru," *Res Publica – Journal of Undergraduate Research* 27, no. 1 (2022): article 9, <https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol27/iss1/9>.

185 "Peruvian Ex-President Castillo Is on Trial for a Failed Attempt to Dissolve Congress," *Associated Press*, republished by International Center for Transitional Justice, March 4, 2025, <https://www.ictj.org/latest-news/peruvian-ex-president-castillo-trial-failed-attempt-dissolve-congress>.

186 Jeff Wallenfeldt, "Dina Boluarte," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed August 30, 2026, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Dina-Boluarte>.

187 Del Aguila, "The Roots of Political Conflict in Peru."

188 Will Freeman, "President Boluarte Impeached, but Peru's Crisis Runs Deeper," *Council on Foreign Relations*, October 10, 2025, <https://www.cfr.org/articles/president-boluarte-impeached-perus-crisis-runs-deeper>.

189 Leidys Becerra and Paola Villar S., "Dina Boluarte Becomes Peru's First Female President Following Castillo's Removal," *Bloomberg Línea*, December 7, 2022, <https://www.bloomberglinea.com/english/dina-boluarte-becomes-perus-first-female-president-following-castillos-removal/>.

190 Aída Chavez, "Peruvians Are Protesting Their Unelected President," *The Nation*, August 16, 2023, <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/peru-dina-boluarte/>.

191 "Protests and Strikes Continue in Peru Against Dina Boluarte," *Peoples Dispatch*, February 23, 2023, <https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/02/22/protests-and-strikes-continue-in-peru-against-dina-boluarte/>.

192 Monzón Kcomt, "In Peru, Under Every Stone Lies a Political Party."

193 Martín Tanaka, "Perú en 2023: De la Polarización a la Coalición Conservadora y Populista Durante el Gobierno de Dina Boluarte," *Revista de Ciencia Política* (Santiago), ahead of print (2024), <https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-090x2024005000123>.

194 Del Aguila, "The Roots of Political Conflict in Peru."

195 Seun Okwoye, "Peru's President Dina Boluarte Removed from Office Amid Scandal Allegations," *Diplomatic Watch*, October 10, 2025, <https://diplomaticwatch.com/perus-president-dina-boluarte-removed-from-office-amid-scandal-allegations/>.

196 Chavez, "Peruvians Are Protesting Their Unelected President."

197 Okwoye, "Peru's President Dina Boluarte Removed From Office."

198 Christopher Martínez, "The End of Dina Boluarte's Government and the Pattern of Presidential Failures in the Region," *Latinoamérica 21*, October 15, 2025, <https://latinoamerica21.com/en/the-end-of-dina-boluartes-government-and-the-pattern-of-presidential-failures-in-the-region/>.

199 Raphael McMahon, "Peruvian Political Crisis Intensifies after President Dina Boluarte Impeached, and a State of Emergency Introduced," *Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI)*, October 31, 2025, <https://bisi.org.uk/reports/peruvian-political-crisis-intensifies-after-president-dina-boluarte-impeached-and-a-state-of-emergency-introduced>.

201 "Peru Launched into Crisis Following President's Removal," *Civics Monitor*, <https://monitor.civics.org/explore/peru-launched-new-chapter-political-and-institutional-ll3i/>.

202 "IACHR Releases Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru," news release, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, May 2, 2023, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2023/083.asp.

203 U.S. Department of State, "Peru," 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 20, 2023, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/415610_PERU-2022-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf.

204 Regina García Cano, "Peru's New Government Declares National Emergency, Suspends Rights of 'Personal Security and Freedom,'" *Associated Press*, December 14, 2022, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/perus-new-government-declares-national-emergency-suspends-rights-of-personal-security-and-freedom>.

205 Political Constitution of Peru (1993, rev. 2021), Art. 137–139.

206 "Peru," *Human Rights Watch*, accessed August 30, 2026, <https://www.hrw.org/americas/peru>.

207 "Peru: UN Human Rights Office Calls for Meaningful Reforms to Guarantee Right to Peaceful Assembly, Ensure Inclusive Dialogue," news

release, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, October 19, 2023, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/10/peru-un-human-rights-office-calls-meaningful-reforms-guarantee-right>.

208 “Peru: Lethal State Violence against Protesters Is Disproportionately Targeting Indigenous Communities – New Research,” Amnesty International UK, February 16, 2023, <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/latest/peru-lethal-state-violence-against-protesters-disproportionately-targeting/>.

209 HRW, “Peru.”

210 “Peru: Senior Officials Should Face Investigation over Lethal Repression,” Amnesty International, May 25, 2023, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/peru-senior-officials-should-face-investigation/>.

211 “Peru: UN Experts Call for End to Violence during Demonstrations, Urge Respect for Human Rights,” news release, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 6, 2023, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/peru-un-experts-call-end-violence-during-demonstrations-urge-respect-human>.

212 United Nations Development Programme, *Unlocking New Pathways to SDG Acceleration: Peru*, May 2024, https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2024-05/UNDP_SDG_Peru.pdf.

213 “IACHR Urges Peru to Refrain from Passing Laws Granting Amnesties for Serious Human Rights Violations,” news release, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, June 26, 2025, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsform/?file=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2025/128.asp.

214 “Statement: The Political and Humanitarian Crisis in Peru,” news release, EarthRights International, December 16, 2022, https://earthrights.org/media_release/statement-peru2022/.

215 “Peru: Senior Officials Should Face Investigation over Lethal Repression,” Amnesty International, May 25, 2023, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/peru-senior-officials-should-face-investigation/>.

216 OHCHR, “Peru: UN Human Rights Office Calls for Meaningful Reforms”

217 “Peru: Lethal State Violence against Protesters Is Disproportionately Targeting Indigenous Communities – New Research,” Amnesty International UK, February 16, 2023, <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/latest/peru-lethal-state-violence-against-protesters-disproportionately-targeting/>.

218 Patricio F. Gajardo, “Peru’s 2026 Elections: When Political Fragmentation Becomes the System,” TSG Co., March 19, 2026, <https://tsgco.com/post/perus-2026-elections-when-political-fragmentation-becomes-the-system>.

219 “Peru,” International IDEA, accessed August 30, 2026, <https://www.idea.int/country/peru>.

220 “Peru 2026 Presidential Election Explained,” Encyclopedia Britannica, July 28, 2026, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Perus-2026-Presidential-Election-Explained>.

221 Monzón Kcomt, “In Peru, Under Every Stone Lies a Political Party.”

222 “By the Numbers: What’s at Stake in Peru’s 2026 Elections,” AS/COA, <https://www.as-coa.org/articles/numbers-whats-stake-perus-2026-elections>.

223 International IDEA, “Peru.”

224 “Peru: Meet the Candidates 2026,” Americas Quarterly, May 18, 2026, <https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/peru-meet-the-candidates-2026-2/>; “On Peru’s Constitutional Crisis,” Verfassungsblog, January 22, 2025, <https://verfassungsblog.de/on-perus-constitutional-crisis/>.

225 Americas Quarterly, “Peru: Meet the Candidates 2026,” Verfassungsblog, “On Peru’s Constitutional Crisis.”

226 Pledge 4 Peace, “Peru’s 2026 Polarizing Elections.”

227 Gajardo, “Peru’s 2026 Elections.”

228 “Keiko Fujimori,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed August 30, 2026, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Keiko-Fujimori>.

229 “Peru 2026 Presidential Election Explained,” Encyclopedia Britannica, July 28, 2026, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Perus-2026-Presidential-Election-Explained>.

230 International IDEA, “Peru.”

231 Gajardo, “Peru’s 2026 Elections.”

232 OHCHR, “Peru.”

233 Pledge 4 Peace, “Peru’s 2026 Polarizing Elections.”

234 “World Report 2026: Rights Trends in Peru,” Human Rights Watch, January 2026, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/peru>.

235 FTI Consulting, “Peru Political Update.”

236 OHCHR, “Peru.”

237 Evan Ellis, “The Evolution of Peru’s Multidimensional Challenges, Part I: The Political Crisis,” Global Americans, July 13, 2022, <https://globalamericans.org/the-evolution-of-perus-multidimensional-challenges-part-i-the-political-crisis/>.

238 “Understanding the Constitutional Law and Government Structure of Peru,” Generis Global Legal Services, November 25, 2024, <https://generisonline.com/understanding-the-constitutional-law-and-government-structure-of-peru/>.

239 César Landa, “Back to Bicameralism: The Illiberal Goals of Peru’s Constitutional Reforms,” ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, March 26, 2024, <https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/back-bicameralism-illiberal-goals-peru>.

240 Naida Jahic, “Fragility and Rule of Law in Peru,” The Borgen Project, January 5, 2023, <https://borgenproject.org/fragility-and-rule-of-law-in-peru/>.

241 Generis Global Legal Services, “Understanding the Constitutional Law and Government Structure of Peru.”

242 Del Aguila, “The Roots of Political Conflict in Peru.”

243 Matthew Søberg Shugart, “Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ed. R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 344–365.

244 Transparency International, “Peru.”

245 “Anti-Corruption Windows of Opportunity in Peru,” Anti-Corruption & Governance Center, CIPE, July 26, 2023, <https://acgc.cipe.org/rapidresponse/blog/anti-corruption-windows-of-opportunity-in-peru/>.

246 Jahic, “Fragility and Rule of Law in Peru.”

247 “Towards a National Integrity and Transparency System in Peru,” OECD, 2025, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/towards-a-national-integrity-and-transparency-system-in-peru_4207602e-en.html.

248 OECD, “Towards a National Integrity and Transparency System in Peru.”

249 “Peru Report: Monitor of the Lima and Los Angeles Commitments,” Citizen Corruption Observatory (OCC), 2024, https://proyectopascaorg.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/informe-peru_eng.pdf.

250 “Integrity in the Peruvian Regions,” OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1787/ceba186-en>.

251 “Perú: Gobernanza Integrada para un Crecimiento Inclusivo,” Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, Gobierno del Perú, 2023, <https://www.gob.pe/institucion/pcm/informes-publicaciones/4440237-peru-gobernanza-integrada-para-un-crecimiento-inclusivo>.

-
- 252 “Promoting Equitable Access to Government Services in Peru: The National Program PAIS (Platforms of Actions for Social Inclusion),” GDI Case Study, Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, <https://www.effectivecooperation.org/topic/promoting-equitable-access-government-services-peru-national-program-pais-platforms-actions>.
- 253 Carolina Trivelli, “Making Growth Inclusive: Establishment of the Ministry of Social Development and Inclusion,” in *Peru: Staying the Course of Economic Success*, ed. Alejandro M. Werner and Alejandro Santos (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2015), chap. 26, <https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513599748.071>.
- 254 OECD, “Integrity in the Peruvian Regions.”
- 255 GDI Case Study, “Promoting Equitable Access to Government Services in Peru.”
- 256 OECD, “Integrity in the Peruvian Regions.”
- 257 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Observations on the Human Rights Situation in the Context of the Protests in Peru” (unofficial translation), October 19, 2023, <https://reliefweb.int/report/peru/observations-human-rights-situation-context-protests-peru-unofficial-translation>.
- 258 HRW, “World Report 2026: Peru.”
- 259 International Crisis Group, “Unrest on Repeat.”

The National High School Model United Nations Conference (NHSMUN) is a project of IMUNA, a non-profit organization formally associated with the United Nations Department of Global Communications (UNDGC). IMUNA is dedicated to promoting global issues education through simulation.

© 2026 IMUNA. All Rights Reserved.

